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Abstract of thesis entitled: "How to Tell a True War Story": Representation in Late 
Twentieth Century War Narratives 
This thesis studies our spectatorship of war today evident in works of war 
fiction of the late 20th century. "It is often asserted," Susan Sontag points out in her 
2003 book on war photography Regarding the Pain of Others, "that 'the West' has 
increasingly come to see war itself as a spectacle." But she also reminds us: "War is 
not a spectacle." My thesis is thus premised on the discussion of the Spectacle 
mentality in the 20th -century which best characterizes the attitudinal change - which 
I suggest as a "descendent" from the Sublime to a variant form: the Spectacle - since 
the rise of the modem consumerist metropolis which further evolves to become what 
the French situationist critic Guy Debord has called "the Society of the Spectacle" in 
the 1960s. 
In this thesis, I have looked into works by Joseph Hell er ( Catch-22, We Bombed 
in New Haven), Tim O'Brien (Going After Cacciato, The Things They Carried) and 
Arturo Perez-Reverte (The Painter of Battles) spanning from the Second World War 
to the Vietnam War and recent conflicts chronologically through the chapters. I have 
argued that war today is represented as a spectacle and consumed by the general 
Spectator-public "regarding the pain of others". The double sense in which we use 
the word "regard" marks the central theme of this thesis: it does not talk "about" but 
about "looking at" the pain of others in war. Such passive and non-intervening 
watching is at its very heart also an engendered, accusable impotence. I have also 
argued that the spectatorship/impotence coin is indeed a hidden agenda of our 
selected works of war fiction whose major aim is not so much to write about war as 
to write about the spectator-reader: to expose and criticize their impotent 
spectatorship of war and of war representation, and to re-shock, re-situate and 
re-engage them back into the immediacy of war, which is a fact they have forgotten 
and erased off their consciousness. In terms of literary strategies I have argued that 
Hell er and 0 'Brien begin with the more self-enclosed war stories, but as there has 
been a growing awareness of our spectatorship of war, both authors have turned to 
work with the more meta-theatrical/meta-fictional models which I think are indeed 
meta-readerly. I have also discussed the various forms of spectatorships of war 
(civilians, soldier-characters and also the disguised spectator in the name of the war 
photographer) which are all rebuked by the three authors in the texts. Near the end of 
the thesis I conclude that the authors have implicitly offered possibilities to transcend 
our spectatorship of war by examples of the Anti-Spectators. 
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本論文目的是探討在廿世紀的「奇觀文他」下我們如何閱讀戰爭小說，尤其當其中涉
及蘇珊﹒桑塔格(Susan Sontag)在其 2003 年有關戰爭影像的同名著作中所說「旁觀他人
痛苦 J (Regarding the Pain of Others) 的問題。
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New Haven) 和 Tim O'Brien (Going After Cacciato, The Things They Carried) (探討參與
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"Regarding the Pain of Others": 
War as Spectacle today 
"It is often asserted that 
'the West' has increasingly come to see war itself as a spectacle". 
"War is not a spectacle." 
Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others 
War should not be a spectacle, but it is wrongly one today, especially when ours 
is what the French situationist critic Guy Debord has called "the Society of the 
Spectacle". My thesis sets out from the discussion of the Spectacle mentality of the 
twentieth century which I suggest as characterizing the attitudinal change (from the 
Sublime to the Spectacle) ever since the rise of our modem consumerist metropolis. I 
will develop the argument further that war today, in particular, is represented as 
Spectacle and consumed by the general Spectator public "regarding the pain of 
others" in war. The double sense in which we use the word "regarlf' marks the 
central theme of this thesis: what is at issue is not "about" but about "looking at" the 
pain of others, and such passive and non-intervening spectatorship will lead us to the 
discussion on "impotence". Thematically speaking, a sense of accusation towards the 
watching people (soldiers, civilians, and war photographers) is evident in the texts; in 
terms of form I will argue that our authors all share a hidden agenda: their major aim 
is not so much to write about war itself as to write about the spectator-reader. They 
expose and criticize such impotent spectatorship of war and strive to re-engage the 
spectators back into the immediacy of war. 
I am, however, aware that characterizing the twentieth century as one of the 
"Spectacle mentality" may risk a possible danger of "universalizing" every 
individual from very different historical, social, and cultural contexts.1 Despite that, 
the word "mentality" is preferred for use not only for convenience sake but I also 
wish it to encompass the other more politically-laden word "ideology"; as Vovelle 
1 
has written: "The concept of mentality... is wider in scope than the notion of 
ideology. It includes those mental realities which are unformulated, those which are 
apparently 'meaningless' and those which lead an underground existence at the level 
of unconscious motivation." ( qtd. in Brothers 1997, 31) There is also another 
possible challenge which people may raise on the (limited) validity of the concept of 
the "Spectacle mentality"; as Sontag reminds us, the discussion on the "spectators" 
and the "spectatorship" of war is not the way how most people see war: it is only 
"the viewing habits of a small, educated population living in the rich part of the 
world, where news has been converted into entertainment" and that we are dealing 
with only the "well-off countries where people have the dubious privilege of being 
spectators, or of declining to be spectators, of other people's pain" (Sontag 2004, 
98-99). Therefore, I would like to clarify that in this thesis the use of the term 
"spectator-readers" is restricted to the more lucky civilians who can be exempt from 
the immediacy and real physicality of war: as a critical term it differentiates them 
from the general notion of "readers" as used throughout the centuries. These 
"spectator-readers" refer to the specific type of readers bearing the Spectacle 
mentality in the 20th century who are characterized by their spectrum of inappropriate 
reactions toward events- usually unpleasant and horrible events such as war- from 
the affectless, indifferent, uninvolved on one end to the voyeuristic, sadistic, 
oversentimental (with affected sympathy) on the other. 
Works examined include: Joseph Helier (Catch-22, We Bombed in New Haven), 
Tim O'Brien (Going After Cacciato, The Things They Carried) and Arturo 
Perez-Reverte (The Painter of Battles). A more detailed thesis outline is sketched 
near the end of the introduction. 
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War as Spectacle 
"I am one who comes descending, vale by vale,/ 
To lead this living man,/ And all my business is to show him Hell." 
The Divine Comedy 1: Hell, Canto XXIX, I. 94-96 
"War is hell," he declared frequently, drunk or sober, and he really meant it. 
Catch 22, Ch 21 
Perhaps it is not surprising that war narratives today often remind us of the 
spectacular hell images Dante the character sees. The only difference is that we are a 
new type of "interpretive community" from the twentieth century and we do not need 
to go to hell ourselves in order to see them; as David Perlmutter (1999) says: "we 
witness a living-room war on a television set from a couch or easy chair" (175). We 
now watch comfortably the most bizarre and horrible images from war zones 
everyday made possible by photos, TV, satellite, and the Internet. We can even watch 
war LIVE. The common phrase "war is hell" itself suggests that war, like Hell, is by 
nature of the spectacle, of the spectacular, possible to be a "business to show", or 
even a show business of "regarding the pain of others". I am not sure if the word 
"spectacle" would have already been in use in Italian when Dante Alighieri 
(1265-1321) wrote his highly spectacular hell images, but this Hell-as-Spectacle 
mentality is already self-evident when, for example, Dante the character is amazed 
by a demon he sees: "Wow! what a ghastly look he had on him!" (Inferno Canto XXI 
1.31 ). This makes him so much like a modem tourist touring around Hell that the 
demon jeers at Dante's annoying attitude: "it's not a Serchio bathing-party!" (1.49). 
Although Virgil does not sympathize with the suffering souls because he thinks they 
are condemnable and thus deserve it, Dante's voyeuristic enjoyment of the quarrel 
between Adam of Brescia and Sinon of Troy still makes Virgil rebuke his spectator 
consumption: "It's vulgar to enjoy that kind of thing." (Canto XXX, I. 148) We will 
return to this in Chapter 3 when we discuss war photography which deals with a 
similar tour in Hell regarding and recording the pain of others. 
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Before we move on it is worth the effort to discuss the key concepts of the 
"spectacle" and "spectatorship" which will make up the core vocabulary for this 
thesis, and a short etymology of the Spectacle would help.2 The Online Etymology 
Dictionary states that the word "spectacle" was first used around 1340, from Old 
French spectacle ("specially prepared or arranged display") which is from Latin 
spectaculum ("a show, spectacle") and spectare ("to view, watch") and from PIE 
spek- ("to observe"). 3 It is interesting to note that the awareness of who sees, that 
seeing is an act of seeing by the person "Spectator" (from Latin spectator "viewer, 
watcher"), was indeed long belated and first used almost two and a half centuries 
later in 1586: it bears the meaning of "one who sees, or looks at, some scene or 
occurrence; a beholder; onlooker, observer" ( OED). The sense that the presence of 
the spectator would make what he sees a consumable "spectacle" is all from 1590: 
"one who is present at, and has a view or sight of, anything in the nature of a show or 
spectacle" (OED). Indeed if we reflect on the way we structure our modem 
experience we will see how deeply and thoroughly the spectacle has entered our 
everyday life, mentality, and language without notice: the "spectacles" we wear, how 
we "make a scene", and how we exclaim "what a spectacle!", "how spectacular!" 
(''spectacular" as an adjective is from 1682 and as a noun from 1890). 
There seemed nothing negative about such a "seeing" yet, but soon it was 
approached in a spirit of critique. To start with, the word "voyeurism" which came 
into English from French in the 1900s also came with a new negative connotation to 
our way of seeing. Surrealism in the 20s and 30s is also in a sense trying to shock our 
unquestioned everyday seeing (See Sontag's essays in Against Interpretation). The 
postmodemists have further accelerated the discussion of our seeing in terms of the 
"gaze" across different disciplines where the idea that "spectatorship" can be bad has 
evolved and is problematized in, for example, feminism ("the male gaze" in a sense 
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is also to do with the consumption of the women as spectacles) and Black studies.4 
But my thesis relates more to the Situationists who term ours "the Society of the 
Spectacle" and criticize our ways of "seeing", our "spectatorship" of things, others, 
and eventually oneself in the turbulent, late capitalist 1960s. We can note, for 
example, one common everyday mentality: how we do not "face" (a problem, a 
situation, etc.) but we are faced with it. There are no longer individual subjects with 
agency, only a new type of human presence as the Spectator: "[T]he only possible 
relation to the social world and one 's own life is that of the observer, the 
contemplative and passive spectator." (Plant 1992, 1 0) 
The issue of the Spectacle as we understand it in the modem sense (with 
association to the development of the media and our capitalist consumerism) has 
been open up for discussion since, most remarkably, Baudelaire and Waiter Benjamin 
in relation to nineteenth-century capitalist Paris. In her 2003 book Regarding the 
Pain of Others on war photography, Susan Sontag points out that in the nineteenth 
century there was already a sense of "corruption of sensibility" as expressed by 
Baudelaire. We can even now watch so much as has never been before, thanks to the 
development of the media from photography in WWI, movies in WWII, to television 
in Vietnam to LIVE instant images which have brought us the Gulf War (1990-1991 ) 
and September 11 (200 1 ), just to name a few. But the sense that we know war better 
than people a century ago is only illusionary; as Sontag points out: "the importance 
of photographic images as the medium through which more and more events enter 
our experience is, finally, only a by-product of their effectiveness in furnishing 
knowledge dissociated from and independent of experience." (Sontag 1977, 156) 
Sadie Plant, studying the link between Situationism and Postmodernism, notes that 
"[i]f modem society is a spectacle, modem individuals are spectators" (1992, 39). 
For Guy Debord, the spectacle "provided the perfect framework" for a "new 
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paradigm within which contemporary society could be understood": "It captured the 
contemplative and passive nature of modem life and accounted for the boredom and 
apathetic dissatisfaction which characterized social experience." (1992, 9; my 
emphasis) It indeed can be seen as a continuum of the discussion of Modernity about 
a new human condition of feeling emerging after WWI: "Modernity as a condition is 
equated with loss of feeling, alienation, loneliness, suffering and madness" 
(McRobbie 1991, 8). Likewise, in the turbulent yet economically booming 1960s 
after WWII and during the Vietnam conflicts, we are further desensitized and 
alienated but the difference is, now the spectator does not suffer: he watches the pain 
of others and does not intervene. 
This is why in this thesis references to the notion of seeing will take on new 
negative connotations such as what Debord calls "modem passivity" and "inactivity", 
the sense of impotence; even contemplation is only a false kind of disguised 
spectatorship; as Lukacs observes: "[ ... ] people's activity becomes less and less 
active and more and more contemplative." (qtd. in Debord 18; original emphasis) 
The traditional positive connotation of "seeing" with "understanding", "perspective", 
"insight", etc., would be called into question as we move on. The discussion of the 
spectacle is not limited to situationists, though. Sontag and John Berger, for example, 
also share similar views about the common experience of non-experience today 
where experience is substituted by mere seeing. Early back in the 70s Sontag already 
observes in her On Photography (1977): "It would not be wrong to speak of people 
having a compulsion to photograph: to turn experience itself into a way of seeing. 
Ultimately, having an experience becomes identical with taking a photograph of it, 
and participating in a public event comes more and more to be equivalent to looking 
at it in photographed form." (1977, 24; original emphasis) Nowadays realities are not 
"understood in the form of images" but they are "realities understood to be images, 
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illusions" (153; original emphasis); and the spectator prefers images as "coveted 
substitutes for firsthand experience" (168). 30 years later Sontag again underpins a 
stronger accusation against our seeing - this time it is a seeing even more accusable 
because it involves "regarding the pain of others" (i.e., atrocities) - in her 2003 book 
of that same title. John Berger, who has written extensively on our ''ways of seeing", 
also addresses the problem in 2001: "Today, in the system's spectacle [ ... ] no 
experience is communicated. All that is left to share is the spectacle, the game that 
nobody plays and everybody can watch." (Berger 2001, 13) The picture even 
"becomes evidence of the general human condition. It accuses nobody and 
everybody." (Berger 1991, 44) We will return to this accusation against the "nobody 
and everybody" paradox throughout the thesis. 
All of these examples show that the spectacle is an important issue on the 
agenda of our "human condition" today, and it is particularly worth examining in the 
extreme context of war, where war as the sublimated spectacle is a common (yet 
physically remote) human experience to the civilian spectators. Indeed the discussion 
on the spectacle is not restricted merely to the fact that we live in a world of images 
with a history of the ever accelerated media industry. The spectacle is "a way of 
seeing", "the focal point of all vision and all consciousness" (Debord, 7), and it 
"cannot be understood as a mere visual deception produced by mass-media 
technologies": rather it is a ''worldview that has actually been materialized" (7), and 
at least according to Debord "the spectacle represents the dominant model of life" (8; 
original emphasis), "[ f]or the spectacle is both the meaning and the agenda of our 
particular socio-economic formation. It is the historical moment in which we are 
caught" (9; original emphasis). In short, the spectacle "is not a collection of images; 
it is a social relation between people that is mediated by images" (Debord, 7). The 
spectator is "alienated" and that "the more he contemplates, the less he lives" (16). 
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Sontag shares Debord's view. She claims that since "[t]hrough the camera people 
become customers or tourists of reality", "photographs make the entire world 
available as an object of appraisal" and ''convert the world into a department store or 
museum-without-walls in which every subject is depreciated into an article of 
consumption" ( 1977, 11 0). Like the situationists who say that eventually everyone 
would become (or already has become) a spectator of his own life, consuming 
himself as a spectacle, Son tag refers to this phenomena as "tourism". As Son tag 
notes: "essentially the camera makes everyone a tourist in other people's reality, and 
eventually in one's own." (1977, 57; my emphasis) The reality is now "presented as 
an immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything that was directly lived has 
receded into a representation." (Debord, 7) So have the realities of oneself and of the 
pain of the others. Sontag pushes the discussion on spectacle to include the issue of 
surveillance; as she says that the camera "define[ s] reality in the two ways essential 
to the workings of an advanced industrial society: as a spectacle (for masses) and as 
an object of surveillance (for rulers). The production of images also furnishes a 
ruling ideology. Social change is replaced by a change in images." (qtd. in Berger's 
"Uses of Photography" [1978] in response to Sontag's On Photography; in Berger 
1991, 59-60; my emphasis) 
By and large, discussion of the spectacle may seem a modem product at first 
glance, but I would argue that it is in fact a closely linked metamorphosed form of a 
much older mentality: the Sublime. The Sublime (a sense of overwhelming power 
exercised upon oneself - which I think would lead to a sense of impotence also) 
might be re-understood as a "Postmodem Sublime" which indeed seems more like 
"spectacle". The concept of the sublime is not univocal, and so for the following 
section I would like to focus on the relationship between the sublime, the spectacle, 
and war; and how they have come to shape our understanding of war today. 
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From Sublime to Spectacle mentality and the birth of Spectator-reader: 
Caspar David Friedrich 
Wanderer above the Sea of fog, 1818 
Kunsthalle Hamburg 
The mushroom cloud of the Bomb 
in Nagasaki, Japan, 9 Aug, 1945 
While it is said that the Romantic artists of the nineteenth century expressed the 
sublime by the "epic of nature", the (Post)modemist "artists" of wars have taught us 
what the sublime is in the twentieth-century sense by the "epic of war", the "epic of 
devastation", which is the best exemplification of how we can combine the Kantian 
"dynamic sublime" and "mathematical sublime" at the same time to form a new 
(Post)modem Sublime. Postmodem critics have been fascinated by the topic of the 
Sublime in other disciplines including psychoanalysis and Marxism. Among them 
Lyotard proposes the "Postmodem Sublime" in his Lessons on the Analytic of the 
Sublime linking up the idea of the "sublime" with "terror", Zizek the terrorist attack, 
and Baudrillard the hyperreality of the Gulf War. 
The word "sublime", which first entered English in 1586, has its origin from the 
Latin sublimis meaning "uplifted, high, lofty" ( Online Etymology Dictionary) and it 
has been discussed since Longinus in the first century AD in relation to the 
"sublimity" of the rhetoric, and in the Romantic era in the eighteenth century (by 
Edmund Burke and Kant) in relation to the sublimity of Nature, God and even our 
"imagining of apocalypse". In our postmodem age where "most recently and most 
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controversially, those of us who looked agog at the destruction of the twin towers on 
September 11 2001 could be said to have experienced something of this power [of 
sublime] to astonish." (Shaw On Sublime 2006, 2; my addition) The attributes of the 
sublime can all be applied to war: the "indescribable", the "ideas of the great, the 
awe-inspiring and the overpowering" which involve "value judgments", "a state of 
mind", a "spiritual moment" (Shaw 2006, 1, 4) and "[i]n broad terms, whenever 
experience slips out of conventional understanding, whenever the power of an object 
or event is such that words fail and points of comparison disappear, then we resort to 
the feeling of the sublime. As such, the sublime marks the limits of reason and 
expression." (2006, 2; original emphasis) 
Even from its etymology "War" - especially the epic wars such as the Trojan 
war - is sublime by nature; it only takes on a much less epic sense for the spectacle 
since the last century when war journalism and photography and the development of 
the media rocketed and then spectacle-ized it. 5 Like the sublime, war is also to 
confuse from the start as its etymology says: "War" comes from late Old English 
(c.IOSO) wyrre, were; from French guerre; and can be compared with German 
verwirren meaning "to confuse, perplex". That the original sense of "war" is "to 
bring into confusion" reminds us of the Sublime as the Sublime is also highly 
associated with the feeling of perplexing confusion of our reason and imagination. It 
is even more interesting to note that the Romantic peoples wanted another word 
source to translate Latin bellum because helium is too close to bello- meaning 
"beautiful" ( Online Etymology Dictionary). In that regard something which is at the 
same time confusing, perplexing (and terrifying) and yet possibly - however 
remotely - associated with the beautiful is, of course, the Sublime. 6 
The fact that not a small number of us think that war can be beautiful marks 
perhaps our unconscious or half-conscious sublime (and in the modem version: 
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spectacle) mentality. Son tag observes: "That a gory battlescape could be beautiful -
in the sublime or awesome or tragic register of the beautiful - is a commonplace 
about images of war made by artists." (Sontag 2004, 67) It is only our sense of 
morality which represses this thought; as Sontag goes on to point out: "to find beauty 
in war photographs seems heartless. But the landscape of devastation is still a 
landscape. There is beauty in ruins. To acknowledge the beauty of photographs of the 
World Trade Center ruins in the months following the attack seemed frivolous, 
sacrilegious." ( 67) Today our modified, euphemistic reaction in an unconscious 
attempt to mask our sublime/spectacle mentality is to resort to the Surreal: ''The most 
people dared say was that the photographs were 'surreal', a hectic euphemism behind 
which the disgraced notion of beauty cowered." ( 67) By calling our experience 
"surreal" we deny our moral embarrassment that we do take both pleasure and terror 
in "looking up to" war, and that war has the beauty, the sublimity. 
Unlike the sense of "epiphanies" brought about by the sublime (awe, greatness, 
spiritual awakening), a "postmodem sublime" is a spiritual moment "that emerges at 
precisely the point when all that we know, all that we have felt, thought, and 
understood, become useless, or even ridiculous." (Zizek 2000, discussed in Shaw 
2006, 4) Such a "postmodem sublime" may have a "less positive" or even 
"melancholic" tone preoccupied with "the impossibility of representation", "failing 
to convey the enormity of human experience" (Shaw 2006, 7); as Philip Shaw puts it: 
"The postmodem sublime, one might say, is defmed not by its intimations of 
transcendence but rather by its confirmation of immanence, the sense in which the 
highest of the high is nothing more than an illusion brought about through our 
misperception of reality" (Shaw 2006, 3). Indeed the sense of such "anticlimax", "a 
descent from the sublime to the ridiculous" is already evident in modernity, as that is 
the meaning of the word "bathos" first attested in English in 1 727 from Greek bathos 
11 
( Online Etymology Dictionary). Heller's and O'Brien's texts (especially Catch-22 
and later chapters of Cacciato) often adopt this literary strategy of the comic bathos -
(fr. chute du sublime au ridicule) -and this discussion of the slip from the Sublime to 
the Spectacle is not unlike Baudrillard 's "passage from the real to the scene and 
finally to the obscene" (See Plant 1992, 161 ). The irony is also evident in the way the 
publications have used the word "Spectator". Joseph Addison's The Spectator 
( 1711-14) which sometimes dealt with his sublime feelings for his nature walks has 
been been adopted by its modem-day counterpart magazines but we see that the 
sense of the "spectator" has been very different: from the literary magazine American 
Spectator (1932-1937) to the U.S. conservative political magazine The American 
Spectator (1967-) to even Spectator Magazine (1978-2005) which is a free sex 
newsmagazine in San Francisco. The "spectator", we can see, entails at its very heart 
the "voyeur". Strangely though it takes quite some time for us to associate the two 
(from "one who sees" to the "prying observer"), as the word "voyeur", we have 
learned, only came in from French in 1900, "voyeurism" in 1924 (Online Etymology 
Dictionary). 
Thomas Weiskel says that today "we no longer share in the sacred or mystical 
aspects of the sublime, which went unquestioned by previous generations" (Weiskel 
1976; in Shaw 2006, 3). I would suggest that the reason why we today will miss what 
"went unquestioned by previous generations" is because we are a new generation of a 
new "paradigm": it is now the "Spectacle" (as Debord says) which governs our 
"worldview", our "way of seeing", our "focal point of all vision and all 
consciousness" (Debord, 7). We may say that the perception of the Sublime is the 
prototype for our modem-day capitalist, consumerist Spectacle mentality; but now 
the Spectacle mentality - which is the flip side of the Sublime, the bastardized 
Sublime deprived of its original sense of the sacred and transcendent - has taken over. 
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It is especially true in the context of the twentieth-century war. Compare agatn 
Wanderer above the Sea of fog and the gentleman on the top of the mountain with 
any modem-day spectator of the picture of the Bomb, or the postmodem spectator of 
the moving, all-angle, audible TV images of the Twin Towers, you will see how the 
Spectacle perplexes, deadens (and secretly excites) us with a new postmodem 
definition: This is chute du sublime au ridicule, and this may best show what 
Baudrillard says about the "passage from the real to the scene and finally to the 
obscene" (Plant 1992; qtd. earlier). 
Caspar David Friedrich 
Wanderer above the Sea of fog, 
1818 Kunsthalle Hamburg 
The mushroom cloud of 
the Bomb, 
Nagasaki, Japan, 
9 Aug, 1945 
Twin Towers of the 
World Trade Center, 
New York City, 
September 2001 
In fact to speak of the Sublime is also to speak of the Spectacle. Edmund Burke 
(1729-97), for example, may have already implied a sense of the Spectacle mentality 
in his A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the 
Beautiful (1757). As Shaw notes, "the threat of violation" (2006, 5) is in the sublime: 
"the threat of violence is mitigated by the effects of distance: an erupting volcano 
may well induce terror in the mind of one about to be engulfed by lava, but to the 
distant spectator the sight could be experienced as a form of delight" (2006, 6; my 
emphasis). One takes delight of danger only from a distance, as a spectator. It is not 
coincidental that there was the Grand tour in the 17th and 18th century bringing 
people en plein air to experience the sublimity of nature (such as the Alps). Among 
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them was Joseph Addison mentioned earlier who wrote about his concepts and 
experience of the sublime in his founded daily publication and called it The Spectator 
(1711-14) which was especially read among the middle class of the 181h-century 
England. I would suggest that Addison's The Spectator featuring the narrator Mr. 
Spectator and his friends of the "Spectator Club" may have well prophesized almost 
140 years before what the French critic Debord terms his bourgeois, capitalist society 
"the society of the spectacle" in the 1960s. It is just that while it was termed and 
dominated by the discourse of the Sublime two centuries before, the speedy 
advancement of the capitalist and industrial era of the late 19th to 20th century has 
shifted to the discourse of the Spectacle. 
Sublime, which is related to the unspeakable, unpresentable, unimaginable, 
takes on a negative extreme form in Silence. We see a tradition of the preference for 
"shutting up" (such as Wittgenstein's famous quote: "Of what we cannot speak we 
must remain silent", or Son tag's "aesthetics of silence"). In the context of war, Wait 
Whitman has already asserted that books cannot encapsulate the real war, because 
the real war exceeds both human comprehension and the capability of language to 
depict. As J ames Dawes discussing Whitman puts it: "the scale of war defied 
comprehensive encapsulation" and "the essential nature of violence is always in 
excess of language" (7 -8). The attempt to "mime violence through language" and to 
"approach it analogically" would only amount to what Whitman calls "scraps and 
distortions". This is why Whitman demands the "chaste silence of respect" even 
though it may mean an ignorance of the future generation about the "interiors" of the 
war. Between letting them know with a distortion and not knowing at all, Whitman 
chooses the latter and declares: "it is best they should not" (Dawes 2002, 7 -8). 
Whitman's concern is respectable but such a silencing act - which only became "an 
embarrassed silence" especially after Vietnam (Hagopian 2006, qtd. in Marilyn 
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Young 2007, 1) - is indeed an act of "repressing reality", a kind of "amnesia", 
"hypnosis", and even "concealment". Such a mute and passive attitude would only 
further spoil our spectators as they are what Baudrillard calls "the silent majorities": 
"They are given meaning: they want spectacle." (Plant 1992, 155) Silence is then a 
questionable solution of the "unpresentable". To "not to represent at all" is an active 
choice of inaction rendering what we originally think is a problem about an excess 
into a very lack (see Os borne 2006). It is as if we are saying that since war is larger 
than life and beyond the human, let us discard any attempts to represent and 
understand it at all and move on without it, regardless of it. 
From "regarding" (however futile and weak a gaze it is, it is still a gaze) to 
being "regardless" (an act of denunciation, of elimination) and to "disregard" is only 
a step. As Berger points out in his essay "Hiroshima" (1981) he was angered by how 
people (himself included) nowadays thought that they have known enough about the 
war that they no longer felt the urgency and the necessity of looking, and they forgot 
that this unconcern (conscious or not) is indeed culpability as well as complicity to 
Evil itself: "One of evil's principal modes of being is looking beyond (with 
indifference) that which is before the eyes." 7 The false contentment that "the facts 
are there in the textbooks" (as if it is the book which does the remembering for us), 
Berger realizes, is actually a "process of suppression and elimination": "In public 
thinking nowadays, the concept of evil has been reduced to a little adjective to 
support an opinion or hypothesis (abortions, terrorism, ayatollahs)" (Berger 1993, 
286-295). In fact this is exactly the true (ideological) "function" of the spectacle, as 
Debord says, the spectacle "is to use culture to bury all historical memory" ( 1 06). 
Indeed regardless is itself a form of disrespect, as we can see from the meaning 
of the word respect (c. 1300) which actually evolves from Latin respectus and refers 
to a "regard" which embeds "treat[ing] with deferential regard or esteem". Nowadays 
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our "regard" has lost the intended meaning of "consideration, kindly feeling" it used 
to have in the late 14th century (Online Etymology Dictionary). 
One thing which makes us even worse Spectators is that in addition to the 
"regardless" - "turning away from the scene of injury'' - the Spectator even "gazes 
insistently at the wounded" (Dawes 2002, 8). While the former speaks of a 
disinterested rejection of acknowledgement and action, the later is a degraded, 
over-conversion of the former into a voyeuristic, prying, sadistic over-interestedness, 
a consumerist, affectless, slack spectacle mentality. This idea can be illustrated by 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean Baudrillard. 
In June 1945 Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote the essay "The War Has Taken 
Place" in which he pointed out the problem of how his contemporaries were treating 
the war only intellectually: "We knew that concentration camps existed, that the Jews 
were being persecuted, but these certainties belonged to the world of thought. We 
were not as yet living face to face with cruelty and death" (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 139). 
His comment already embedded a sense of our indifference and uninvolvement to the 
war which characterize our very spectatorship. The issue, as we have seen, is 
reasserted continuously throughout the years by different writers such as Berger, 
Sontag, and our authors. But the same spectatorship of war and Merleau-Ponty's 
critical attitude of it is translated into Baudrillard's postmodem celebrated view of it 
when he wrote "The Gulf War Did Not Take Place" equating the Gulf War as 
hyperreality, simulation, a show, a spectacle. The idea that war can even be a 
conspired, con spectacle is notoriously remarked by many "9/11 truthers", one recent 
celebrity example being Oscar-winning actress Marion Cotillard in an interview in 
the French TV show Paris Premiere commenting that September 11 is "fabricated".8 
It seems that the spectacle mentality is so omnipresent that we are stuck with it. 
What else can change our taken-for-grantedness of it? As Dawes questions: "What 
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can we possibly say that has not been said before, or that will make a difference?" 
(Dawes 2002, 6; my emphasis). War is an age-old topic (as old as literature itself, 
Bennett and Royle say) and perhaps we would think that there is, seemingly, nothing 
war fiction has not yet talked about: the atrocities, the horror, the evil; everything has 
all been explored. But in later chapters I will show that our authors have strived to 
"make a difference" not really by the subject-matter (i.e., depicting war) but by 
re-engagement of the spectator-reader. This is a new direction for war fiction to 
continue its mission in our "society of the spectacle". In her essay "One culture and 
the new sensibility" (1965) Sontag comments on the mission of art today: "Art today 
is a new kind of instrument, an instrument for modifying consciousness and 
organizing new modes of sensibility" (in Sontag 2001 , 293-304). Berger also says in 
his essay "Hiroshima" ( 1981) that "[ t ]he whole incredible problem begins with the 
need to reinsert those events of 6 August 1945 back into living consciousness", 
because "the eliminated reality is both physical and moral" (in Berger 1993 ). What 
our authors aim at is to "modify'', to "organize", to "re-insert" our sensibility and 
consciousness of the immediacy of war. Whether such consciousness can be further 
translated into conscience nobody knows, but at least it is essential that we can come 
to the realization that because what we see no longer gets into our consciousness, our 
"regard" (French: regarder) is actually further away from "voir ".9 We now look 
without seeing, without real concern and understanding. Our "regard" is both 
horrified yet amazed. Why does consciousness matter? The consciousness is 
important for war fiction because without it, such fiction is going not to be read, or 
misread. Any work of art is highly context - as well as consciousness-based; as 
Sontag points out "[p ]hotographs cannot create a moral position, but they can 
reinforce one - and can help build a nascent one." (Sontag 1977, 17); She also 
reminds us: "What determines the possibility of being affected morally by 
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photographs is the existence of a relevant political consciousness. Without a politics, 
photographs of the slaughter-bench of history will most likely be experienced as, 
simply, unreal or as a demoralizing emotional blow." (1977, 19) 
It is crucial to look at the socio-historical contexts where we have started the 
consumption of war as spectacles (through the media) and how the media (of 
governments in particular) have grown aware of the impact of war as spectacle today. 
Spectatorship is in nature inseparable from Consumership; as Debord says: "The 
spectacle is the flip side of money. It, too, is an abstract general equivalent of all 
commodities.'' (24) Indeed the War as Spectacle mentality is made possible by war 
photography and war "tourism" which were married in the industry of the 
tourist-journalists since the mid-nineteenth century. According to Sontag, the 
inextricable relationship among photography, tourism and war may at least date back 
to the rise of "class tourism" (1977, 57) in the late nineteenth century. As Sontag 
notes: "After the opening of the West in 1869 by the completion of the 
transcontinental railroad came the colonization through photography"; and one of the 
key subject matters of photography at that time was "the American Indians", the 
"Civil War", the tourist-photographers aspired to look for "a good shot of Indian life" 
(1977, 64). This has shaped, promoted and eventually normalized our spectatorship 
of calamities and atrocities; as Sontag puts it: "Being a spectator of calamities taking 
place in another country is a quintessential modem experience, the cumulative 
offering by more than a century and a half's worth of those professional, specialized 
tourists known as journalists. Wars are now also living room sights and sounds." 
(Sontag 2004, 15) Photographic images first appeared in news publications in the 
early 1900s when photographers started to go to the First World War taking static 
pictures. They were not able to be transmitted "over the wire" until the late 1920s. 
The portable cameras made it easier to capture the war by photographs during the 
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Second World War. The Vietnam War is "the first war to be extensively photographed 
for mass consumption" (Brothers 1997, 201) and is "America's first true televised 
war" (Daniel Hallin; qtd. in Brothers 1997, 202). Only in the late 1980s, with the 
development in satellite and the growing prevalence of TV installations (in 1996 
about two-thirds of the world's households had television), did transmissions of 
instant images of war to households become possible, which made the Persian Gulf 
War available to be viewed from CNN "live from ground zero" (Perlmutter 1999, 
178, 181). The instant, 24-hour television images today, the "real-time," 
"living-room" wars, and the "communal viewing" nature through the ways "the 
satellite news age has further erased the distinction between the elite and the ordinary 
viewer." (Perlmutter 1999, 188) This may seem an advantage that spectatorship is 
"democratized", but the darker implication, as critics note, is that today everyone -
from civilian viewers to decision-making presidents and soldiers going to war - has 
subsided into the position of spectators viewing war as spectacle and thinking it 
normal. Because of the instant, 24-hour news we feel that we are now more 
well-informed, and that we can have equal access to the battlefront despite our 
spectatorship; quite the contrary, this is only an illusion. We forget that such seeing is 
not true witness of war: "Unable to carry out its primary function of witness, the 
super-technology of television [ ... ] was ironically unable to convey anything but 
parody and the simulacral." (Brothers 1997, 212); it is only an "interplay of video, 
satellite and computer technology that created the spectator's feeling of 'being there' 
on the Allies' side, in a kind of virtual reality war [which] disguised" its very 
illusionariness. The "alternatives became unthinkable" because the TV presents a 
point of view so seemingly authoritative and objective it erases other possibilities 
(Brothers 1997, 213). It is unhealthy for our moral and political ability too because a 
generalized, homogenized and abstracted form of war will not "mobilize conscience"; 
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as Sontag says: "But moral feelings are embedded in history, whose personae are 
concrete, whose situations are always specific. [ ... ] The more general they are, the 
less likely they are to be effective" (1977, 17). Spectatorship does not allow political 
actions because "all politics, like all of history, is concrete." (Sontag 2004, 71) A 
generalized war which looks "too vast, too irrevocable, too epic to be much changed 
by any local political intervention'' is at last bound to be ignored, erased from the 
agenda (71). 
Critics have said that we are living in an "image-choked world" (Sontag 1977, 
15), "a visual age'' (Emst Hans Gombrich), and a "new age ofunbelief' (1977, 153), 
which all characterize the condition which has nurtured the species of the modem 
world: the Spectators. But spectatorship is not simply there but is even preferred, 
encouraged; as Sontag notes: "Needing to have reality confirmed and experience 
enhanced by photographs is an aesthetic consumerism to which everyone is now 
addicted. Industrial societies turn their citizens into image-junkies; it is the most 
irresistible form of mental pollution." (1977, 24) Indeed ever since photography first 
"through close-up and remote sensing" has "so greatly enlarged the realm of the 
visible" ( 1977, 115) and "enlarge[ d] our notions of what is worth looking at and what 
we have a right to observe" (1977, 3), it has spoiled us to believe that we now have 
every right to look, to let "images consume reality" ( 1977, 179). This is how the 
capitalist and technologically advanced society nurtures a modem species of the 
pathological masses: the Spectator "image-junkies". Critics have also revealed the 
ideological aspect of the spectacle of war; people in power know too well that "what 
the mass audience is viewing is important precisely because it is all that the people 
get to see." (Perlmutter 1999, 189) The institutionalization of images also exposes 
"how far political, military and increasingly corporate interests have determined what 
we are able to see." (Brothers 1997, 202) But the highly constructed, selective, 
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always already meditated and mediated nature of what we (are allowed to) see is 
simply forgotten. 10 
"In a world in which horror is sold as art," this is the premise from which the 
novel The Painter of Battles evolves (Painter 13). We have always known war is 
profitable but the capitalist system also makes war "spectacular"; it intervenes in the 
industry of war photography; as Faulques the character notes: "Companies that 
advertise automobiles, perfume, and expensive watches don't like to see their 
advertisements run alongside those kinds of [atrocious] scenes." (Painter144) This 
critique of such a "political-military-corporate monolith" which "has controlled how 
wars since Spain have been understood and remembered" (Brothers 1997, 216) is 
evident already in Joseph Helier's Catch-22 on the Second World War (Milo and his 
M&M Syndicate) and We Bombed in New Haven on the consumerist Spectators who 
pay to watch his "war play". 
Marshall McLuhan observes: "The war in Vietnam was lost in the living rooms 
of the nation" ( qtd. in Perlmutter 1999, 179; see also Brothers 1997, 206). This 
marks the fact that ever since the Vietnam War the fashioning of the spectacle of war 
has become inseparable from war itself. 11 As Perlmutter notes: "The battle to control 
pictures of war will not be separate from warfare; it will be part of warfare" (1999, 
202). Leaders "have become interested in finding new ways to influence the images 
that make up the news" (1999, 202); even "the definition of 'news' among 
practitioners in major media organizations is universal, hence the product is 
identical." (1999, 202) 
Like Debord, Sontag and Berger also see that human experience, even history, 
has been transformed into spectacle: "cameras miniaturize experience, transform 
history into spectacle." (Sontag1977, 110; my emphasis) Berger also observes: "The 
industrialized, 'developed' world, terrified of the past, blind to the future, lives within 
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an opportunism which has emptied the principle of justice of all credibility. Such 
opportunism turns everything - nature, history, suffering, other people, catastrophe, 
sport, sex, politics- into spectacle." (Berger 1991, 58-59) History is first turned into 
spectacle and then erased because of the illusion that the spectacle can do the work of 
memory and preservation for us: "The spectacle creates an eternal present of 
immediate expectation: memory ceases to be necessary or desirable. With the loss of 
memory the continuities of meaning and judgment are also lost to us. The camera 
relieves us of the burden of memory. It surveys us like God, and it surveys for us. Yet 
no other god has been so cynical, for the camera records in order to forget." ( 1991, 
59) We have seen earlier that Debord has already pointed out that such historical 
"amnesia", even "historical senselessness" (Brad bury 1992, 270), is a result and 
manifestation of the spectacle mentality. Even worse today, because of the 
overabundance and ever faster and faster phantasmagoria of images, we live in what 
Brothers calls "instant history" (Brothers 1997, 214 ). We have grown impatient and 
more forgetful. Sontag points out that this is a ''self-destructive quality of American 
experience, in which even the recent past is constantly being used up, swept away, 
tom down, thrown out, traded in." (1977, 68) Berger also observes this: "The 
situation at the end of our century is different. The future has been, for the moment, 
downsized, and the past is being made redundant. Meanwhile the media surround 
people with an unprecedented number of images, many of which are faces. The faces 
harangue ceaselessly by provoking envy, new appetites, ambition or, occasionally, 
pity combined with a sense of impotence." (Berger 2001, 58; my emphasis) All of 
this shows how image-dominated our very history has become; as Steve Edwards 
speaks of the national institutionized archives of images manipulating our memory 
and history: "These super-archives now constitute a multi-million-dollar industry. 
The commercial ownership of historical image collections, obviously, has significant 
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implications for the control of memory and the representation of history." (2006, 113) 
But ironically, Baudrillard argues that for the spectator the issue of manipulation of 
the spectacle is out of the question. Because for Baudrillard the spectator masses are 
one which simply "absorbs and envelops [the media], accepting them with a proud 
and complete lack of interest or engagement"; they are totally "passive" and they do 
not actually bother (Plant 1992, 156). It is this indifference and unthinking 
spectatorship which reveals the urgency for literary re-imagination and 
re-representation of war. 
Susan Sontag says in Regarding the Pain of Others: "Our failure is one of 
imagination, of empathy: we have failed to hold this reality in mind.'' (2004, 7) The 
discussion of our failure of imagination, empathy and our unawareness of our very 
failure of that will remain a key issue throughout this thesis which at the very heart 
characterizes our modem-day spectatorship ''regarding the pain of others". Lyotard 
says in his important essay "Defining the Postmodem" (1986) that "the question of 
postmodernity is also the question of the expressions of thought: art, literature, 
philosophy, politics" which has led to Lyotard's idea of the "crisis of representation" 
(and of the sublime). But I would think that our "failure", or the "crisis of 
representation" are really what Sontag says "one of imagination" and "of empathy" 
and of "amnesia" (failing to "hold this reality in mind"). It is thus strange that, as 
Son tag notes, the spectator today can only respond to the terrorist attack of the Twin 
Towers, for example, as "surreal", and people of some generations earlier would say 
it "like a movie" (See Son tag 1977, 2004 ). The "power to astonish" people "who 
looked agog at the destruction of the twin towers", as we read from Shaw (2006, 2; 
my emphasis) earlier in this chapter is in the end not as much about the "sublime" as 
it is about the "spectacle". The sublime is bastardized into the spectacle; the crisis is 
at the same time of representation (because of crisis of imagination) and emotions 
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(because of crisis of empathy). We can only resort to the spectacle even when we 
want to express our strongest emotions, imagination and memory. This also shows us 
why there is no longer the sublime and what's left is the spectacle. 
Thesis outline 
Here is a brief thesis outline. Thematically, in this thesis I will discuss three 
major forms of war as spectacles- Hell, Tourism and War Photography- which have 
shaped our spectator mentality towards regarding the pain of others in war. We will 
also discuss the twins spectatorship and impotence regarding war and the pain of the 
others by ( 1) the fictional characters (in all texts); (2) the spectators in the theatre 
who pay to watch a war play (Chapter 1); (3) the civilian reader-spectators who 
consume war fiction (Chapter 2); (4) the spectator disguised as war photographer 
(Chapter 3). All of them would come to realize their culpability in the pain of the 
others because of their very spectatorship and impotence. 
Each text accuses of our very spectatorship (and thus impotence) being 
tourist-voyeurs of the pain (and Hell) of others. I argue that the novels want to show 
that true Evil is as much about what one does as it is about what not; as 
Merleau-Ponty has put it well: "Thus when we look closely at things, we find culprits 
nowhere but accomplices everywhere; so it is that we all played a part in the events 
of 1939." (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 141) 
With regard to literary techniques and forms I will discuss how the novelists 
have strayed away from the relatively more traditional realist model to the more 
absurd, fantastical and metafictional in the wake of the need to re-insert the 
consciousness of war back into the spectator-readers. In chapter 1 I will discuss 
Joseph Helier's novel Catch-22 (1961) and play We Bombed in New Haven (1967). 
Joseph Helier first begins his writing with a comparatively more self-enclosed war 
story of Catch-22 which is read as very pioneer-postmodernist because of its 
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uncanniness displayed. The intention of writing this traditionally held as "playful" 
novel (or Helier would have it, "dark comedian" instead) was, as Helier says in an 
interview, to make the readers be ashamed that they are amused. Successful or not, 
Helier reasserts this issue more explicitly then in his later meta-theatrical play We 
Bombed in New Haven which might have borrowed characteristics from Artaud's and 
Brechtian theatres, aiming at assaulting the comfortably seated Spectator-audience -
as Sontag reminds us: "audience in the modem sense, an assembly of voyeuristic 
spectators." (Sontag 1982, 184) In chapter 2 we will look at Tim O'Brien's America 
after the 1960s (i.e., after Heller). Tim O'Brien writing in the 70s onwards has 
witnessed a more severe inappropriate attitude of the Spectator-reader on war and 
war fiction and thus he holds a similar conviction as Heller towards the civilian 
reader by also adopting the "meta-" element in his works. And both authors have 
started with more "playful" novels (Catch-22, Cacciato) moving to more sober and 
meta-fictional ones (We Bombed, The Things). O'Brien's novels The Things They 
Carried (and Going After Cacciato indeed) are highly metafictional, and metafiction 
is said to be a key literary concern in postmodemism. But I would argue that the 
"meta-" elements in both Heller's and O'Brien's works are not so much about 
parodying and disclosing the limits of their representations either as play or as 
novel -which is the postmodernist's playful concern with the genre - than as an 
intervention of the genre so as to shock the reader. In that case, the "meta" elements 
are self-reflexive not only about the ''meta-fictional" (how the story is being told) but 
rather about the "meta-reader" (how the story is being read). In chapter 3 we will 
move away from America to Spain, and from the shadows of Vietnam War to more 
recent conflicts heavily interfered in the age of media in which the Spectator-readers 
are further retreated to their Spectatorship. I will point out that the War Photographer 
is actually also a culpable Spectator disguised in the name of Witness. 
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The novels do not just accuse us for our spectatorship and impotence; they also 
offer possibilities of transcending our spectator mentality and identity. Near the end 
of the thesis we will discuss the transformation of the spectator-characters from 
regarding the pain of others to realizing and experiencing their actualities and 
immediacy, from narcissism (blind to other's pain) to eros (a transitional stage) and 
at last agape (suffering). I suggest that the possibilities of transcendence are: the 
psychogeographical jlaneur, the subversive women anti-spectators, and last of all, 
Jesus Christ. 
This is basically how this thesis came about. The topic of the "spectacle" is 
perhaps nothing new, but what my thesis strives to add to the discussion is to adopt 
the discussion of the spectacle into the literary analyses of war fiction; I also want to 
point out that what is normally deemed self-evident and obvious (as we have seen a 
lot of critics and authors have all seen the issue of the spectacle across various 
disciplines) is indeed not that obvious in itself. I would like to make the spectacle 
explicit for discussion and to criticize it instead of simply assuming its presence. As 
Sontag says: "Oscar Wilde pointed out that people didn't see fogs before certain 
nineteenth-century poets and painters taught them how to; and surely, no one saw as 
much of the variety and subtlety of the human face before the era of the movies." 
(Sontag 1982, 189) In fact, as Plant reminds us, "[t]he situationists had always been 
aware that the term 'spectacle' could easily be robbed of its critical force, recuperated 
as a descriptive concept and appropriated to serve the ends of spectacular society 
itself." (Plant 1992, 150) And the purpose of this thesis is to renew, reiterate, and 
reassert the importance of the discussion of the spectacle which seems to have gone 




From "We Bombed in New Haven" to bombing our new "haven": 
Jose ph Helier's War Play of Metatheatre against Spectators 
"[ ... ] audience in the modem sense, an assembly of voyeuristic spectators." 
Susan Sontag, "The Aesthetics of Silence" ( 1967) 
"I never thought of Catch-22 as a comic novel. I wanted the reader to be amused, and ... I 
wanted him to be ashamed that he was amused. My literary bent ... is more toward the morbid 
and the tragic. Great carnage is taking place and my idea was to use humor to make 
ridiculous the things that are irrational and very terrible." 
Joseph Helier 1986 interview with The New York Times 
Background 
Joseph Helier (1923- ) began writing Catch-22 in 1953 and published it eight 
years later in 1961, which means there is a sixteen-year time gap for reflection since 
Helier's participation in WWII. 12 Catch-22 (1961) has long been discussed as an 
existentialist, or comic, postmodernist war novel against institutions (such as the 
Nation-State, Bureaucracy, the Army, the Church, the Hospital) and war as an 
institution itself. But it is interesting to see this later comment made by Joseph Helier 
in a 1986 interview that he actually wanted the reader "to be ashamed that he was 
amused." The criticism and assault on the reader has escaped our first impression of 
the novel: there is not a reference to the reader in the novel. Despite that, I would 
like to argue that J oseph Hell er did show his awareness and criticism of the 
spectators hip of war. There are references to the "war as spectacle" mentality, and in 
the "Eternal City" chapter, Yossarian's undergoes the epiphany of his own 
spectatorship of war and is then transformed from regarding to empathizing the pain 
of others as the novel proceeds. 13 But I would think that the issue of the "reader" 
which Helier claims he wanted to achieve in Catch-22 is given much more force in 
his later 1967 play We Bombed in New Haven, and the 1986 interview is more a 
retrospective comment to spell out his intention of criticizing our modem-day 
spectatorship of war which has been a missed central theme of his works. We 
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Bombed in New Haven, though lesser-known than Catch-22, is thus of great 
importance for examining how Helier has reworked his message during the turbulent 
sixties under the shadow of the Vietnam War and after the impact of WWII on the 
American psyche. Military theorist Antoine-Henri Jomini, for example, describes 
war as a "terrible and impassioned drama" ( qtd. in Perlmutter 1999, 9). Helier would 
want to attack the view that war can in anyway be a drama, a spectacle. 
Joseph Helier's two-act play We Bombed in New Haven was originally produced 
at the Yale School of Drama in December 1967. In the play we can see recurring 
themes Joseph Helier has worked on earlier in his 1961 novel Catch-22. Both of 
them successfully mock the insanity and unnecessity of war through showing how 
the protagonists refuse to carry out their duty as soldiers and they indeed want to run 
away (Yossarian in Catch-22, Henderson in the play). The officers in the play are 
obsessed about carrying out a ridiculous and impossible mission: to "bomb 
Constantinople right off the map". Note that it is Constantinople, not the Istanbul it is 
now: "Constantinople isn't on the map. There just ain't no such place any more" (18). 
Yet an insane mission is still a mission, just as the captain Starkey says to sergeant 
Henderson: "Ours not to reason why. It's yours but to do as you're told ... and die." 
(18) But even Starkey begins to question such insane Catch-22 mentality after the 
death of the character Henderson which is also the disappearance of the actor playing 
Henderson. This is where the weird play-within-a-play and the intrusion of fiction 
into reality begin. 
Helier remains a key author of war fiction in the US literary scene because he 
furnished the points of view of WWII by insights developed from the post-war years 
and the new Vietnam War conflicts. It often takes a time lapse - sometimes years 
after the war - for certain views on the past war to take form. This is why although 
Helier's novel Catch-22 is set in 1944 near the end of the Second World War, we 
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should also take into account the impact of Helier's meditation of the post-war 
aftermath, and the series of turmoil such as the Civil Rights Movement, the Vietnam 
War and the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Malcolm X, Martin Luther 
King Jr. etc in the 1960s, (or even the Watergate scandal in the 1970s, and the early 
Cold War), all of which "further undermined faith in the truthfulness of government 
officials and the versions of events they presented" (Geyh et al eds 1998, xii). 
All the above-mentioned events may not have directly affected Hell er's works, 
but they did set the dominant mood of ridicule and distrust which are evident in 
Helier's works. Susan Sontag commented in her essay "What's Happening in 
America" (1966) that what the 1960s meant to America was even greater: "what's 
happening in America matters so much more in the late 1960's than it did in the 
1920's" (Sontag 1978, 194). The US had not really experienced the First World War 
as much as the Europeans did, as Sontag says: "Except for portions of the South a 
hundred years ago, America has never known war" ( 1978, 197). It is thus interesting 
to see what a tremendous blow it was to have their Pearl Harbour attacked and that 
they had to be involved in the Second World War (death poll ranking the top of all 
wars in human history: 60,000,000-72,000,000, cf. First World War: 20,000,000-
70,000,000). That fact may be part of the reason why the US would end the war by 
genocide, as Sontag suggests with a sarcastic note: "Since wars always happen Over 
There, and we always win, why not drop the bomb? If all it takes is pushing a button, 
even better." (1978, 197) The US brought the war to an end by dropping the two 
atom bombs which ended the Nazi holocaust and Japanese imperialism on the 
positive side, but also produced this irretrievable mass genocide and destroyed the 
idea of human "progress" on "rationality" and "human civilization". The after-math 
of WWII and the Vietnam War in particular develop our need for opposition against 
what Lyotard calls the "grand narratives". They are the "transcendent explanatory 
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system[ s] - such as God, national identity or historical materialism, to name just 
three - which leads to terror, persecution and oppression" (Bennett & Royle 2004, 
250); in a more extreme sense the grand narratives are versions of "totalitarianism", 
as in 1944 witnessing what atrocities the war can bring, Theodor Adomo and Max 
Horkheimer told us: "Enlightenment is Totalitarian" ( qtd. in 2004, 250). WWII is the 
first war where the war frontline was brought home to bombing the civilians (and the 
Spanish Civil War with Guemica bombed is another), and what is most shocking to 
the world, the nightmarish consequences after the two atomic bombs are devastating 
for the generations to come. The context ofHeller's writing then, we can see, begins 
from the breaking-out of the Second World War (1939-1945), the post-war economic 
and technological bloom (particularly after 1955) in the US because the war has 
helped the nation become a dominant new world superpower both economically -
"sixty percent of the world's wealth owned by a country containing six percent of the 
world's population" (Sontag 1978, 195)- and also politically. In Sontag's 1966 essay 
the feeling that "American power is indecent in its scale" and that "America was 
founded on a genocide" is already evident (Sontag 1978, 194-195). The idea that war 
makes money is parodied frequently in Catch-22 as we see war is a huge business in 
the novel. War becomes a "civic enterprise" where "business boomed on every 
battlefield." (Catch-22, 292) But soon again the US involvement in the Vietnam War 
("Vietnam Conflict" by then) from 1951 marks a total mistake and this time the 
Vietnam war is regarded by the majority of the US population as pointless and 
un-American. This is roughly the socio-historical scene of the 50s to the early 70s. 
We will follow up to a different attitude of the post-70s in Chapter 2. 
Joseph Helier works in such a context. The US literary scene had included 
Surrealism in the 20s and 30s, Existentialism in the 30s and 40s, and in the 60s there 
was the rise of Postmodernism, New Journalism and Reader-response criticism (see 
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Bradbury 1992). Helier's highly meta-theatrical play made in 1967 shares the same 
awareness of the presence and importance of the reader following thoughts from 
postmodernism and reader-response criticism. But Helier is different from the two 
major attitudes which attribute the meaning-making power to the reader because the 
author ("authority") of the text is now dead (Barthes's and Foucault's idea of the 
"death of the author") and any grand-narratives (ideologized narratives, such as the 
text itself) should give way. Helier is closer to Artaud's and Brecht's theatres and the 
artistic events called the "Happenings" which all highly involve the spectators. But 
Helier is very critical of his spectator-readers instead of respecting them because to 
him, the spectator-readers are devoid of true concern and valid judgment regarding 
the pain of others; they lack the very consciousness of their own wrong spectatorship. 
Sontag says in "One Culture and the New Sensibility" that the function of art today is 
to extend and educate consciousness, as she also says in a 1977 interview that 
consciousness is not "abstract", that "consciousness has a structure, a thematic, a 
history" and that all art should be "experienced sensuously" and a work of art is 
about "how they function- concretely, sensuously, and formally" (PAJ 1977). The 
task is not easy because ours is a society where sympathy and empathy atrophy to 
widespread apathy instead. But I think Helier has successfully found a "structure" to 
let his play be "experienced sensuously" by his audience, "concretely" (the Time 
Bomb scene will tell you) as well as "formally" (as a meta-theatrical play). Let us 
look at how Helier's assault on the spectators (in both literal and metaphoric sense) 
who pay to see his war play We Bombed in New Haven works. 
Helier's play as a "meta-theatrical" and "meta-readerly" play 
Susan Sontag's Regarding the Pain of Others (2003) shows us a brilliant 
analysis of war photography and our understanding of the "agonies of war" as the 
"pain of others" in today's society of images, and this book has set a very good 
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intellectual framework for us to re-look at what Joseph Heller wanted to achieve in 
his play back in the 1960s: to shock and re-engage the audience. Journalism, Sontag 
says, is ''expected to arrest attention, startle, surprise" (2004, 20) and that actually 
applies to all arts. But the shock effect seems to have diminished due to our 
"overexposure" to images of horror, our too common "camera-mediated knowledge 
of war" (21 ), what we see now becomes only the "ultra-familiar, ultra-celebrated 
image - of an agony, of ruin" (21 ). That is why we always want to hunt for, Sontag 
says, "more dramatic" images to feed our appetite (21, 86). Hell er thus combines the 
more dramatic and in some way the "anti-theatre" in his meta-theatrical play. 
The setting on stage is an ordinary American Air Force briefing room in a 
bungalow in a war somewhere in a place unidentified, where all the war scenes are 
"heard" offstage. This is to reinforce the central idea of the play which all the 
characters toy with throughout: that war is always somewhere else and "nobody ever 
gets killed" in the theatre. Yet the sounds of airplanes and explosions are so vividly 
close to the audience that it blurs more and more the near/faraway distinction and the 
idea that the theatre is really safe as claimed, especially when the play takes a much 
darker turn in Act Two, cleansed of its comical, easy mood of Act One. 
The play is carefully planned to trick the audience establishing their sense of 
being in a theatre watching a war play. The audience is constantly reminded of the 
metafictionality of the play to the extent that it deliberately spoils itself right from the 
beginning when the curtain is "accidentally" raised too early to expose the setting-up 
and the actors unready on stage, looking surprised and embarrassed. There is a clock 
on stage indicating the actual time and the actors would reference their lines to the 
actual place where the play is performed (New York, London, Hong Kong, etc.). 
These techniques help establish a false assumption for the audience that what is 
going to happen in the next an hour or two is nothing but a play, a fiction, and that is 
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crucial for the later shocking tricks to work. 
The play starts with the "Major" calling the roll to the newly arrived soldiers; he 
says: "Greetings, boys. From the Major, from me, and from the President of the 
United States. You are all hereby ordered ... to a war." (16) Although it is a 
performative speech act, as it is performed on stage the audience of course would not 
take it seriously that the actors have really been "ordered to a war" like that, nor 
would they believe that when one of the young soldiers, Sinclair, says he is going to 
be killed in the mission to Constantinople he is really going to die. Henderson (the 
next to die according to the script) initially finds it funny when Sinclair is afraid of 
the mission. He explains to Sinclair there is no need to worry at all because there is 
no real fear on stage: "Because I'm not really a soldier, that's why. I'm really 
something much different. I'm an actor ... playing the part of a soldier. [Indicating 
the audience] They know that. [ ... ] It's just a little game we're having here now. It's 
only a play, a show, a little entertainment, so let's not get carried away too far and 
forget who we really are. [ ... ] [T]his soldier I'm pretending to be never even lived, 
so how could I get killed? He's fictitious, a figment of somebody's imagination. I 
never met him, and I don't care about him." (26) So we are constantly reminded that 
everything, including the horror of the dangerous missions, violence, death, is mere 
"make-believe" (29). 
But the play takes on an uncanny, surrealistic turn as it goes beyond what is 
normally expected of the "reality" of the play when Henderson - who has used to be 
so sure of the fictionality of the whole thing - fails to find the actor who plays 
Sinclair after he is "killed", totally troubled by the actor's disappearance. After the 
intermission when the audience comes back to Act Two, we are told that there is a 
problem: Henderson has fled, and the characters discuss on stage that they cannot 
carry on without Henderson to complete the script. He has to die in the mission to 
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Minnesota and "blow up in a big explosion right over the field" (112). We later know 
that Henderson deserts his role because he is horrified that he, too, will disappear like 
Sinclair. So in short, this is a play about a play which goes wrong and unfinished in 
the middle, and everyone goes looking for Henderson so that the play can be 
finished. 
This sense that the initial war play is suspended and we are now watching the 
actors - not the characters - looking for Henderson is reinforced when we see 
Henderson has changed back to his ordinary clothes, no longer that uniform which 
gives him the actor-soldier identity. Henderson in this sense is not unlike Yossarian in 
Catch-22 who also refuses to get back into uniform and be a soldier again. The 
notion that "being a soldier is no more than being a drag man" is toyed with in both 
of Helier 's works, and as Bayley (1987) points out, the act of opposing the uniform-
"uni-form"- is also a gesture of refusing to conform to the "role-play" required of 
them. Although Henderson IS the first person to sense the 
characters-becoming-real-soldiers absurdity, he only serves as the catalyst for the 
epiphany of another character Starkey who is the true one to carry Helier 's message 
across. When the Major tells Starkey that he is going to kill Henderson and that he 
means it, Starkey wants to laugh at this actor-Major because he just can't kill people 
"with everyone watching" (another indirect reference to the audience). The Major, 
however, gives a bewildering answer referring to the killing and burying of Sinclair: 
"And just what do you think we've been doing?" (141 ). What is more paradoxical is, 
when Starkey asks the Major: "Are you acting now? Or do you really mean 
everything you're saying?", the Major answers: "It doesn't matter. Can't you see that? 
All that does matter is what happens. That's the thing you don't realize." (143) This 
shows the "make-believe" aspect of war today, and Catch-22, for example, gives 
many examples about how war is full of lies and confusion made real. But 
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Henderson refuses such "make-believe": "I don't want to make believe any more. 
I'm tired of playing soldier - like those two jokers out there. I don't want to make 
believe I'm going to be killed. I don't want to make believe I'm not going to be 
killed. I don't want to make believe I'm killing other people, and then have to make 
believe I'm not killing them. You know, I don't think I even want to be an actor any 
more. (With a touch of genuine sorrow) I just wanna go home." (163) In fact every 
soldier on the battle-field is in a sense also playing this game of "make-believe": to 
make believe that their war is necessary, and to make believe that the other human 
being is ultimately evil and thus inhuman and it is all right to kill him. 
In another sense, Henderson's disavowal of such "make-believe" act is also an 
accusation of the audiences "make-believe" about what is going on up there on the 
stage and what is going on in the world. There is a total sense of despair when 
Henderson is at last found out and then killed on stage, and Starkey touching 
Henderson's corpse shouts in utter horror: "My God! This is blood! This is real blood! 
He's dead! Hey! He's really dead!" (178) The whole game of ''make-believe" is 
deliberately shattered at the end of the play when Starkey even gives up any attempt 
to reassure the audience and himself and says in a sarcastic and defeated tone: "There 
is no war taking place here now! (He sags a moment, then continues desperately) 
There has never been a war. There never will be a war. Nobody has been killed here 
tonight. It's only ... make-believe ... it's a story ... a show." (195) The power of this 
show deliberately revealing itself as such is that it has challenged our traditional, 
unquestioned view of seeing a play as merely "make-believe" and (to most of us 
civilians living in relative peace) of seeing war as no more real than a show. Helier's 
play has shown us that the function of a war play is not to give any information or 
insider's story about the war (We Bombed is deliberately made abstract: bombing 
Constantinople, for example) but to criticize the very act of watching a war play. 
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Like tragedy, Helier's play is perhaps one which also "makes the unconscious public. 
It leaves us uncertain about our very identities, uncertain about how we feel, about 
what has happened to us." (Bennett & Royle 2004, 1 06). I imagine that the audience 
would have left the theatre with a sense of our reality/ fiction, war/ spectacle of war 
antagonism confused and then they would start to re-think our spectatorship of war 
today. 
Inaction, Impotence: Entrapment of the (Post)Modern Subject and Aporia 
The aporia marks the postmodem condition: Yossarian is trapped in the morass 
of the Catch-22 world (Catch-22 is itself an example of aporia); Starkey and 
Henderson and indeed everyone are trapped in the play not knowing how to get rid of 
the script and the stage. Later we will see Paul Berlin in Cacciato is trapped not only 
physically in the war but also mentally in his imagination; Norman Bowker and 
"0' Brien" the character in The Things They Carried in a sense are still trapped in the 
war even during the post-war years, and being the characters they are also trapped in 
the stories themselves, and Faulques is trapped in his mural of his ghostly past in The 
Painter of Battles. 
To Joseph Helier, T. S. Eliot is a symbolically significant figure as he is quoted 
in both Catch-22 and We Bombed. Right at the start of this play we see Starkey quote 
T. S. Eliot's 1915 poem "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" famous for its 
depiction of the "shell-shock" after the Great War which Sontag describes as the "era 
of shock for Europe" (2004). The term "shell-shock" was first used by C. S. Myers in 
1915 (Childs 2005, 164), which is also the same year Eliot's poem was published. 
The devastation has brought to the human psyche envisioning a mentality of the 
paralysis, the inability to act, in short, the key issue in our thesis along with 
spectatorship: impotence. The fact that it is Starkey who recites Eliot's lines has 
hinted a linkage between Starkey and Prufrock. The context that defined the 
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"Modem Subject", as Peter Childs explains, is one of "an emotional aspect of a 
Western crisis, characterized by despair, hopelessness, paralysis, angst and a sense of 
meaninglessness shown on a spiritual, cultural and personal level" (2005, 185). Such 
a "crisis" has been further intensified by the other two destructive wars (WWII and 
the Vietnam War) and continual conflicts which after the spirits of Existentialism in 
the 40s and 50s have then nurtured the spirits of the postmodem age, bringing about 
in the 60s another wave of skepticism against the human subject and meaning (e.g., 
post-structuralism). Starkey represents the "(Post)modem Subject" in the play. He 
quotes: 
... there will be time 
To prepare a face to meet the faces that you meet; 
There will be time to murder and create, 
And time for all the works and days of hands 
That lift and drop a question on your plate; 
Time for you and time for me, 
And time yet for a hundred indecisions, 
And for a hundred visions and revisions 
Before the taking of a toast and tea. 
The title of the poem is not explicitly identified, but the audience must be able to 
recognize this is the poem about the famous Mr. J. Alfred Prufrock who always 
thinks there will be time for "a hundred indecisions", "visions and revisions" (i.e., 
aporia) but ends up failing to do whatever he thinks he will. This Prufrockian 
quotation highlights the key theme of the play: inaction, impotence, right from the 
beginning. We have a strong sense that the people are trapped and paralysed on the 
stage both as characters and actors, that they can do nothing else but to carry on the 
play and stick to their "roles" ("the show must go on"): attempts at running away will 
only be futile. 
The role of Starkey as the most significant character in the play only becomes 
obvious in Act Two and especially when we witness he has grown into the 
Prufrockian man alluded to at the beginning of the play. A "postmodem" Prufrock is 
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different from the "modem" Pruforck by his more acute inactivity and his not seeing 
that as his problem. Starkey fails to keep his word to save Henderson from being 
killed nor can he save his son from being sent off to the mission where he is scripted 
to be killed as well. But such inaction is condemnable because it is not real 
impotence. Starkey is not as innocent as he claims because it is not that he is unable 
to do it ("it didn't seem possible", "it doesn't seem possible", he repeats saying), but 
that he simply does not try even when he should have. He just self-deceivingly 
repeats several times: "It's not my fault." 
STARKEY'S SON 
What's going to happen to me? 
STARKEY 
You're going to be killed, son. You're going to go away in an airplane and be 
killed in an explosion. [ ... ] It's not my fault. 
STARKEY'S SON 




What were you doing when all this was happening? 
STARKEY 
My job, I guess. 
STARKEY'S SON 
Pop, you had nineteen years to save me from this. Why didn't you do 
something? 
STARKEY 
It didn't seem possible. 
STARKEY'S SON 
When I was a little boy, of five, or ten, or fifteen, when I was growing up-- you 
loved me then, didn't you? You must have loved me then! Didn't you know they 
would take me into the army someday if I just kept growing? 
STARKEY 





It just doesn't seem possible. 
STARKEY'S SON 
Pop ... don't you understand?[ ... ] Don't you see? Don't you know?[ ... ] 
STARKEY 
[ ... ] it's not my fault. 
STARKEY'S SON 
It is your fault! What were you doing all this time, when you could have been 
doing something? Where were you before, after Sinclair disappeared, when 
mother stood here, right on this stage, and screamed at everyone to stop it, stop it! 
She did. I know she did. She told me she did. 
STARKEY 





Smirking. I hid in back of her and I smirked. 
[ ... ] 
STARKEY'S SON 
Pop ... Dad ... Father ... Stranger. .. help me. 
(184-186) 
Guiltily in an effort to explain away his inaction to save his son, Starkey says to 
the audience: "Now, none of this, of course, is really happening. It's a show, a play in 
a theater, and I'm not really a captain. I'm an actor. Do you think that I, (Real Name), 
would actually let my son go off to a war and be killed ... and just stand here talking 
to you and do nothing?". He ends up being hysterical, grieving, whimpering, and is 
on the verge of weeping (195). Even he cannot convince himself. We all know he 
will "stand here talking" and "do nothing". Not only he but also many of our 
contemporaries - as Starkey calls himself the "modem, contemporary, adult human 
being, a very decent and respectable and sensitive human being" with "pride and 
character and dignity" ( 14 7) - will do nothing. Like Prufrock himself who goes on to 
ask in his poem: "Do I dare? I Disturb the universe?". There is no longer any heroic 
model and there only remains what Starkey's son calls his father when he is sent to 
the fatal mission: "Bastard!" (194). 
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Regarding the Pain of Others: the impotent Spectator 
"What were you doing when all this was happening?" 
- Starkey's Son, p.185 
The Son's accusation towards Starkey is equally applicable to the audience if we 
simply add "Audience" to it: "[Audience!] What were you doing all this time, when 
you could have been doing something? Where were you before, after Sinclair 
disappeared, when mother [Ruth] stood here, right on this stage, and screamed at 
everyone to stop it, stop it!" It is especially the case when Starkey's son says 
"Stranger ... help me." And this address to the "stranger" is not only directed to his 
actor-father but also every stranger - i.e., everybody - in the theatre to help. This 
reminds us of what the Major says to the young men at the beginning of the play: 
"All of us - all of you - are fighting a war" ( 16). The audience must have assumed 
the same attitude of the senior officers thinking that it is just you (the actors)- not us 
(the audience) - fighting a war. 
The sense of accusation towards the heartless officers (such as the Major or later 
Star key) who watch the pain of others is now directed also to the audience. We have 
already seen examples of the actors establishing the habit of referring to the audience 
so that the audience would feel it normal to be referred to. But the act of referring to 
the audience takes on a more directly accusing tone when Henderson is furious and 
shocked to learn that the audience would not care if he is to get killed right on stage: 
HENDERSON 
(indicates audience) 
What about them? Are they gonna care if I get killed? 
BAILEY 
Why should they? That's what they came to see. 
HENDERSON 
Did they? Well, it's too bad about them. Look what happened to Sinclair. 
(114) 
The accusation is not ad hoc. The same accusation of the "bad" audience is 
reinforced later when Starkey is shocked that the Major says he means it to kill 
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Henderson even on stage. Such a remark must have shocked us too because it 
mockingly suggests that we the audience not only do not "care", we do not even 
"act" to do something or at least try to stop something: 
STARKEY 
Right here? Right out in front of all these people? In front of all these witnesses? 
MAJOR 
If I have to. 
STARKEY 
Oh, no. They won't let you. They won't just sit there and let you kill them. 
MAJOR 
Yes, they will. 
(143) 
It is this charge to the audience's indifference that makes the play important. We 
are no "witnesses" as Starkey says. We are not even "an audience" but, in Sontag's 
words, "voyeuristic spectators"; or we are sadistic and we do not intervene. What is 
Joseph Helier angry about? Of course we would say the audience would not 
intervene in what is happening on stage (whatever gruesomeness and evil there is) 
because we know it is just a show. But when we come to reflect upon ourselves, as 
Starkey does trying to cover up his shame that he would have saved his son if it were 
in reality and not in a show, we would feel the same slap right in our face that many 
of us do just "sit there" and let people kill people. Do we really care what is going on 
in the war zones afar? Do we even care what happens to our neighbours, the 
strangers sitting right next to us? 
To me the importance of this play lies not just with challenging the form of the 
play in a post-war context (60s) as many other novelists and playwrights were doing. 
These writers felt the inadequacy of modernist literary forms to represent the horror 
and insanity of wars and began to explore self-reflexivity in novels and plays. But I 
argue that Hell er's play is meta-theatrical (questioning the horror represented on 
stage and the making up/ making real distinction) in order to be meta-readerly: It 
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goes beyond pointing a finger at the text itself (as in metafictionality and 
self-reflexivity) to point a second finger at the audience as well. It is a surprising 
gesture which is even prior to the rise of the reader-response theories in the 1970s, 
which suggested that art is not isolated from the reader and that the reader is also 
crucial in the process of meaning-making. I think Helier's play has made us realize 
that the problem lies not with the literary form (the text) but with the audience. The 
actor-characters on stage are representatives of us who come to realize the 
spectatorship of other people's pain and by watching their realization we would 
(hopefully) come to realize our own. The play reveals itself as a spectacle and then 
challenges it, breaking the "play as only a representation" concept by meta-theatrical 
means. It also reveals our role as spectators by defamiliarizing the audience's normal 
expectation of the theatre and our unquestioned watching. We have long taken it for 
granted that we can just sit and watch. Helier shows us that the theatre of war is not a 
genre (highly preditable, consumerable as a spectacle), but an event. 
That the whole point of the play is to make itself an "event" can be 
demonstrated by the change of addresses to the audience. The actor-characters shift 
from indirectly mentioning the audience as "they" to directly addressing them as 
"You". They stop talking about the audience and start talking to them. The audience 
members who have been sitting in the theatre comfortably watching and are 
addressed indirectly may have thought that all of this involvement of the audience is 
only for comic effect, as when the other characters Golfer and Hunter discuss 
bombing the theatre even if the audience will not like them (62) (this is a subtle 
reference to the play title We Bombed in New Haven); or when Starkey talks to the 
audience friendlily: "I'm not real. I'm not really a captain. I'm pretending, and I'm 
sure that all of you out there, have seen me act many many times before in many 
different roles." (74) Up until now the audience can remain spectators taking the 
42 
jokes. But just when the audience members have grown accustomed to their 
addressed spectatorship in the theatre, they are suddenly asked by the characters to 
respond, to take action, to elicit emotions. Their spectatorship is rebuked as 
indifferent and heartless. For example, Ruth runs towards the edge of the stage and 
screams to ask the audience to stop what is going on in the play (that Henderson will 
be taken away and killed), and Starkey is being hysterical near the end of the play 
with the audience who have watched him send his son away to death on cue with the 
script. The audience must be shocked and feel uneasy whether they should really "do 
something" as requested by Ruth or if such pleas are just meant to be a part of the 
play script and they should remain sitters, silent and passive. 
This is why I think the play has made an important gesture when it tries to 
involve the audience and let them feel the immediacy of war, which is best 
exemplified in the scene of the toy "Time Bomb" (82-85). In this scene, the 
actor-characters really carry out what Golfer and Hunter have suggested earlier. 
Starkey enters with a toy called "Time Bomb" and suggests the characters play a 
game like musical chairs and whoever gets the bomb when the bell rings will lose. 
They have a first go and everybody loves the game and asks to ''play some more" 
(my emphasis). They have a second go with another bomb and when it rings Starkey 
yells sharply at the man holding it: "Throw it! Quick! Get rid of it! Throw it away! 
Throw it!". The man throws it far away to one end of the stage and the bomb does 
explode with fire flashes and smoke. All the characters are shocked and infuriated 
but Starkey orders them to have a third go. 
JOE 
Sir? Sir? Which one is this? Is it the toy or is it the bomb? 
STARKEY 
(Laughing) 
Boys, that's where the real fun comes in. I don't know! 
(84) 
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They play with panic this time without knowing whether it is the toy or the bomb, 
and when the bomb finally comes to Starkey's hands he "rushes toward the front of 
the stage, and, letting out a terrified scream, draws his arm back to hurl the ringing 
time bomb out into the audience" (85) - the audience must be horrified and 
screaming too - but then he stops in mid-motion and smiles at the audience 
"obliviously": "It's okay, folks. This is not a real bomb, and nobody here is going to 
get hurt. Not yet. We're not really going to blow you up. So we can all relax because 
it's only a toy, isn't it?". And then Starkey, "[g]rinning and chuckling in the 
friendliest fashion" and "in a gesture of mock horror" "tosses the bomb off the stage 
onto the floor in front of the first row of spectators " (85, my emphasis). He has lied 
and violated the safety pact. Note the word "Spectator" is sometimes used here in the 
play other than "Audience". We do not know if there is a deliberate intention for 
Helier's choice of words but somehow I suggest that they are not really mutually 
interchangeable because I think "spectator" (usually of an event, any event) connotes 
less respect than "audience" usually of a performance (a musical, a ballet, a meeting). 
The former can be merely somebody who watches. 
This is what Sontag means by the "audience" watching images of "faraway 
suffering": "Wherever people feel safe [ ... ] they will be indifferent" (2004, 89). That 
the images of suffering appear so immediate and intimate to them on TV screens just 
right there in their living rooms can be compared with the same immediacy on stage 
here. Starkey's threat and assault on the audience can thus be seen as a gesture of 
breaking what the audience always takes for granted: the distance guaranteed and the 
safety pact. The stage/ audience boundary is symbolically, groundbreakingly broken 
through, but the audience has failed to recognize this gesture of a barrier being tom 
down and its invitation of their engagement in what is going to happen next on stage. 
The title of the play We Bombed in New Haven has multiple meanings. First, we 
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should bear in mind that "New Haven" (in Connecticut, U.S.) is not so much a real 
geographical place as a state of mind, in the same way that the squad wants to bomb 
Constantinople (History, Civilization). But what is more crucial is that the title 
already spells out what Helier is going to do in the play, that they are going to bomb 
the spectators' "new haven" (i.e., the theatre). The theatre "haven" is no longer a safe 
and peaceful place where people are protected from violence and horror. This is why 
the ''Time Bomb" scene is significant; here, not only can we see Joseph Helier's 
verbal accusation concerning the audience 's role as mere Spectator, we can also see a 
very physical component to his critique. The scene highlights - realizes and 
materializes - the title and the very aim and concept of the play. Spectators, by 
definition, only watch the scenes without ever bothering to involve themselves what 
they are seeing (they never intervene), and thus they remain in a more privileged and 
protected position to observe the plight and horror experienced by the others on stage. 
Hell er may want to shake the audience out of their taken-for-granted comfort and 
false sense of security in the theatre, and their being protected from the shield of the 
so-called civilization. I imagine the audience must have enjoyed it so much watching 
the men toss the bomb back and forth in panic on stage; but by involving the 
audience in exactly the same horror experienced by the actors playing with the bomb, 
their laid-back attitude is turned into one of immediacy. This violent violation of the 
safety pact may help make the audience members realize their false assumption of 
safety in the theatre: How can they? How can they think that while people get killed 
on stage they can be any safer under the same roof in the theatre? The same 
implication is that it is illusory if they think they are even as safe while people get 
killed everyday everywhere in the world - they are actual happenings, not even 
plays -just outside the theatre. Wars are really real, and the theatre is unable to 
circumscribe the spectators from the world of wars as a "haven". I think this is a 
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powerful play, demonstrating what a play (especially a tragic play) can really do: not 
as a mimesis of the reality aspiring to trigger pity and fear for the actors and hoping 
that it can trigger the audience's reflection upon themselves, too. The play should 
give the audience the reality itself, and if that has to do with horror, let it be horror 
itself, not horror as mediated through a character making it horror second-hand. The 
play should speak directly to the audience. The audience should experience "Me", 
not "Me, too". 
In the play Helier has made implicit comparisons of modem plays to those of 
Shakespeare, Greek tragedies, and ancient stories like that of King David in the Bible. 
At first glance it may seem that Helier is mocking these classic masters, such as 
when a discussion between Young Fisher and Fisher concludes that "there's lots of 
violence in Shakespeare" because "Shakespeare had a low audience"; to Fisher 
modem plays like We Bombed in New Haven do not need that because "we've got a 
high audience. We're here for a good time." (89) Fisher goes on to reassure Young 
Fisher - as well as the audience - that "all the fighting takes place far away", "out 
there someplace" and because they know the audience is here just for a good time, he 
promises: "There's no violence out here, and no blood. Nobody gets killed here, so 
you don't have to worry. There's no violence in public." (89) Of course we know 
later that in this play there is violence, and blood, and people do get killed (Sinclair, 
Henderson, the Son), and near the end of the play both Young Fisher and the 
audience must have felt cheated when Fisher confesses to Young Fisher: "I was lying 
to you," which is a remark announced "coldly, cruelly, with no hint of an apology" 
(179). But why should he not? Such coldness, cruelty and no-apology is reality, such 
lying is the truth: it is a shattering revelation of the illusionariness of their Spectator 
mentality which believes the "no violence to spectators" pact in the theatre. The play 
has even suggested that if the audience remains the expressionless, inexpressive 
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spectators who never react or voice out anything, they will eventually become the 5 
Idiots roaming the stage like bodies without brains, the dummies who are placed on 
stage by Heller, I think, as vigilant counter-examples. After all, what is the difference 
between "dumb" and "numb"? 
When Sinclair is killed in the play (or at least we are told he is), Ruth comes out 
to the stage and mourns for his death. She turns to the audience and questions why 
they are not mourning as she does: 
RUTH 
Oh God! God ... God ... God! 
(Ruth turns and drifts forward. She speaks directly to the audience with a deep 
sincerity of emotion) 
Another young boy killed in a war. And all of you just sat there. It happened 
right now. Didn 't you care? Doesn't it mean anything to you? 
STARKEY 
Hey, Ruthie! Ruthie! Take it easy, will you? What do you want from them? This 
is only a play. They never heard of this character Sinclair before. He's a stranger 
to them. He's like a name in this newspaper. (p.56) 
Starkey is not the only one who thinks so. Ruth's mourning for Sinclair's 
fictitious death is ridiculed as exaggerated, unnecessary emotions by Henderson as 
well: "Okay. You don't have to make such a big scene out of it." (54) He admits he 
"smirk[ ed]" (186) at this "big scene" and very likely so did the audience, I can 
imagine. But by the end of the play the audience would have grown to reflect upon 
themselves, asking where their emotional capacity has gone, and why they cannot 
feel attached to the play like people in the old days may have. 
The problem of regarding the pain of others is not a recent product, though, as 
Sontag reminds us: "The argument that modem life consists of a diet of horrors by 
which we are corrupted and to which we gradually become habituated is a founding 
idea of the critique of modernity - the critique being almost as old as modernity 
itself." (2004, 95) Wordsworth denounced our "corruption of sensibility" in 1800 in 
the Preface to Lyrical Ballads, and Baudelaire as well in the 1860s' refers to how the 
" 'daily' events and 'hourly' news of 'extraordinary incident"' and such 
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"overstimulation" functioned, in Wordsworth's words, "blunt the discriminating 
powers of the mind" (qtd. in Sontag 2004, 95). Wordsworth and Baudelaire must 
have seen other things we have not, unique to their age; nevertheless, they would not 
have imagined this new bizarre visual age we are now living in with overabundant 
images from photography, TV, advertisements, just to name a few. "War" has greatly 
metamorphosed because of our age of information and images. Back in the late 19th 
century, as Sontag reminds us, it was already a key issue in the discussion of war 
"how to respond to the steadily increasing flow of information about the agonies of 
war" (Sontag 2004, 16). Now we see in recent decades the problem has gone farther: 
"It is often asserted that," Sontag points out, "the West has increasingly come to see 
war itself as a spectacle." (2004, 98) 
One explanation for the modem "corruption of sensibility" of wars, Sontag 
offers, is that "an ample reservoir of stoicism is needed to get through the great 
newspaper of record each morning" (2004, 12). But this is no excuse for us to take 
on a stoic shield against regarding the pain of others and then to feel untroubled by 
our impotence and "regard": to look and then turn a blind eye to all these. Berger, as 
discussed in the introduction, has accused such as a "looking beyond''. 
It is therefore a powerful gesture that J oseph Helier mocks at our modem lack 
of emotions by making Ruth shout at the audience in the scene. It is not to say that 
people in the past centuries were more able to feel than us, but perhaps people of the 
"modernity" and "post-modernity" living in what Debord terms "the society of the 
spectacle" are more prone to situate themselves in the positions of the "audience" 
(i.e., the spectators expecting to consume and to be entertained without any 
participation and involvement both physically and morally). The society and even 
war have become a spectacle and we are all engaged in a kind of "co-spectatorship", 
or worse, "consumers of violence as spectacle" (Sontag 2004, 99) and we have failed 
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to recognize the "indecency" of such "co-spectatorship" (2004, 53-54). Note how 
"making a scene" enters our everyday language showing that every moment of our 
everyday lives can now become a "scene" to watch. The most exemplified form of 
such "co-spectatorship" and "consumers of violence" must be the audience in the 
theatre enjoying modem tragedies, and they are Helier's target of assault in his play. 
We have already seen the mocking comment earlier that there is no more 
Shakespearean-like violence in today's theatre because we now have a modem-day 
"high" audience. Helier does not let such a "high audience" resume its comfortable 
and prestigious positions, well-protected from the realities of human cruelties. He 
wants to make us see that there is nothing as ridiculous today as our distorted 
thinking and emotional incapacity. It is ridiculous, on the contrary, to see that today 
showing emotions about mischief and agony is "over-reaction" and we would feel 
disgraced if we can still be shocked by such cliched mischief and agony, as if 
mischief and agony can really become cliched, and more ironically, those of us who 
make that comment have never been to war seeing real mischief and agony and dare 
call what they have no right in, "cliches". We are too accustomed to the 
(over)abundance of war news and images and forget that our understanding and 
"experience" of war is only mediated forms of horror, always distant, always just a 
selected portion of it. Clearly many of us have mistaken the TV, newspapers, or even 
films like Apocalypse Now and Pearl Harbor for what War really is. Such 
representations of war are important, but we must bear in mind that they are 
representations and their function is not meant and should not be meant to substitute 
for our emotional and moral engagement in war. 
The fact that many of us would think the issue of war atrocities is cliched also 
shows our common attitudes of generalization and exemplarity. The Hollywood 
movies, for example, demonstrate to us how "one stab or slash has to take the place 
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of thousands" and "this soldier's death stands for the deaths of thousands of others" 
(Bennett & Royle 2004, 276). Is it not also how journalists and historians "often 
employ images to stand for, encapsulate, or serve as exemplars for entire wars, eras, 
or even cultures" adopting the strategy of ''metonymy" to use "one thing symbolizing 
a greater condition", to "sum it up" (Perlmutter 1999, 8)? Henderson scorns Ruth's 
"over-reaction" mourning for the death of Sinclair who is, he thinks, only one of 
many. But later when he knows he is the next to die Henderson loathes the audience 
for not caring about his death: "Are they gonna care if I get killed?" (114; my 
emphasis). Bailey his comrade even feels annoyed by Henderson obsessing about his 
own death and shoos him away heartlessly: "What do you want? You're not the only 
person who ever got killed in a war" ( 112). This distinction between Me (safe and 
happy) and the Others (suffering and in pain) is most exemplified in war when we 
regard the death of others, which embeds what Sontag describes as "the voyeuristic 
lure", as her friend says: "This is not happening to me, I'm not ill, I'm not dying, I'm 
not trapped in a war." (2004, 89) Or are we not? 
Wars are generalized into any war and this generalization has de-individualized 
every unique human being, as we see from the conversations between the characters 
regarding the death of others: "What do you want? You're not the only person who 
ever got killed in a war" ( 112). Everyone suffering in War (in the capital, not wars -
many and different wars) is rendered into a perception of the "generic", the 
"anonymous victims" (Sontag 2004, 8, 55). Virginia Woolf once wrote an essay 
saying that wars today (and war photography in particular) have cruelly rendered the 
dead bodies of human beings indistinguishable from the bodies of dead pigs, and 
Son tag furthers Woolf's idea: "her point is that the scale of war's murderousness 
destroys what identifies people as individuals, even as human beings. This, of course, 
is how war looks when it is seen from afar, as an image." (2004, 55) It is this 
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"anonymity" which saddens and infuriates Henderson that nobody is going to care 
whether he dies or lives, and that his suffering is not unique. Perhaps Henderson 
would have been "offended" if he knew how I compare his death with Sinclair's, 
theirs with other characters' deaths in the Second World War, in the Vietnam War, in 
other novels. Sontag gives the example of how the Sarajevans are equally offended to 
see their photographs exhibited alongside with the Somalia pictures taken by the 
English photojoumalist Paul Lowe in 1994 and she comments: "To set their 
sufferings alongside the sufferings of another people was to compare them (which 
hell was worse?), demoting Sarajevo's martyrdom to a mere instance." (2004, 101) 
No one would love to be reduced, dehumanized to merely "an instance", an example: 
it is typical and yet stereotypical at the same time, and what's worse, people start to 
cite them, not care. I can also understand why Henderson is mad at the idea that his 
death has to be exhibited on stage for us the spectators, the voyeurs, the sadists, as if 
he was how the "colonized exotic" (mostly "Africans and denizens of remote Asian 
countries") "were displayed like zoo animals in ethnological exhibitions mounted in 
London, Paris and other European capitals from the sixteenth until the early 
twentieth century." (Sontag 2004, 65) Now we have an "appetite" for a new kind of 
exhibits: the soldiers in pain, dying, and the "spectacles" of wars. They are the new 
"exotic" to us when viewed from afar. 
Sontag points out that the problem of our modem mentality is our inability to 
imagine and to empathize with what we see today regarding the wars and our very 
unawareness of the problem: "Our failure is one of imagination, of empathy: we 
have failed to hold this reality in mind." (2004, 7) Bennett and Royle (2004) point 
out that "sympathy" having its Greek origins "syn" (with) and "pathos" (suffering) is 
indeed not simply "feeling sorry for" but "suffering with" (2004, 1 07); this is not 
"regarding the pain of others" but experiencing it with the others which exactly 
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involves imagination and empathy. But how? Helier gives us mock suggestions of 
reconstructing our imagination and empathy: by re-adopting what Starkey's Son calls 
the "old-fashioned" forms such as Shakespearean and Greek tragedies. Starkey's Son 
asks Star key if he can react more like what King David would when he, too, hears of 
his son's death. However we see that even if Starkey is made to speak exactly the 
same lines of King David's, he is completely void of genuine emotions not even 
knowing whether he can mean what he say. Starkey is one good example of those 
who lack imagination and empathy: 
STARKEY'S SON 
Then will you get angry now? Will you at least raise your voice? Won't you do 




(Indicating the Major) 
Smash his face. 
[Starkey refuses. He cannot do that.] 
STARKEY 
STARKEY'S SON 
Then will you throw a stone or break a window or let. .. out ... a ... scream? 
[ ... ] 
Then will you gnash your teeth? Will you at least do something as old-fashioned as 
that? Will you beat your chest with your fists and tear your hair? Will you weep for 
me? 
When King David was told that his son had been killed even in a rebellion against 
him, he cried: "0 my son Absalom! My son, my son Absalom! Would God I had 
died for thee!" 
STARKEY 
I will weep for you. I will cry: "My son, my son! Would God I had died for thee!" 
STARKEY'S SON 
But will you mean it? 
STARKEY 
(Slowly, with shame) 





Earlier Starkey has mistakenly thought that his inability to act and to feel is a 
failure of the genre he is in. He thinks self-pitily that it is the modem theatre which 
has ''limited" him rather than his own impotence, and that if he can play classical 




(He turns and shuffles forward a step or two to address the audience.) 
I am a man. 
I'm not a thing. 
I'm a modem, contemporary, adult human being. 
I'm a very decent and respectable and sensitive human being. 
I'm married now, and I work for a living, just like you-you all know that. 
I've got pride and character and dignity, and I have a wish and a determination to 
maintain my self-respect. 
I do have convictions. 
I have very deep convictions and very genuine and powerful feelings that I want to 
give voice to in loud, rolling sentences like: "Was this the face that launched a 
thousand ships and burnt the topless towers of Iliom? Sweet Helen, make me 
immortal with a kiss." 
(With a wishful smile) 
I want to make long speeches like that. 
(With even greater longing) 
I want to play tragedy. 
(Turning grave again.) 
That's why I'm really not so happy here right now. 
The part I have is too ... limited. I'm not sure I like it here any more, 
Squeezed in between the curtain 
And the edge of the stage, 
Squeezed into this small narrow role, 
Pressed into a tight uniform, 
Between the curtain 
And the edge of the stage, 
And forced to say, 
"Yes, sir." 
(147-148) 
For tragedy to work, however, it has to "involve an encounter not only with the 
death of a character on stage (or in the pages of a book) but also with the idea of our 
own deaths." (Bennett & Royle 2004, 103) Helier seems to suggest that tragedy will 
not work for the modem spectators because they have long been practicing this 
disengaged "regarding the pain of others" spectacle mentality, and that it is no longer 
easy to provoke their "pity and fear" and identification with the pain of others, let 
alone "a sense of going out of ourselves but, at the same time, putting ourselves on 
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stage." (Bennett & Royle 2004, 197; original emphasis) Starkey mistakes that his 
predicament is a problem of form and it could be solved simply by, for example, 
speaking with line breaks and imitating lyrical expressions of famous tragedies. He 
fails to realize that his failure to become an individual is not a problem of form or 
genre. Speaking a monologue with the repetitions of "I" will not make him concrete 
and keep him from falling apart. He also fails to realize that his predicament of being 
"squeezed in between the curtain/ And the edge of the stage" and "squeezed into" his 
"small narrow role", "pressed into a tight uniform" and "forced to say, 'Yes, sir'" is 
indeed his very own impotence. He could at least have tried to rebel like Henderson 
who said no to his officer and his uniform and the stage, or like Yossarian in 
Catch-22 who "had decided to live forever or die in the attempt" (Catch-22, 33). 
Although Henderson died in his attempt to desert his role and his fate, he has 
demonstrated the strong will-power which sets him free from his pathetic role as the 
modem subject, and likewise, Yossarian's determination makes him remarkable. 
The play seems to suggest that wars today are less heroic, less dignifying than 
Helen and Troy, for example. Unlike the epic Greek wars of person-to-person battles 
of glory, what honour is there today when you just press a button and the smart 
bombs will do the job, as Sontag comments ironically: "Since wars always happen 
Over There, and we always win, why not drop the bomb? If all it takes is pushing a 
button, even better." (1978, 197; qtd. earlier); or when the soldiers go on mundane 
duties in wars without ever knowing the justified reasons for that? The juxtaposition 
and comparison of Starkey the modem soldier with those ancient ones who preceded 
him creates a strong sense that the idea of war and its meaning have become 
downgraded as history proceeds into the modem day, most remarkably beginning 
with the First World War which was claimed to be "the war to end all wars" and it 
was not. Twenty years later, the Second World War had more or less a point in ending 
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Nazism and the Holocaust, it also shocked the world with its Bombs, and the 
Vietnam War is definitely an anti-climax of the glory of war histories (another more 
recent example is the U.S. involvement in Iraq, the so-called anti-terrorist war). At 
last, perhaps Helier's 1962 interview shortly after publishing his Catch-22 can 
already foresee why some 5 years later he would produce the real-time, real-place 
meta-theatrical play: "I tried to give [ Catch-22] a structure that would reflect and 
complement the content of the book itself, and the content of the book really derives 
from our present atmosphere, which is one of chaos, of disorganization, of absurdity, 
of cruelty, of brutality, of insensitivity [ ... ] People die and are forgotten. People are 
abused and are forgotten. People suffer, people are exploited, right now; we don't 
dwell upon them 24 hours a day. Somehow they get lost in the swirl of things of 
much less importance to us and to them and to the human condition." (from "An 
Impolite Interview with Joseph Helier" 1962; original emphasis) Perhaps Helier 
would have been shocked in the 1990s when he sees how now we can really "dwell 
upon them 24 hours a day" not out of concern but of voyeuristic curiosity made 
possible by the satellite and TV. 
In chapter 2 we will look at Tim O'Brien who writes of the Vietnam War and 
who is dismayed by the impotent and forgetful spectatorship of the general public. In 
We Bombed in New Haven we have seen how Helier "bombed" our new "haven" of 
the theatre by his meta-theatrical play to re-engage the long removed audience back 
to the immediacy of horror. In O'Brien's Going After Cacciato and The Things They 
Carried we will see how he, like Helier who moves from Catch-22 to We Bombed, 
also chooses to move from a more imaginary, self-enclosed war fiction ( Cacciato) to 
a meta-fictional one (Things) trying to assault and to re-engage the reader-spectators. 
O'Brien will also re-define what it means by Truth in war fiction to disturb our 
spectator-readers' conventional reading of war stories. 
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Chapter2 
From "Society of Spectacle" to Society of Impotence: 
Tim O'Brien's War Novels of Affect against Spectator-readers 
"Our failure is one of imagination, of empathy: we have failed to hold this reality in mind.'. 
- Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others 
"After Vietnam, 
there was a sense of impotence that swept across the nation and entered into our psyches." 
- Tim O'Brien, in Edelman 's 1994 interview 
Background: from anguish to impotence and amnesia 
The Vietnam War ( 1965-197 5; conflicts started from the 40s) is said to be the 
most "unpopular" war in the U.S. war history (the other being Iraqi campaigns 
recently). The questions still trouble the nation today: Was the war right or wrong? 
Did the American presence there justify the huge military and civilian fatalities (1.4 
million military fatalities, 6% of which were the U.S. armed forces; and 2 - 5.1 
million civilian fatalities)? Did people fight and die needlessly, purposelessly? These 
are the frequent questions discussed in most Vietnam fiction, where this war which 
corrupts and disappoints the US psyche is often compared with the much more 
glorious (and glorified) World War 11 of their fathers. Tim 0' Brien ( 1946 - ), who 
served as a foot soldier for 13 months from 1969 to 1970 after his undergraduate 
studies, says in a 1994 interview: "America before the 1960s was a pretty innocent 
place. We were the Lone Ranger galloping off to the rescue of the needy and the 
oppressed of the world, and we could get things done. There was a sense of rectitude. 
All of that was washed away by the late 1960s." (Karp 2002 interview) 
O'Brien has brought the issue into his works. For example, his celebrated war 
novel Going After Cacciato (1975), which through its imaginary journey of 8,600 
miles to Paris paid ambivalent (and probably sarcastic) tribute to the "nearly exact 
complement in American lives lost" in Vietnam (Cacciato 300; see also Bates 1987, 
275). Perhaps whether the war was right was still unclear in the 1970s when the 
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novel was written, as the character Paul Berlin in the novel also says "he did not 
know who really started the war, or why, or when, or with what motives; he didn't 
know if it mattered; he saw sense in both sides of the debate [ ... ] He just didn't know 
if the war was right or wrong or somewhere in the murky middle. And who did? Who 
really knew?" (Cacciato 249-250; original emphasis). He does not know, amid the 
war, if "it was a war of ideology or economics or hegemony or spite." (255) 
Comments about the war are often retrospective, such as seeing the war as "largely a 
capitalist war fought to protect American political and economic interests in 
Southeast Asia by an American military organized and managed like a corporation 
working hand-in-glove with other American ' business, ' just what Eisenhower had in 
mind when he warned of an emerging 'military-industrial complex"' (Carpenter 2003, 
33). Alternatively, the war is seen as a form of "American imperialism" (Kinney 
1995, 637). 
Paris in Cacciato then becomes more than a geographical place for it is 
symbolically "representing all that Vietnam is not: peace, civilization, and the 
triumphant arrival of American soldiers in previous wars" (Kinney 1995, 635). The 
fact that the apartment which Berlin and Sarkin Aung Wan rent in Paris is one which 
has been left uninhabited since 1945 shows that their journey is not only physical 
(from Quang Ngai to Paris) but also mystically temporal and symbolic (from 
Vietnam 1968 back to Paris 1945); as Kinney observes: "Paris in 1945 symbolizes a 
point in history where everything went right for Americans, the essential opposite of 
Vietnam in 1968. Paris denotes the desire for both absolute power and innocence" 
(Kinney 1995, 635). The journey to Paris is, therefore, highly nostalgic; as Kinney 
notes: "Paris inevitably marks a return to the origins of the Vietnam War, the seat of 
the French empire that sought to reestablish its control over the land, resources, and 
people of Vietnam at the close of World War II." (Kinney 1995, 635) Raymond 
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Olderman (1976) says that American literature before the 1960s has been informed 
by the metaphors of "a lost Eden," the "American Adam," and the "American 
Dream," while that of the 1960s was then one of the "image of the waste land", a 
landscape of "dry and sterile waste" (Olderman 1976, 8-9). A naive wish to return to 
such an original state of innocence, the "lost Eden", when the Vietnam War had not 
taken place, when America was "still a pretty innocent place" is bound to be mocked 
by 0 'Brien. As in "How to tell a true war story" when referring to Vietnam he has his 
characters say: "Well, that's Nam, [ ... ] Garden of Evil. Over here, man, every sin's 
real fresh and original." Instead of building a new Garden of Eden we build a Garden 
of Evil where the original sin of our gaining the forbidden knowledge is now even 
more "fresh" and "original" because we mankind have an unimaginable capability 
for making use of that power of knowledge we have got to make evil. Thus it is 
normal that comments about the war usually only take shape well after. After all, as 
Stewart O'Nan (1998) points out in his Vietnam Reader: "In a war smothered in lies, 
silence, and misinformation (even now, well after the fact), how does a writer or 
screen writer claim to be the bearer of truth?" ( 5). We do see a change of attitude from 
confusion about the war evident in war fiction of the 70s to one of critique in the 90s. 
In his post-war story "On the Rainy River", twenty years after the war, O'Brien's 
narrator could at last declare with affirmation: "I did not want to die. Not ever. But 
certainly not then, not there, not in a wrong war." (Things, 42; my emphasis) That 
O'Brien's The Things They Carried (1989) was nominated for the 1990 Pulitzer Prize 
and the National Book Critics Circle Award may tell us how O'Brien's criticism of 
the war was widely shared and valued then. 
But the critique and ambivalent feelings about the US involvement in the war 
have been washed away gradually over the years which leads to O'Brien's later more 
"radical" work such as The Things They Carried and In the Lake of the Woods. "After 
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Vietnam," O'Brien observes in a 1994 interview: "there was a sense of impotence 
that swept across the nation and entered into our psyches. We had been the Lone 
Ranger for so many years, and now we were unmasked. We've wanted to pump iron 
for so many years, show that we're tough guys, you know, go into Grenada and go 
into Panama and go into Iraq and kick ass. The Vietnam syndrome." It is this sense of 
impotence and the subsequent Vietnam syndrome "built into the political psyche of 
the nation" (Edelman 1994 interview) that urges Tim O'Brien to write his novels. 
What he wants to do then is to make things remembered again, to resist "the age of 
forgetting" (Baxter, qtd. by Melley 2003, 1 06), the "historical amnesia" which has 
swept over the US over these years. 14 Even if the "whole thing [the war] would go 
away", his stories will do the task of preservation of history 15 ; as the "O'Brien" 
writer-character says in the story "Spin": "Forty-three years old, and the war 
occurred half a lifetime ago, and yet the remembering makes it now. And sometimes 
remembering will lead to a story, which makes it forever. That's what stories are for. 
Stories are for joining the past to the future. [ ... ] Stories are for eternity, when 
memory is erased, when there is nothing to remember except the story." (Things 35) 
Such criticism of the public impotence-turned-amnesia is heightened in many 
post-war novels of the 1990s (such as O'Brien's In the Lake of the Woods). In 
O'Brien's The Things They Carried, for example, Norman Bowker's inability to 
articulate his war experience when he returns to the civilian world signifies not only 
his failure of expression but more importantly, it is a failure on the reader/listener's 
part that "people in the world have chosen to deny the reality of the war; they don't 
want to hear about it. Least of all do they want to hear about it from the returned 
veteran, which would make their abstracted, statistical notions of war altogether too 
real." (Timmerman 2000, 1 06) Such mockery of the civilian attitude of resuming 
their prestigious and apathetic position as outsiders is put into words by the pre-war 
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civilian "O'Brien," an undergraduate student about to do graduate studies at Harvard, 
who was then "infuriated" by his being drafted to the war, he said: "I was too good 
for this war. Too smart, too compassionate, too everything. It couldn't happen. I was 
above it" (41; original emphasis). As a civilian, his anti-war sentiments towards the 
war were limited to his campaigns at college, and to "O'Brien": "Oddly, though, it 
was almost entirely an intellectual activity. [ ... ] I felt no personal danger; I felt no 
sense of an impeding crisis in my life" ( 40). That people do not talk about the war 
and would not listen was a dominant mentality of the decades after the war, as 
ironically described through the war veteran Norman Bowker's being unwelcomed 
by the civilian world: '"How' d you like to hear about the war?' [Bowker] might have 
asked, but the place could only blink and shrug. It had no memory, therefore no 
guilt" ( 144 ). But we know this is an ironic remark: denying the story, refusing a 
memory of it does not guarantee guiltlessness. There is no "therefore no guilt", 
because as Norman Bowker says in another story "In the field", the fault of Kiowa's 
death in the shitfield is: ''Nobody's fault" but "everybody's" (173). 
To resist such historical forgetting and denial of what happened in Vietnam and 
its subsequent sense of impotence, re-engagement is the key issue. But the form of 
engagement should not be philosophical or scholarly or statistical; as Timmerman 
observes: "Certainly it is possible to engage the experience of war exclusively on 
scholarly and academic terms, to configure the experience according to statistics and 
historical accounts. Every time human experience is rendered as fact, however, the 
human place in war becomes more abstracted and more simplistic." (Timmerman 
2000, 1 00) A new area of engagement is thus opened up in the Imaginary sphere for 
literary representations. O'Brien therefore views his novels - literary, imaginary 
re-presentations of war - as serving the purpose of "reaffirming the truth of the 
cliches that 'war is hell,' or 'death is horrible,' something we all so often tend to 
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forget. Body counts, casualty rates, our politicians have made it all so abstract"; to 
0' Brien, his writing is "a reminder that war is hell for a particular reason" (Bourne 
1991 interview) and as his "How to tell a true war story" states: "True war stories do 
not generalize. They do not indulge in abstraction or analysis." (Things 75) Every 
war story is a scoop; and Tim O'Brien strives to make the spectacular to the 
particular. Traditional war narratives capture the "spectacular" to please the appetites 
of the reader and that kind of representation of the "spectacular", of making it 
spectacular is to dramatise it, which means also to overrepresent (i.e., misrepresent) 
what can be boosted to be the spectacular and to underrepresent what is thought as 
trivial and banal. O'Brien does quite the contrary when he devotes pages to simply 
the banal walking of Paul Berlin to the mountain (every movement of the body parts 
is described) and such unusual spotlight given to the trivial is best shown in his 
description of the fly disturbing the execution in Cacciato. 16 
O'Brien's War Novels of Affect 
"I wish we were more troubled." 
- Tim O'Brien, "We' re Adjusted Too Well" 
O'Brien in his "We're Adjusted Too Well", collected in The Wounded 
Generation: America After Vietnam (Home ed. 1981 ), expressed his dismay that the 
nation was trying to erase the war and hoping that everything would "slide back" into 
some "vague", "normal" or "adjusted' state, and he came to pronounce: "I wish we 
were more troubled" ( qtd. in Timmerman 2000, 100-101 ). In a 1994 interview 
O'Brien disapproves this growing "amnesia" or indifference with his anger at people 
who "wish the whole thing would go away, be forgotten" and the sad thing is: "And 
it practically has. This is all basically a footnote to the Vietnam War now." (Edelman 
1994 interview) "If American society is no longer troubled, if it has exorcised a 
segment of our historical past," Timmerman comments also, "it has also occluded 
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something of our human nature." (2000, 100-101) 
Timmerman points out a very important question regarding the function of war 
stories today: "War stories must evoke the dreams and lives of individual soldiers, as 
opposed to giving a statistical or historical accounting of data. This telling raises 
several aesthetic questions. Can one capture the reality of the event in such a way 
that the reader imaginatively participates in it? Is there a point where the imaginative 
life evokes a greater reality than the factual accounting, so that the reader 
understands not only what happened but also why it happened and how it affected 
the soldier?" (2000, 101; my emphasis). The answer to his question is, yes, O'Brien 
has achieved a new form of war novels which serves as a form of re-engagement of 
the impotent, forgetful reader with the reality of war - his "story-truth", or 
"emotional truth", or "spiritual truth" which is "sometimes truer than 
happening-truth" because it is necessary to "make up a few things" to get at a truth 
you will never get if told otherwise. This is why I call his works "War Novels of 
Affect" where he takes both the characters and the readers on a psychogeographical 
journey in Cacciato, and in The Things he deals with meta-fiction. I will later argue 
that this is a m eta-fiction as meta-reader work; self-reflexivity involves not so much 
storytelling as story-listening: the act of exposing the limits of the fiction itself is 
instead an act of exposing the limits of the spectator-readers, and of resisting any 
easy and laid-back consumption. 
War fiction is another form of engagement because it affects and troubles the 
reader: through literary complexities and hard work it does not render human 
experience of war as merely facts. The multiple meanings of "affect" are critical. In 
addition to causing emotions ("to make somebody have strong feelings of sadness, 
pity", "to have an influence on somebody"), to "affect" is also to "attack somebody", 
to "make somebody become ill or sick". A true war story is to affect the reader. It is 
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this last meaning of "affect" which best characterizes O'Brien's works, as he himself 
says that his novels are always in search of "emotional truth, which is what fiction is 
about" and that "[w]hat's really true is not a philosophical thing, it's a plaguing 
thing" (Weber 1998 interview; my emphasis). It aims at the reader's "gut instinct", 
not his intellect, as in "How to tell a true war story" (1990) he says: "A true war story, 
if truly told, makes the stomach believe," it "turns inside" (Things 75). O'Brien has 
achieved this to the extent that his works are deemed by many (such as the 
interviewer Bourne) as "a sort of pornography" (such as Curt Lemon's death 
"scattered in pieces up in the tree" and the Viet Cong young soldier "who has a 
star-shaped hole where his eye should be"). O'Brien replies: "I think that violence 
itself is pornographic in a way, and this pornography has to be described in raw, 
physical, truthful terms." (Bourne 1991 interview) After all, how to tell a true war 
story cannot be separated from how to read one, and it is the challenge (and criticism) 
of this reading that distinguishes O'Brien's "true war story". 
Society of Spectacle: Psychogeographical remapping of the landscape of war 
experience as counter-narrative against ideologized spectatorship of war 
·'The war was fought with the feet and legs [ ... ]" 
- Going After Cacciato 
"The spectacle is the map of this new world, 
a map that is identical to the territory it represents." 
- Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle 
Our spectacle mentality has significantly transformed our understanding of war 
(and the war as landscape) today. The new technologies of modernity have 
revolutionized our perception of space with "new modes of transport" which are "on 
a mass scale for mass consumption" (Rodrigues 2005, 16-17). Movement has 
become too easy and speed incredibly increased. But as Debord observes: "While 
eliminating geographical distance, this society produces a new internal distance in 
the form of spectacular separation." (94) This new distance has created our very 
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sense of "alienation", as Debord says: "The spectator does not feel at home anywhere, 
because the spectacle is everywhere." (16) 
Psychogeography is a sub-movement of the "Situationists" in the 1960s. It had a 
direct impact on the anti-Vietnam war movements in Paris and especially the 1968 
events. To the Situationists it is essential to become aware of and to resist such 
spectacle by doing such things as going on a derive as a jlaneur in the city and 
re-looking at it afresh. 
This is the first possibility to transcend our spectatorship of war. Becoming a 
jlaneur is a way of unbecoming a voyeuristic spectator: as Debord suggests that the 
derive, the "simple act of walking can take on a subversive hue, abolishing the 
distancing and voyeuristic perspective of those who view the city from above." 
(Coverley 2006, 1 05) And it "takes the wanderer out of the realm of the disinterested 
spectator [ ... ] and places him in a subversive position as a revolutionary following a 
political agenda" (Coverley 2006, 97). 
Going After Cacciato (1975) tells of a soldier named Paul Berlin (rank Spec 
Four) in his one-night guard (from midnight to 6 a.m.) up in an Observation Post 
overlooking the South China Sea in Quang Ngai, Vietnam, 1968. Cacciato, a soldier 
at the squad, has departed and declared he would walk 8,600 miles to Paris. That is 
the point where the whole story develops from this actual happening the other day 
that the squad went chasing after Cacciato but they lost him on a mountain. Berlin 
therefore spends this night while on guard imagining a fantastical journey to the West 
going after Cacciato (all the way through Mandalay, Delhi, Kabul, Tehran, 
Luxemburg, Iran, Turkey, Greece to Paris), pondering what might have happened if 
they had followed Cacciato, too. The "fact" of the failed chase after Cacciato is then 
extended to the imagination of the journey, also including a love fantasy with a 
young Vietnamese refugee girl, Sarkin Aung Wan, on their way to Paris. Berlin's 
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imagination is also fused with flashbacks of his past memories (such as his early 
days in the war when he was still Private First Class; his time with his father, before 
the war, along the Des Moines River) making fact, memory, and imagination, and the 
past and the present (reality in the Observation post) inseparable from one another: 
"What part was fact and what part was the extension of fact? And how were facts 
separated from possibilities? What had really happened and what merely might have 
happened? How did it end?" (Cacciato 34). Thus Cacciato is a war story about the 
past conditional perfect; and in fact the "unexperienced experience" should be 
equally valued (see Derrida 2000, 47-48). We will return to this idea later in the 
chapter. 
Cacciato is a novel about seeing. There is Berlin's "Observation Post" and the 
viewing lens (periscope) under the tunnel where the VC Li Van Hgoc says to Berlin: 
"Look closer. Concentrate." (89) This scene then brings Berlin to the next chapter, 
Chapter 14, about another version of the death of Frenchie Tucker and Bemie Lynn 
where we see they are indeed not good buddies as they seemed in chapter 9 and that 
their deaths are resulted from man-made mistakes and silly commands, and when 
they were going to die nobody wanted to help. This is what Li Van Hgoc says: "So 
you see [ ... ] things may be viewed from many angles. From down below, or from 
inside out, you often discover entirely new understandings." (93) Here, we see one 
example of the novel challenging our ways of seeing. 
Cacciato takes not only Berlin but also the reader on this imaginary journey to 
desert our preconceived spectator perspectives. The novel treats our deserters in a 
different light, as Milan Kundera says in another context: "From every viewpoint-
political, juridical, moral - the deserter looks unpleasant, blameworthy, akin to 
cowards and traitors. The novelist's eye sees him otherwise: the deserter is one who 
refuses to grant meaning to the battles of his contemporaries. Who refuses to see a 
65 
tragic grandeur in massacres. Who is loath to participate as a clown in History's 
comedy. His vision of things is often lucid, very lucid, but it makes his position 
difficult to maintain: it loosens his solidarity with his people; it distances him from 
mankind." (Kundera 2008, 112) Kundera's definition of the deserter is interestingly 
comparable to our psychogeographical jlaneur and we can see this journey all the 
way through the cities as a psycho geographical remapping of war experience. Berlin 
and his squad, the seven of them, go on this journey ("mission") to hunt down the 
deserter Cacciato without knowing what a great impact this journey would have on 
them. They see this as a good chance to go sightseeing, for example; and to deny 
their complicity in the same crime Cacciato has committed; they call themselves 
"touring soldiers": "soldiers who tour, touring soldiers. In that sense, then, we are not 
strictly soldiers. There's a big difference." ( Cacciato 185) The war "tourism" is fun 
but soon Berlin realizes the impact of such touring has had on him, as he is now 
given a new perspective to look at the cities and what civilization really means when 
he is no longer viewing them from above. He penetrates the city, realizing "the 
totalizing gaze of the voyeur [which] sees the city as a homogenous whole, an 
anonymous urban space that sees no place for individual or separate identities and 
which erases or suppresses the personal and the local. [ ... ] Only by resisting this 
overview can the individual re-establish the emotional engagement with his 
surroundings that psychogeography promotes." (Coverley 2006, 105-1 06) This 
journey matures Berlin significantly because he is not only ajlaneur but at the same 
time a stalker "walking with a thesis" (the mission) and "with a prey" (Cacciato) 
(Coverley 2006, 120). This personal intimacy with the cities is important especially 
when we are in a "Society of Spectacle" where our preconceptions of our 
surrounding world are always already mediated, distorted, disconnected. This is 
especially the case with the Vietnam War. 
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The Vietnam War is regarded by some critics as "a postmodem phenomenon"17 
and a "postmodem war" to the extent that it has paved the way for the later 
postmodem discussions of, by Jean Baudrillard most notably, the hypperreality of 
war because of how it is heavily mediated by media (the argument goes further to 
"The Gulf War Did Not Take Place"). Preferring simulations to reality, we consume 
war images and narratives rather than have direct confrontation with war itself. But 
such taking-over by the simulations is not only about attitude but capability; as 
Richard Osbome (2006) observes: "[Baudrillard] is not saying that everything is 
artificial, because for us to recognize the artificial we need to know what is real. That 
is the problem" ( 168, original emphasis). Franc is Ford Coppola, director of 
Apocalypse Now, has notoriously remarked: "My film is not about Vietnam. My film 
is Vietnam. It's what it was really like." We have, too, mistaken that a representation 
about Vietnam is Vietnam. 
We in Going After Cacciato see how Berlin's pre-war idea of what was going on 
in the Vietnam War was heavily drawn from the media. Moreover, we see how 
untroubled he was because the media has rendered the brutal realities of war unreal. 
Back then at college when Berlin wanted to drop out, the school counselor asked him: 
"Don't you know there's a war on?". We learn that: "And the truth was that Berlin 
did not know. Oh, he knew, but not in any personal sense. He'd seen the fighting on 
TV, he'd read about it in newspapers, but somehow it had never seemed quite real." 
( Cacciato 217) Because of the extensive coverage of the war, soldiers enlisted to the 
armed forces went into war with a preconception of what they were going to see, 
without knowing that it was indeed a highly mediated and ideological misconception. 
This is exemplified by Berlin who feels he knows Quang Ngai and the land already, 
and finds what he sees is too familiar; his emotional capacity to feel and react is 
somehow blunted: 
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He had seen it in movies. He had read about poverty in magazines and newspapers, 
seen pictures of it on television. So when he saw the villages of Quang N gai, he had 
seen it all before. He had seen, before seeing, hideous skin diseases, hunger, rotting 
animals, huts without furniture or plumbing of light. He had seen the shit-fields where 
villagers squatted. He had seen chickens roosting on babies. Misery and want, bloated 
bellies, scabs and pus-wounds, even death. All of it, he'd seen it before. So when he 
saw it - when he first entered a village south of Chu Lai - he felt a kind of mild 
surprise, fleeting compassion, but not amazement. He knew what he would see and he 
saw it. He was not stricken by it; he was not outraged or made to grieve. He felt no 
great horror. He felt some guilt, but passed quickly, because he had seen it before 
seeing it. ( Cacciato 241) 
The shock power of the real images no longer brings horror to Berlin because 
"he had seen it before seetng it". O'Brien always parodies such 
having-seen-before-seeing in his deliberate melodrama of the images of the cities 
imagined by Berlin; O'Brien confesses in an interview that he actually wanted to 
fashion a feeling of stereotyped simulacra of his different city scene on the way to 
Paris as if simply copied out from National Geographic: "I was trying to represent 
these places the way they'd be represented by someone who hadn't in fact been there. 
[ ... ] So I took this National Geographic India and particularized it in the way we do 
the landscapes in our dreams. [ ... ] Berlin says bluntly, 'This is the world I'd seen in 
photographs, in my imagination.' Bolts of cloth, cows roaming the streets of New 
Delhi, all these general images." (Boume 1991 interview) The cities- India, Greece, 
even Paris - are all deliberately represented as stereotyped simulacra in that way. 
But O'Brien wants to challenge this stereotypical, unthinking preconception of 
places (often exotic, mysterious, for example) held by the Other, the American 
soldiers and civilians in particular, by introducing some strange characters (such as 
the strange Americanized Hindu who studied Hotel Management) embodying new 
possibilities and angles to defamiliarize us, to estrange us as "something 
unpredictable, which gives everything a unique, strange quality" (Bourne 1991 ). 
O'Brien goes on to say in the interview: "In each of those cases, throughout the way 
to Paris, it started with a kind of standard backdrop, and then a character 
superimposed on this stereotype that changes everything. [ ... ] Start with the standard, 
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ordinary, all-American knowledge of these places. Then impose on it a uniqueness as 
a consequence of the human imagination." (Bourne 1991) This mingling of the 
human imagination and everyday reality gives rise to a re-imagining of our everyday 
experience, stereotypes, and we can by then come to a new vision by a 
psychogeographical mentality. 
A psycho geographical understanding of the city is not touristic: it resists "a true 
tourist feeling" ( Cacciato 242). In Dehli, "Paul Berlin spent the days roaming the 
city with his camera. He liked the sense of peace, all the col or and harmony, but even 
so he felt an urge to get back on the road. To finish things. Besides, there were times 
when he was struck with an odd sense of guilt. At night, playing checkers with 
Sarkin Aung Wan, the whole made-up world seemed to dissolve: too quiet, too 
serene. A feeling of suspension" (167). Paris, for example, is not all about the Rodin 
Museum, Notre-Dame, Versailles, the Eiffel Tower, all glossy and glamorous. Like 
Yossarian in Catch-22 who also experiences the true essence of the Rome city and 
realizes at last it is not all paradise he used to think it was, near the end of Cacciato 
we see Paris is also disillusioned; it is not all "peace and harmony and happiness" 
(294). Cacciato emerges again in the crowd at the prosperous Parisian street and 
Berlin follows him at a distance into "a part of Paris that Paul Berlin had never seen": 
"It was poverty. Thickset roofs clung to one another as if designed to block out 
sunlight; everywhere there were tenements running in bleak rows like barracks, one 
to the next. There was no beauty in it, no elegance or charm." (297) 
Discussing William Blake using a psychogeohraphical approach, Coverley says 
Blake has "transformed the familiar landscapes of his own time and place into a 
transcendent image of the eternal city" (See Coverley's discussion on William Blake 
2006, 40); I think Yossarian in Catch-22 and Paul Berlin in Cacciato have both 
transformed their own too as they have come to see the city in ways they "had never 
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seen", a deja vu becomingjamais vu, and transforming the historical landscape into 
one of the imaginary, the fictional, the metaphorical dreamscape (e.g., as Yossarian's 
"Eternal City" chapter title reveals). 
The psychogeographical derive, we have learned, "takes the wanderer out of the 
realm of the disinterested spectator" (Coverley 2006, 97) as it is "abolishing the 
distancing and voyeuristic perspective of those who view the city from above" (2006, 
105; my emphasis). This "from above" point of view is spectacular; and it marks our 
very spectator mentality of modernity (the Alps, the bird's view enabled first by the 
Eiffel Tower, aerial balloons and airplanes, even nowadays the instant satellite view 
by Google Map and Google Street View). The scene of the beheading of a young boy 
(an AWOL soldier, not even a deserter) in Tehran with a crowd assembling in front of 
the platform watching and even clapping, and martial music being played from the 
loudspeaker as if it was a carnival, is called by Doe "a show," "a spectacle" which he 
goes on to declare: "It's one of those true spectacles of civilization." (Cacciato 178) 
The scene goes on: 
'See?' Doe said. 'What did I say? Isn't it a genuine spectacle?' 
'It is.' 
'One of civilization's grandest offerings.' 
[ ... ] 
'Watch this,' Doe said. He touched Paul Berlin's shoulder. 'Your fine expedition to Paris, 
all the spectacular spectacles along the way. Civilization. You watch this shit.' 
'Let's go,' Paul Berlin said quietly. 
'No, man. No, I want you to watch this. Pay attention, look for all the pretty details.' 
[ ... ] 
'Jesus,' Eddie whispered. He looked away, then looked back again. 
( Cacciato 1 79-180; original emphasis) 
So this is our "spectacular" civilization. Berlin does not want to watch. Eddie 
looks away and looks back again while saying "Jesus" all the time. The frrst action of 
Eddie's looking away is fear, or sympathy, but the second action of looking back is 
pure curiosity, highly voyeuristic and sadistic. This episode indeed can illustrate the 
growing difference between Berlin and the general spectators (the squad, the crowd): 
Berlin has begun to outgrow the spectator he used to be, although still not quite, as 
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he - under the peer pressure of his spectator friends for this "communal watching" -
has stayed and "watched closely", concentrated, trying to "remember the details, 
store them up for future understanding" (181). The intention is good (as now he 
watches not in order to entertain himself and to consume but to "store them up for 
future understanding"); but still, what is the use if "Paul Berlin is by nature a watcher 
rather than a doer" (Bates 1987, 274)? And what is the use even if he now has come 
to an awareness of his own spectatorship in regarding the pain of others but without 
breaking the embedded impotence? 
Society of Impotence 
Responsibility is a common theme in most war fiction, but the emphasis is often 
on what the soldiers did (i.e., evil actions) rather than what they did not (i.e., 
inaction). In O'Brien's novels, the problem of responsibility, courage, etc., is given 
much scholarly criticism such as in the discussion of cowardice in O'Brien's The 
Things They Carried. But I would like to argue that what the soldiers did not do -
that is, their impotence - is also a kind of responsibility they have to bear, and this 
originates from our mentality because we are a Society of Spectacle, which at the 
same time reveals our very nature to be one of Impotence as well. 
Throughout the novel there are many occasions when Berlin is sympathetic with 
the suffering, such as the incident of "frisking" the Vietnamese villagers while he 
said in his heart: Sorry papa-san. I don't like it either, nobody likes it, but we do what 
we do (135). The same happens when Berlin wants to help the young AWOL soldier 
who is desperate to shoo off the fly during the execution. "Please," Berlin whispers. 
Then he is shouting: "The fly, somebody - " ( 181) But he is unable even to articulate 
it bravely, not even something like "somebody help him!" He is sensitive to others' 
pain and suffering, down to noticing the most trivial detail (e.g., the fly), but when 
compassion does not translate to action, what is the use? Susan Sontag points out in 
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Regarding the Pain of Others the interdependent relationship between compassion 
and action: "It is because a war, any war, doesn't seem as if it can be stopped that 
people become less responsive to the horrors. Compassion is an unstable emotion. It 
needs to be translated into action, or it withers. [ ... ] [T]hen one starts to get bored, 
cynical, apathetic." (Sontag 2004, 90-91) 
Likewise, Berger observes in the early 1970s how war photographs had become 
"normal" in some mass circulation newspaper and people were no longer "shocked" 
and they became "inured to violent images" (Berger 1991, 42). He also concludes: 
"As we look at them, the moment of the other's suffering engulfs us. We are filled 
with either despair or indignation. Despair takes on some of the other's suffering to 
no purpose. Indignation demands action." (Berger, "Photographs of Agony" [1972], 
in Berger 1991; my emphasis) Berlin is worse because his sympathy is only a form 
of denial of culpability; as Sontag reminds us: "So far as we feel sympathy, we feel 
we are not accomplices to what caused the suffering." (2004, 91) But possession of 
sympathy cannot justify us to declare innocence, to discard accomplices and the 
complicity for our non-intervention; as Sontag goes on to point out: "Our sympathy 
proclaims our innocence as well as our impotence." (2004, 91) In the case of Berlin, 
he is too aware of his very lack of innocence, which is a situation worsened by his 
impotence. Not only is he impotent to do things, but more sadly, impotent to say no: 
"So, sure, he frisked them all: one by one in a row, patting along the thighs and 
rumps and breasts without daring to look, not feeling but not unfeeling, no touch in 
his fingers. Then the babies, frisked them in their sleep, spilling out cradles at 
gunpoint. Cats and dogs, all frisked. The whole village was frisked." ( Cacciato 136) 
It is because of this inaction that the Vietnamese people shout at Berlin: 'Shame!' 
'Evil!' 'Wicked!' 'Illegal!' 'Dishonor!' ' Disgrace!' however "truly, deeply" Berlin 
meant by his mental apology and excuse (134, 136). This impotence also makes itself 
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into an initial form of emotional confusion which ends up as emotional paralysis: 
"They did not know how to feel. Whether, when seeing a dead Vietnamese, to be 
happy or sad or relieved"; "They did not know how to feel when they saw villages 
burning. Revenge? Loss? Peace of mind or anguish?"; "They did not know good 
from evil." (Cacciato 256) 
The fault of Berlin is that he fails to see his culpability and he always wants to 
play innocent: "He wanted to be liked. He wanted them to understand, all of them, 
that he felt no hate. It was all a sad accident, he would have told them- chance, 
high-level politics, confusion. He had no stake in the war beyond simple survival; he 
was there, in Quang Ngai, for the same reasons they were: the luck of the draw, bad 
fortune, forces beyond reckoning. His intentions were benign. He was no tyrant, no 
pig, no Yankee killer. He was innocent. Yes, he was. He was innocent." (249) But 
Berlin forgets that intentions are out of the question; it is his actions (or inactions) 
which have brought the very bad "external consequences" upon the Vietnamese that 
counts; and definitely even if he is not the direct agent he still has a large "share of 
responsibility" (See Merleau-Ponty, 145). 
In addition to shuddering his responsibility to "chance" and "accident", to 
politics and the outer "forces beyond reckoning", seemingly beyond individual 
interruption, too. Berlin goes on to excuse his inaction saying that he is unable to, not 
that he does not want to: "He would have told them that, the villagers, if he'd known 
the language, if there had been time to talk. He would have told them he wanted to 
harm no one." (249) He even tried to seek understanding by saying he, too, was a 
victim: "He had wronged no one. If he'd known the language, he would have told 
them how he hated to see the villages burned. Hated to see the paddies trampled. 
How it made him angry and sad when ... a million things, when women were frisked 
with free hands, when, in a ville called Thin Mau, Oscar and Rudy Chassler shot 
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down ten dogs for the sport of it. Sad and stupid. Crazy. Mean-spirited and 
self-defeating and wrong. Wrong!" As always we see how he would have this and 
would have that and would have and would have. And how he would have told 
especially the kids that he is different from the other American "Yankee killers": "But 
not me, he would have told them. The others, maybe, but not me. Guilty perhaps of 
hanging on, of letting myself be dragged along, of falling victim to gravity and 
obligation and events, but not- not! - guilty of wrong intentions" ( Cacciato 249). 
Berlin fails to see that intentions were no longer the issue and that the guilt of 
wrong intentions was as evil as the guilt of "hanging on", of "letting [oneself] be 
dragged along", and thus he was no "victim" but the conspirator-victimizer. Berlin 
even goes to challenge: "What would anyone have done?" (250), as if he is saying 
that his inaction is indeed the only possible, universal reaction. But a 
counter-example to Berlin's speculation (and he himself is well conscious indeed) is 
Cacciato, the one who embodies Human Possibilities, the alternative, the what-ifs. 
While Berlin and the squad say that killing their former Lieutenant Sidney Martin 
was the only "hopeless" way to stay alive at the war: "It's a thing that has to be done. 
That's all it is. It'll be done anyway" (228), Cacciato is able to say no: "I won't do 
it." Berlin keeps challenging Cacciato: "You think that'll stop them?" "But you think 
that'll stop it?" "Nothing will stop it. It'll happen anyway". It is as if Berlin is at the 
same time trying to make himself feel better. But he fails to realize that even if he 
cannot change the decision of the squad, at least he can do his own part by not 
participating in it, like Cacciato who refuses. And Cacciato, partly because he does 
not want the culpability of the war, at last chooses to desert and goes on his journey 
to the West. The truly courageous is not the one who stays at the war, but the one 
who chooses to say no to the war, as Berlin says of Cacciato: "You can't say he 
wasn't brave. You can't say that" (23). Even another less significant character Oscar 
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also realizes the problem and says with disgust to the squad and especially to Berlin 
at last: "No more tryin [ ... ] Tonight you pitiful mothers is gonna do. Tonight I teach 
the basic difference between fuckup tryin' and doing" (309). 
This inability to say no is one central issue to O'Brien's novels which often 
feature paralyzed characters, who are pathetic not necessarily for what they did, but 
rather, what they did not, and this inability to say no is a universal predicament. 
O'Brien says in an interview: "There were moral issues, like the terrible thing of 
even going to the war and not having the courage to say no, which makes you want 
to write about how hard it is to say no in this world to anything. Saying no makes 
you unpopular and hurts your reputation-so you say yes to everything. Whether it's 
your country or your girlfriend-it's hard to say no, right? So, Vietnam is a way of 
entering that, but the essential problem isn't geopolitical. The central problem is 
more human." (Karp 2002 interview) However, despite the fact that these paralyzed 
soldiers look pathetic and seem to draw our sympathy to them, O'Brien says in an 
interview that what he does is to re-create the situations for the reader to see the 
circumstances more clearly, but that does not mean that can justify what they did. 
O'Brien does not sympathize with his characters: "I understand what they went 
through. It's like Hitler. You can explain it. It doesn't mean you can justify it. [ . .. ] I 
tried in the book to carefully show the circumstances that led up to it, the men dying, 
anger and everything" (Edelman 1994 interview). 
In all the texts we examine we see there is always an active "other" as contrast 
to the impotent, inactive protagonists (see Bayley 1987). In We Bombed we have 
Henderson and Starkey as a pair, in Catch-22 Orr and Yossarian, here in Cacciato we 
see Cacciato never gives up; he does not only think of impossibilities like Berlin 
does in his imagination: he carries it out, he at least tried. What can be more 
impossible than walking to Paris, or fishing in the Lake Country which is indeed 
75 
"bomb craters filling up with rain" (226)? But Cacciato "fished without the least 
show of temper or fatigue[ ... ] and he did not give up" (235); He thought of going to 
Paris and he really departed, whereas Berlin can only toy with such a "splendid idea" 
in his imagination, and let the others - never himself- let Cacciato do it: "Cacciato 
leading them west through peaceful country, deep country perfumed by lilacs and 
burning hemp, a boy coaxing them step by step through rich and fertile country 
toward Paris. It was a splendid idea" (33). Berlin is only interested in idea, 
possibilities, what might have been done, but never action. He only pretends: 
"Pretending was his best trick to forget the war" ( 17) from first page to last: "His 
eyes were closed. He was pretending he was not in the war. Pretending he had not 
watched Billy Boy Watkins die of fright on the field of battle. He was pretending he 
was a boy again, camping with his father in the midnight summer along the Des 
Moines River. 'Be calm,' his father said. 'Ignore the bad stuff, look for the good. ' In 
the dark, eyes closed, he pretended. He pretended that when he opened his eyes his 
father would be there by the campfire and, father and son, they would begin to talk 
softly about whatever came to mind, minor things, trivial things, and then roll into 
their sleeping bags. And later, he pretended, it would be morning and there would not 
be a war." (Cacciato 201) He wishes that his father and mother would help him, that 
the war itself will resolve effortlessly, that simply by closing his eyes (metaphorically 
speaking, that is turning a blind eye, denying a reality), by pretending and by only 
wishing and dreaming everything would turn out fine like miracle: "A miracle, Paul 
Berlin kept thinking. It was all he wanted - a genuine miracle to confound natural 
law, a baffling reversal of the inevitable consequences. He thought of his father for a 
time, and of his mother, and then he slept, dreaming of miracles." (230) 
Berlin always thinks there is strong determinism in the world and that human 
actions would only suffice very little because everything is uninterruptible, as if they 
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are composed of "natural law" and "inevitable consequences". He does not even 
want to try. This is not dissimilar to the French existentialist (and some nihilist) 
thought of futile human actions which dominated the 1940s and 50s of the American 
novel. This continued too to the postmodemist 1960s with the sense of "some 
massive unhuman force which has rendered us powerless" (Olderman 1976, 3). 
There is also the existentialist absurdity which "rules human actions" and that "there 
are no accepted norms of feeling or conduct [which we can] appeal"; in short, this is 
a "world of error" (1976, 13). Berlin has the same feeling: "Out of control, and 
maybe it always had been. One thing leading to the next, and pretty soon there was 
no guiding it, and things happened out of other things. Like the time Cacciato went 
fishing in Lake Country [ ... ] And then Lieutenant Corson came to replace Lieutenant 
Sidney Martin. The way events led to events, and the way they got out of human 
control." (Cacciato 235) Berlin denies his own responsibility as an individual and 
calls the evil things that happened "accidents". He said that their collective murder of 
Sidney Martin was a "very sad thing" ("What happened to Lieutenant Sidney Martin 
was a very sad thing"), but Berlin and Cacciato know too well that it is "a very sad 
thing" not because it happened but because it could have been stopped. Can he shun 
all his responsibilities by just saying everything is simply always "out of control" and 
"one thing leading to the next" and "things happened out of other things" as if on 
autopilot? 
Berlin ts, however, self-conscious of his own impotence, especially when 
compared to the more active doer Cacciato: "He might even have tried himself. With 
courage, he thought, he might even have joined in, and that was the one sorry thing 
about it, the sad thing: he might have" (30). Sarkin points out: "It is one thing to 
speculate about what might be. It is quite another to act in behalf of our dreams, to 
treat them as objectives that are achievable and worth achieving. It is one thing to run 
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from unhappiness; it is another to take action to realize those qualities of dignity and 
well-being that are the true standards of the human spirit" and anyone "must then do 
what he can to edge reality toward what he has dreamed, to change what he can 
change, to go beyond the wish or the fantasy" (300). And Doe reminds him: "No 
more maybes. Reality doesn't work that way." (291) Sarkin Aung Wan is fed up with 
Berlin's "possibilities": "Possibilities unending. Possibilities and possibilities." And 
she is fed up with his "thinking": "Thinking! Think and think and think! You're 
afraid to do. Afraid to break away. All your fine dreams and thinking and 
pretending ... now you can do something, Spec Four. Don't you see? Why have we 
become refugees? To think? To make believe? To play games, chasing poor Cacciato? 
Is that why? Or did we come for better reasons? To be happy? To find peace and live 
good lives? No more thinking, Spec Four. Now we can make it permanent and real. 
We can find a place to live, and we can be happy. Now, we can do it now" (281; 
original emphasis). Sarkin Aung Wan urges Berlin to act, and to act now, no more 
possibility, no more a would-be possibility infinitely postponed to future. As we all 
know, possibility without realization is always only possibility. 
Metafiction as Counter-narrative Against the Affectless Spectator-Readers 
"I wanted to use stories to alert readers to 
the complexity and ambiguity of a set of moral issues." 
-O'Brien, interview with Larry McCaffery in Chicago Review (1982) 
Tim O'Brien's works are in many ways a deviant from the mainstream 
"realistic-naturalistic, 'war is hell' model of the American war novel"/ 8 and as 
Carpenter observes, "O'Brien seems to become progressively more impatient with 
the self-limiting nature of realistic writing" (2003, 44) and so he needs something 
else to "construct alternate visions of reality" ( 45). O'Brien does see his writing life 
as a construction of the usual realities: "I spend my life inventing a different reality" 
(Bruckner 1990 interview). O'Brien's works belong to those Vietnam war-related 
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novels which "realized that their experiences in Vietnam demanded a very different 
kind of narrative paradigm" (Carpenter 2003, 31 ), and O'Brien is happy with his 
success in achieving a "new form" in his works: "The Things They Carried is my 
best book. There's no doubt in my mind about it. When I was writing Cacciato I had 
that feeling; I have that feeling now. I can tell by the strangeness of it. It's a new 
form, I think." (Naparsteck 1991, 7-8) 
Jonathan Culler has differentiated two levels of the narrative: level of the told 
(story) and level of telling (discourse) (Bennett & Royle, 55). What O'Brien does in 
his metafictional novel The Things They Carried (1989) is to lay emphasis on the 
latter and to "denaturalize or defamiliarize our sense of how narratives function'' 
(Bennett & Royle, 56) because a war narrative is indeed the most unnatural and 
artificial when we try to give form to such a troubling experience. Thus O'Brien 
constantly interrupts and subverts his war stories to violate the reader's pleasure level. 
The readers would feel "tricked", "deceived", "dissatisfied", "disappointed", 
"uneasy"; in short, this is a deliberate assaultive act of "undermining a reader's 
comfort level and expectations" (Herzog 2000, 896). But why would O'Brien want 
to do that? 
Malcolm Bradbury (1992) observes what O'Brien and other literary critics, 
perhaps the whole nation, have also observed regarding America from the 1970s to 
the 1990s: "It could be said, indeed, that the Vietnam War did much to shake 
Americans into a sobered realism and a sense of human impotence in a mechanical 
and military age. It provided images of random, machine-made violence and feelings 
of historical senselessness" (270; my emphasis). In reaction to that age with the 
civilian readers who are then habituated to such "sobered realism" with both a sense 
of "human impotence" (i.e., a somehow self-deceivingly justified non-intervening, 
disinterested, or even uninterested attitude) and of "historical senselessness" (i.e., 
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"amnesia", denial of responsibility and concern), O'Brien has thus attempted to do 
very differently. The Things They Carried aims to affect - to assault - the civilian 
readers by providing them a seemingly autobiographical novel with some chapters 
written by a 1st person narrator named "Tim O'Brien", some from an omniscient 3rd 
person point of view, some even in form of explanatory "Notes" to previous stories 
or a very essayish ''story" like "How to tell a true war story"; but this is indeed a 
mock "sobered realism" as the novel becomes more and more metafictional. 19 Note 
the fact that some of the short stories in the novel were first published in magazines, 
and readers and literary reviewers have argued a lot about the factuality of O'Brien's 
stories especially because O'Brien has made them deliberately personal and 
autobiographical, but as he says in an interview, we should not confuse the character 
"O'Brien" with him and (thus) the definite, authorial truth (if there is any): "The guy 
who's narrating this story has my name and a lot of my characteristics, but it isn't 
really me" (Naparsteck 1989; 1991 , 9). O'Brien has successfully assaulted the 
readers by making them realize their own unquestioned reading habits and thus their 
susceptibility to the writer 's manipulation. Form is not separable from content, as 
Philip Beidler and Catherine Calloway say of Going and Things that their "form" has 
become their "content" (see Calloway 1995). For O'Brien, this shows how "form" 
shapes the expectation of the reader and the meaning of the text, the same as we are 
prone to trust the "Notes" chapter concerning Norman Bowker because it 's written in 
the form of an explanatory "note", as O'Brien says: "Forms of things determine the 
things we believe. For example, the form of a memoir determines one 's belief in a 
book" (Boume 1991 interview). The readers are tricked. 
In fact metafiction has an important place in the history of the post-war 
American novel. Novels in the 1960s seemed to move, according to Brad bury ( 1992 ), 
broadly in "two contrary, yet related, directions," namely, the "New Journalism" 
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(Truman Capote, In Cold Blood, 1966) "faction" which aimed to ''displace 'boring' 
novels as the imaginative record of the times" (202), and "Metafiction," 20 which 
examined the "limits of fictionality" and prompted many novels to grow 
"self-conscious and reflexive, treating fiction's subject as fictionality itself' (203). 
O'Brien writing his 1989 novel may have also taken into account the reader-response 
criticism which began in the late 1960s and flourished in the 70s and 80s. 
But O'Brien's - and Helier's as well - metafictions are remarkably different 
from the conventional metafiction and reader-response criticism as we know them. 
The tradition of self-reflexivity evident in literature such as Dante's addresses 
humbly to the act of writing and to an assumed reader friendlily, or the postmodernist 
playful metafiction in which the characters are often in alliance with the readers to 
assault the author and the text itself is different from Helier's and O' Brien's: theirs 
are m eta-fictional in order to be meta-readerly; they interrupt their own fiction 
actually in order to interrupt the reader, and the blame of limits is neither on the 
incapacity of the author nor the text itself but on the reader. This also explains the 
metafictional element in the novels where the time is counted off consciously and 
creates a sense of immediacy and urgency which the readers cannot ignore: the clock 
telling the exact time on stage in We Bombed reminding the audience that war 
happens here and now, in Cacciato Berlin has to hurry up his imaginary journey as 
he keeps watching the time from mid-night to day-break and the reader is constantly 
pulled back to the real immediate present (and we will see Faulques in The Painter of 
Battles has his days numbered by his assassin visitor in Chapter 3). All these 
techniques remind the readers that what they read, though written in past-tense, 
refuses to be consumed as something which is in the past, finished and done with and 
thus does not and cannot involve the readers, just as Berger points out that 
experience is highly time-bound (see 1980), and these texts want the reader to 
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experience an event (i.e., not read about it but to be conscious of their act of reading 
it now). And the more the readers are conscious of their act of reading (and thus their 
position as spectators) the more they are attacked for their uninvolvement and their 
failure to understand war and their very inability to act. 
O'Brien's metafictional novel is metafiction in the sense that it is also a kind of 
" 'anti-war novel ' war novel", one which is not only carrying across the anti-war 
message, but also one which resists itself being read as a war narrative, because in 
the case of war, any war novel is indeed most fictional when it tries to give "order 
and form to the chaos" (Olderman 1976, 26) of one of the most extreme forms of 
human experience - war. Nigel de Lee says in "Postmodemism and military history": 
"It is very difficult, if not impossible, to know what happened in a battle; all 
available forms of evidence are unreliable and fragmentary. Battles are uncertain and 
messy ... We may not be able to know with certainty and valid proof what happened 
in combat, but we can form reasonable beliefs, based upon imagination, about the 
events, conditions and characteristics of military engagements. The use of 
imagination, based upon sceptical use of what evidence can be obtained, is more akin 
to the creative work of the artist, than the analysis of a chemist or the calculations of 
a mathematician. In place of proof and certainty the historians must put possibility, 
probability and plausibility." ( 187) 
That truth ("proof and certainty") is inseparable from "possibility, probability 
and plausibility" might refer to Tim O'Brien's exploration of what has happened 
versus what might have happened, the happening-truth versus the story-truth in his 
works. Somehow we feel more contented and reassured if we read information like 
"Joseph Heller did serve as bombardier in the Second World War" or "Tim O'Brien 
did serve as foot soldier at Vietnam from 1969 to 1970", and this exposes our 
(perhaps unconscious) conventional reading of war narratives that we will associate 
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war narratives with the idea of ''truth" (facts) asking questions like: Is it really like 
that? The author has been to war, so how much of the fiction is then autobiographical, 
that is, true? O'Brien challenges such reading by pointing out the importance of 
"possibilities", "extension of fact" and "what might have happened" in Cacciato and 
further develops his ideas 12 years later in The Things They Carried in which he 
convinces us by demonstrating how "story-truth" can sometimes even be "truer" than 
"happening-truth". O'Brien thus deals with the issue of "re-presentation" rather than 
"representation" often associated with truth. For example, 0' Brien says about the 
plurality and even sometimes contradictory versions of the same war: "In battle, in a 
war, a soldier sees only a tiny fragment of what is available to be seen. The soldier is 
not a photographic machine. He is not a camera. He registers, so to speak, only those 
few items that he is predisposed to register and not a single thing more. Do you 
understand this? So I am saying to you that after a battle each soldier will have 
different stories to tell, vastly different stories, and that when a war is ended it is as if 
there have been a million wars, or as many wars as there were soldiers." ( Cacciato 
189) The common attitude that the reader can get the true story (the authoritative 
version) of the war by reading war fiction is challenged by O'Brien. This is the same 
with war fiction. Literary re-imagination and re-presentation have nothing to do with 
the falsely assumed ethics of Truth: they are equally true and important in their own 
ways. 
A metafictional/meta-readerly novel as such is not only about "how to tell a true 
war story"; it is also about how to read it and, because a spectatorship (readership) of 
war easily fails any competent and meaningful readership, the conclusion is that the 
novel is not a demonstration of "how to tell" but a rhetorical exclamation of 
frustration and outrage: How can we tell a true war story any more nowadays given 
such readership? It is thus essential to keep shocking and re-shocking his readers-
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who are so forgetful- to the realities of Vietnam, as O'Brien says in an interview: "It 
has to be unusual, otherwise people will just read it and forget it" (Edelman 1994 
interview). The "unusualness" of O'Brien's metafictional forms (repeatedly 
undermining his narrative authority by lies and revelation of lies) has received both 
praise and criticism; some say that his works are only self-obsessive "games" to trick 
the readers unnecessarily. But I see that O'Brien is deliberately assaulting his own 
narrative and his readers for good reasons: "I guess that's what I was trying to do, to 
make the reader feel those sorts of ambivalences. Hearing a story, being seduced, 
then having the seducer say 'by the way, I don't love you, it all isn't true.' And then 
doing it again. And then saying, ' that also isn't true, just kidding' and doing it again. 
It's not just a game, though. It's not what the "Good Form" chapter is about. It's form. 
This whole book is about fiction, about why we do fiction" (Bourne 1991 interview). 
What he does is not only necessary, it is for the reader's good: "I'm like a seducer, 
yet beneath all the acts of seduction there 's a kind of love going on, a kind of trust 
you're trying to establish with the reader, saying 'here's who I am, here's why I'm 
doing what I'm doing. And in fact I do truly love you, I'm not tricking you, I'm 
letting you in on my game, letting you in on who I am, and why I am doing what I 
am doing. [ ... ] And it's going to hurt now and then, and you' re going to get angry 
now and then, but I want to do it to you anyway and for you. That's the point of the 
book" (Bourne 1991 interview). The point of the book, if it succeeds, is to smash our 
unquestioned reading of war novels as blind and sadistic consumption. 
Tobey Herzog speculates a few hypotheses for why O'Brien writes his 
metafictional novels which keep frustrating his readers. It may be, Herzog 
hypothesizes, having "a bit of fun" on the "liberal-minded reader" (those who believe 
in the possibility of Truth and who "expect art and life to be separated neatly") and 
the "tabloid" reader who is more interested in O'Brien the real man's life than his art 
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of fiction (Herzog 2000, 905). O'Brien might be having an "intentional but subtle 
revenge on 'civilian' readers" (Herzog, see also Bates) which heightens the 
distinction between "us" the soldiers/veterans and "they"- the civilians who know 
nothing about war and never would, not even by reading the war stories (905). I 
would suggest the "civilian" and "tabloid" reader combines to form the 
Spectator-reader, one who has long consumed those war novels which O'Brien does 
not like: "They're all so terrible, filled with melodrama, stereotypes, cartoons, 
predictability, cliches" (Bourne 1991 interview). O'Brien despises these war novels 
because they do not only generalize, what's worse, they have been too easy and 
catering for the readers that they have corrupted the readers' sensibility to the true 
war stories. "Sweetheart of the Song Tra Bong" in which Rat Kiley tells the story of 
Mary Anne can show how spoiled we are as listeners of war stories today. At first the 
squad is not interested in Rat Kiley's story and they simply think the story impossible, 
unbelievable. Mitchell Sanders questions Rat Kiley about the "reason" (Things 96), 
his style (99), his tone ( 1 00), and when Rat Kiley ends the story midsentence, 
Mitchell Sanders goes "crazy" and says to him: "You can't do that. [ ... ]Jesus Christ, 
it's against the rules. [ ... ] Against human nature. This elaborate story, you can't say, 
Hey, by the way, I don't know the ending. I mean, you got certain obligations" (1 04); 
as if the storyteller is obliged to give a conventional form of war story which satisfies 
the story listener. For conventional stories, they appeal, they do not affect. 
Through his metafictional The Things They Carried O'Brien also frustrates the 
reader's "literary competence" and "horizon of expectations" for he knows how 
well-trained the reader is to "identify literary genre, recognize plots, create 
'characters' out of the scattered details provided in the text" (Culler 2000, 62) and 
also he knows the reader expects to read a highly autobiographical account of what 
Tim 0 'Brien experiences and thinks about the war. That is why O'Brien tricks the 
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reader by its forms of"Notes" and autobiography (writing himself"O'Brien" into the 
text) and presents contradictory versions of events and characters (e.g., initially we 
learn that Norman Booker is responsible for Kiowa's death in the shitfield but in a 
different chapter he is not; it turns out to be someone else). This act forces the reader 
to re-read certain chapters to make comparisons, and call into question the authority 
of the voice, the seeming authorial voice of the "O'Brien" the reader has appealed to 
for long; and O'Brien's approach reveals the overdependence on the part of the 
reader towards the text. 
The Spectator-readers are critiqued because frrst of all, they do not know about 
Vietnam; their fault being not as severe to their having not gone to the war but their 
historical ignorance due to lack of interest in history. In the "On the Rainy River" 
chapter in The Things They Carried, "Tim O'Brien" writes: "They didn't know Bao 
Dai from the man in the moon. They didn't know history. They didn't know the first 
thing about Diem's tyranny, or the nature of Vietnamese nationalism, or the long 
colonialism of the French. [ ... ] I was bitter, sure. But it was so much more than that. 
The emotions went from outrage to terror to bewilderment to guilt to sorrow and then 
back again to outrage. I felt a sickness inside me. Real disease." (Things 43-44) It is 
this "know-nothing attitude" of the "bourgeois America" which angers Tim O'Brien 
(Bourne 1991 ): "And the ignorance in these little towns is overwhelming. There's a 
laziness and a complacency, a kind of Puritan sense of pious rectitude, that you can 
tell really pisses me off. [ ... ] There are some people out there who do read their 
newspapers carefully. But in my experience, by and large that is not the case, and I'd 
like to nail the bastards" (my emphasis). 21 It is such "ignorance", "laziness", 
"complacency", "a kind of Puritan sense of pious rectitude" and carelessness and 
indifference which make O'Brien infuriated and us the "bourgeois" spectator-readers 
"bastards". In addition to the general public, the same can also be said of the civilian 
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readers who consume war stories (war novels, and even war news like those of CNN 
as stories). Tim O'Brien tells us in "How to tell a true war story" that the true war 
story has the "absolute and uncompromising allegiance to obscenity and evil" that 
"embarrasses" you (Things 68), and the reader should always "be skeptical" (70). 
The list of what makes a "true war story" goes on, but the very first item on the list is 
the straightaway disavowal of war stories as having a moral "point": "A true war 
story is never moral. It does not instruct, nor encourage virtue, nor suggest models of 
proper human behaviour, nor restrain men from doing things they have always done. 
If a story seems moral, do not believe it. If at the end of a war story you feel uplifted, 
or if you feel that some small bit of rectitude has been salvaged from the larger waste, 
then you have been made the victim of a very old and terrible lie." (Things 68) 
Readers who expect to feel "uplifted" or to have "some small bit of rectitude 
salvaged", I think, are not only "made victim"; Tim O'Brien would not want true war 
stories to become moral substitutes for the reader, as if the act of reading war stories 
itself is to substitute for the reader 's real (physical, emotional) confrontation with 
war and this denied responsibility then will only degrade to some catharsic process 
for the reader to feel better and after reading put it away and forget about it.22 
Readers have the responsibility of putting effort into war stories: attention (you 
cannot be "lazy"), carefulness (you cannot be "ignorant"), critical thinking (you 
should "be skeptical" and not "complacent"), emotional involvement (you have to 
feel "embarrassed") (See also Calloway and Herzog). The ignorant public are 
affected by the war but they are affected only from a distance and their reaction is so 
affected that it infuriates the real soldiers who see and experience war first-hand. 
Such a spectator public is best exemplified in Going After Cacciato by the girl 
from California the squad meet on the road to Paris who lectures them (soldiers who 
have fought war flesh-and-blood!) on "the meaning of doom: assassinations, cities on 
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fire, students swarming through Washington, universities under siege" (259) without 
knowing what "doom" really is herself. She goes on to say she understands what evil 
these soldiers have seen and what trauma they have to go through for their desertion, 
and that they are "brothers and sisters": "Sure, man. I'm a dropout myself. Two years 
at San Diego State, all the bullshit in the world. Couldn't hack it. So, bang, I quit." 
When Oscar stares at her with a missed dismissive tone: "'You say it's same-same? 
Nam and fucking San Diego State?" (259-260), the girl says: " 'Not exactly, maybe. 
But I can empathize. That's all, I can tell what it must be like." (260) Yes, she may 
tell what it must be like (but even that is doubtful), and defintiely never what it is. 
Ignorance is worst when it is accompanied by oversentimentality which O'Brien 
rebukes. It is evident in Cacciato in the above mentioned episode where the 
California girl says she can empathize with the soldiers concerning what evil and 
guilt they must have experienced. But instead of a sympathetic well-meant innocent 
girl, she is portrayed more as an ignorant layman with affected (over )sentimentality. 
We see this through the unmatched downplayed responses of the soldiers resisting 
her enthusiasm and in their mocking reactions to the girl: 
'The thing I can't get over, ' the girl said, 'is that you dudes actually were there. I mean, 
like, you saw evil firsthand. Saw it and smelled it. The evil. Children getting roa~ted, 
the orphans, atrocities. And you had the guts to walk away. That's courage. ' 
' Well, it wasn 't-' 
'And the guilt.' The girl wagged her head sadly. ' God, the guilt must be awful.' 
'Guilt?' Oscar said. 
'It must hurt something fierce. ' 
Oscar looked at Eddie. ' You got guilt, man?' 
'All over,' Eddie said, and smiled broadly. 
( Cacciato 260) 
They sneer when the girl says she can "understand how it is" (260). We can smell 
obvious disgust at the girl who actually represents the larger public who say they 
understand war simply by the media and their own ridiculous oversentimental 
misconceptions (such as "children getting roasted") and the moment she says it, she 
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indeed shows excitement more than real concern. O'Brien rebukes her inappropriate 
so-called "empathy" by making her even more ridiculous to the extreme that she 
would want to have sex with them because she so empathizes with these soldiers. 
Ironically, she is turned down. They simply have no interest in her. In "How to tell a 
true war story", "O'Brien" also calls the lady-reader "You dumb cooze" because "she 
wasn't listening": 
Now and then~ when I tell this story, someone will come up to me afterward and say she 
liked it. It's a woman. Usually it's an older woman of kindly temperament and humane 
politics. She'll explain that as a rule she hates war stories, she can't understand why 
people want to wallow in all the blood and gore. But this one she liked. The poor baby 
buffalo, it made her sad. Sometimes, even, there were little tears. What I should do, she'll 
say, is put it all behind me. 
Find new stories to tell. 
I won't say it but I' 11 think it. 
I'll picture Rat Kiley's face, his grief, and I'll think, You dumb cooze. 
It wasn ~ a war story. It was a love story. 
But you can't say that. All you can do is tell it one more time, patiently, adding and 
subtracting, making up a few things to get at the real truth. No Mitchell Sanders, you tell 
her. No Lemon, no Rat Kiley. No trail junction. No baby buffalo. No vines or moss or 
white blossoms. Beginning to end, you tell her, it's all made up. Every goddamn detail -
the mountains and the river and especially the poor dumb baby buffalo. None of it 
happened. None of it. 
(The Things They Carried 80) 
We can sense the narrator's anger at the story listener's misled sympathy as he mocks 
at the "goddam detail" and "especially the poor dumb baby buffalo". A true war story, 
"0' Brien" concludes, is about "sisters who never write back and people who never 
listen" (80). One reason why 0 'Brien is angry, I think, is because the readers are 
more attracted to the fantastical stories, the more surreal and unreal juicy details, than 
to the real war stories of "all the blood and gore", and many of us "hate war stories" 
and only find pleasure in reading a war story because it does not look like one. 
"In many cases a true war story cannot be believed," "O'Brien" reminds the 
readers, "If you believe it, be skeptical" (70). He has demonstrated the necessity of 
being skeptical when one reads by putting so many instances of suspicious 
fabrication into his stories, such as (i) the brief foreshadowing in "On the Rainy 
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River" about the "slim young man [who] would one day kill with a hand grenade 
along a red clay trail outside the village of My Khe" (53) and the subsequent 
contradictory versions of the young man's death in "The Man I killed", "Ambush" 
("0' Brien" admits the killing was out of fright) and in "Good Form" he denies the 
killing?3; (ii) in the very autobiographical story ''On the Rainy River" where the 
narrator "O'Brien" tells of how he got drafted to the war and his reaction of "moral 
freeze", "paralysis" etc (41 , 52) he ends with a note saying: "I saw faces from my 
distant past and distant future. My wife was there. My unborn daughter waved at me 
[ ... ]"(53). If you know some biographical details ofTim O'Brien, this remark would 
prove shattering to the whole authority and intimacy of trust built in this 
"autobiographical" piece because there is no real daughter, no Kathleen. 
O'Brien goes on to carry out his "act of fusing lies and facts, memory and 
imagination, and fiction and reality" not only in his novels but also his public life 
including his writing classes, public readings and interviews, making consistent his 
"authorial deceit in a very self-reflexive manner", and refusing to please the audience 
with "real" war stories, the "real" Tim O'Brien (Herzog 2000, 895-896). The public 
desires a "real" O'Brien, the public authorial figure with the aura and the authority to 
explain his war stories in public occasions, but when asked about the mysteries of his 
stories (e.g., Who touched the grenade in Cacciato?) he only answers, blankly, "I 
don't know, I simply don't know."; or, "Who did it doesn't matter". There is no 
real-life O'Brien who knows exactly what happened and who knows his work best. 
By so doing O'Brien not only writes postmodem fiction but he lives it, 
demonstrating the postmodem notion of the death of the authorial meaning. He 
highlights that the authorial meaning should not be overemphasized, that in reality, 
the author is as fictional and as unreliable as his work, that he can say: "I don't 
know." Or even, "it doesn 't matter." 
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O'Brien says: "In other cases you can't even tell a true war story. Sometimes it's 
just beyond telling". Thus, the "fatass colonel" who demands "the story" from the 
6-man patrol on the mountains and their weird experience is indeed an indirect 
accusation against the reader too. The 6-man patrol's inability to report to the colonel 
is also a silent refutation of the reader who demands the story: "But the guys don't 
say zip. They just look at him for a while, sort of funny like, sort of amazed, and the 
whole war is right there in that stare. It says everything you can't ever say. It says, 
man, you got wax in your ears. It says, poor bastard, you' ll never know-wrong 
frequency-you don't even want to hear this. Then they salute the fucker and walk 
away, because certain stories you don't ever tell" (Things 73-74). There are certain 
stories we do not ever tell because they are beyond telling, and because there are no 
true listeners who can understand them. We are all the "fatass colonel" with wax in 
our ears; also, there are certain things the civilian readers will not like to listen. We 
only want to listen to what we think war stories are about - for some, perhaps the 
"blood and gore", for others, the poor baby water buffalo- but this selective, picky 
attitude does not create a true reader. As Mitchell Sanders says: "Nobody listens. 
Nobody hears nothin' . Like that fatass colonel. The politicians, all the civilian types. 
Your girlfriend. My girlfriend. Everybody's sweet little virgin girl friend" who are 
too innocent to hear the true war story. There is Norman Bowker's girlfriend Sally 
Kramer who does not want to hear Bowker talk about Kiowa's "shitfield" because he 
feels the suffocation that he cannot tell and people would not listen to he committed 
suicide. These are the "people who were too lazy to read a newspaper, who were 
bored by the daily body counts, who switched channels at the mention of politics" 
(174). After all, war is about experience; intellect cannot tell you the taste of 
"chocolate" from "shit": "[ ... ] those girls back home, how clean and innocent they 
all are, how they'll never understand any of this, not in a billion years. Try to tell 
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them about it, they'll just stare at you with those big round candy eyes. They won't 
understand zip." (1 05) Likewise, readers who want to retain the prestigious civilian 
position, such as those who want to know about war in a lecture, are bound to be 
mocked by O'Brien: "It was a brisk, polite town. It did not know shit about shit, and 
did not care to know. Norman Bowker leaned back and considered what he might've 
said on the subject. He knew shit. It was his specialty. The smell, in particular, but 
also the numerous varieties of texture and taste. Someday he'd give a lecture on the 
topic. Put on a suit and tie and stand up in front of the Kiwanis club and tell the 
fuckers about all the wonderful shit he knew. Pass out samples, maybe" (144). 
In Catch-22 we see how war is fought as spectacles. Colonel Kom, for example, 
says the whole point of the war is not war itself but how it would look: "We don't 
care about the roadblock. [ ... ] Colonel Cathcart wants to come out of this mission 
with a good clear aerial photograph he won't be ashamed to send through channels." 
(3 76) They deliberately make the "bombs explode close together" not for military 
reasons but because "General Peckem feels it makes a much nicer aerial photograph" 
(221 ). In short, war is a show, as ridiculous as the absurd and meaningless parades 
which the generals compete among themselves. O'Brien also deals with the problem 
of the Sublime Spectacle in the novel. The killing of the baby water buffalo is one 
instance - an instant too- of the "sublime", though it is in effect but not yet in name. 
He describes: "Rat Kiley was crying. He tried to say something, but then cradled his 
rifle and went off by himself. The rest of us stood in a ragged circle around the baby 
buffalo. For a time no one spoke. We had witnessed something essential, something 
brand-new and profound, a piece of the world so startling there was not yet a name 
for it" (my emphasis). This immense feeling of witnessing something larger than life 
which is yet unnamable is actually the overpowering impact of the sense of sublime. 
The "mix of unnamed terror and unnamed pleasure" which Mary Anne, another 
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mysterious female character in the novel, expenences through Vietnam and its 
supernatural, inhuman rituals is another example. The same is true of "O'Brien"'s 
concept that "war is beautiful". "[W]ar is grotesque", "O'Brien" says, "[b]ut in truth 
war is also beauty ... It's not pretty, exactly. It's astonishing. It fills the eye. It 
commands you. You hate it, yes, but your eyes do not. Like a killer forest fire, like 
cancer under a microscope, any battle or bombing raid or artillery barrage has the 
aesthetic purity of absolute moral indifference-a powerful, implacable beauty- and 
a true war story will tell the truth about this, though the truth is ugly" (Things 77, my 
emphasis). A sense of "beauty" which is "not pretty, exactly", which is "astonishing", 
which "fills the eye" and "commands you" is, exactly, the sublime. In face of the 
sublime we experience an "absolute moral indifference". A true war story, then, 
"0' Brien" the character seems to suggest, is also a story which can tell a truth about 
this sense of sublime. Paradoxically, though, this sublime feeling of war is not the 
right reaction. It occurs only in the imagined form of war by the outsider, people who 
have never been really to war, the distanced spectator would think that "war is 
beautiful''. The real author 0' Brien who saw war disapproves that in an interview: "I 
don't, for example, believe that war is beautiful in any aesthetic way whatsoever. 
Even though the character sounds like me and says pretty pointblankly that war is 
beautiful, the harmonies and shapes and proportions, it's not me saying that. The guy 
who's narrating this story has my name and a lot of my characteristics, but it isn't 
really me. I never felt and thought that war's pretty [ ... ] My personal feeling is that 
it's pretty ugly. I was in danger, and my perception never let me see any beauty. All I 
felt was fear." (Naparsteck 1989; 1991, 9) 
Testimony and the plaguing truth of a true war story 
Not many of us do realize that it is in fact ideological to request that the author 
should maintain clear distinction between literature and testimony as if they can 
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really be mutually exclusive. It is also seen as a commonsensical view that the author 
should be consistent in his answers to the questions asked, and that his real life be 
separated from his fiction. O'Brien overthrows all these reader's preconceptions not 
only in his fiction but in his real-life interviews. For example, his responses to his 
own postwar adjustment vary from interview to interview, and sometimes in 
interviews he may start to confuse the reality of the interview with his fiction by 
giving responses similar to those spoken by the fictional "O'Brien" (Herzog 2000, 
901 ), as if right on the spot of the interview he has resumed to "Tim 0' Brien" again. 
Some critics and reviewers of O'Brien's metafictional novels, however, have 
objected to these approaches, calling them instances of "manipulative style" with 
"the presence of 'too many facts or fiction games"' ( qtd. in Herzog 2000, 899). They 
even regard O'Brien's choice to bring on this metafictional practice into his public 
real life a failure, a "writer-storyteller's failure either to distance himself completely 
from the story or to place himself firmly in it." (in Herzog 896) But Derrida would 
argue otherwise because "testimony", he thinks, is highly fictive indeed. 
Derrida says in his Demeure: Fiction and Testimony (1998) that testimony "does 
not consist, for the most part, in sharing a knowledge, in making known, in 
informing, in speaking true" (Derrida 2000, 27). "Testimony," Derrida says, "always 
goes hand in hand with at least the possibility of fiction, perjury, and lie." (Derrida 
2000, 27; original emphasis) (That reminds us of New Historicism.) Testimony is 
also "never being able or obligated [ ... ] to become proof." (Derrida 2000, 28) We 
should then understand what "testimony" means anew. The fact that O'Brien's novels 
seem highly autobiographical and because he, like Hell er and Perez-Reverte, has also 
served in the war, may make his words to be taken to be a kind of testimony: I saw 
this and did that. But testimony should not be mistaken for "proof' and bear the 
requirement of truth. Testimony itself is personal and whatever personal is bound to 
94 
be subjective and fallible. Literature should be freed from constraints of truth. 
Derrida says: "One can read the same text - which thus never exists 'in itself' - as a 
testimony that is said to be serious and authentic, or as an archive, or as a document, 
or as a symptom - or as a work of literary fiction, indeed the work of a literary 
fiction that stimulates all of the positions that we have just enumerated. For literature 
can say anything, accept anything, receive anything, suffer anything, and stimulate 
everything; it can even feign a trap, the way modern armies know how to set false 
traps" (Derrida 2000, 29). This marks what literature can do that other forms of 
representation (such as historical documents in the strict sense) do not. 
A literary writer like 0' Brien does not need to engage himself to tell the truth 
because, as Derrida says, "if testimony thereby became proof, information, certainty, 
or archive, it would lose its function as testimony." (Derrida 2000, 30) Derrida 
reminds us that the "I" that speaks is always different from the "I" that is being 
spoken of, like O'Brien says the "O'Brien" although very much resembles him is not 
him. After all, as Derrida says: "this is literature, the narrator is not the author, no one 
has committed himself here to telling the truth before the law, thus no one can be 
accused of lying." (2000, 37) This is why the "O'Brien" should not be mistaken as 
the real O'Brien; "O'Brien" says that war is beautiful in the highly essayish "How to 
tell a true war story", but O'Brien reminds us in an interview, as discussed earlier, 
"it's not me saying that." (Naparsteck 1989; 1991, 9) 
If the postmodern writer is, as Lyotard says, working to formulate the rules of 
the future perfect, "what will have been" (Bennett & Royle 2004, 256), I would 
argue that O'Brien is also in line with the postmodem writer who believes that there 
is "no pure present" (256). But to O'Brien his stress is not on the future perfect, but 
rather, the past conditional perfect: "what might have been". A war novel of the 
postmodem should not "imitate or represent the war in the classic manner of literary 
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realism; instead they continue the experience of the war on its own diverse and 
relativistic terms." (Carpenter 2003, 36; my emphasis) A realist war novel is the same 
as the factual, statistical war document in the sense that they are both of the past 
tense, marking the closedness of the war, the discontinuity of the war to our 
immediate present and relevancy. A true war story, however, should bear the 
responsibility to "continue the experience of the war" by its unwillingness to close 
the file and by its ability to question the "what ifs" . What is more important, the 
"what ifs", O'Brien emphasizes, are not mere speculations and possibilities of the 
imagination contrary to Truth; they represent the truths of our human spirit. 
O'Brien says there are two levels to the "truth" in his writing: "On one level the 
stories are made up. But they' re made up for a reason, and the reason has to do with 
a different kind of truth. It has to do with emotional and spiritual truths. It is a way of 
trying to use a lie, which is the story, to approach some deeper, more spiritual sense 
of truth. I don't mean truth with a capital T; I just mean small kinds of truth." (Karp 
2002 interview; my emphasis) There are multiple "small kinds of truth" resisting any 
metanarrative of "truth with a capital T", O'Brien says, truths which are "emotional" 
and "spiritual", a "deeper," "different kind of truth", and as in the case of O'Brien's 
character Rat Kiley, "facts were formed by sensation" (Things 87). A story 's truth is 
measured by "an entirely different standard, a standard of emotion, feeling- 'Does it 
ring true?' as opposed to ' Is it true?'" (Naparsteck 1989 interview; 1991 , 9-10). Just 
as Nietzsche says that facts are interpretations from the intellect, to O'Brien, then, 
facts are interpretations from your "stomach", your body, your real-life emotions and 
feelings evoked through art, and it is "artificial" to try to classify fact from fiction 
because things about literature are in fact all basic instincts: "To try to classify 
different elements of the story as fact or fiction seems to be artificial. Literature 
should be looked at not for its literal truths but for its emotional qualities. What 
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matters in literature, I think, are pretty simple things - whether it moves me or not, 
whether it feels true. The actual literal truth should be superfluous" (Naparsteck 1989 
interview; 1991, 9). 
That is why O'Brien says: "Absolute occurrence is irrelevant. A thing may 
happen and be a total lie; another thing may not happen and be truer than the truth." 
(Things 79) Kathleen and Norman Bowker feel true. Kiowa's death in the shitfield 
and Curt Lemon's death of explosion into the tree, however ridiculous, feel true. 
Even the fantastical story of Mary Anne, the Sweetheart of the Song Tra Bong who 
transforms herself into a Kurt-figure in the jungle, feels true, too. This is why the 
young man with an eye of the star-shaped hole feels truer than the faceless real 
corpse at My Khe, because truth is a personal, emotional, and metaphorical thing. 
And truth is not simply there; to O'Brien the story-truth means more to him because 
it is a process by which he can look into the things that really matter; as he says: "I 
think exercising the imagination is the main way of finding truth [ ... ] let's say the 
death of your mother, over the course of time your imagination is going to do things 
with that experience to render it into something that you can deal with and that has 
meaning to it. You're going to select some details and forget others [ ... ] The 
experience that you remember is going to have a power to it that the total experience 
didn't have. [ ... ] all that random stuff that you've forgotten will be rearranged by 
your imagination into a new kind of experience. I think in war we tend to block out 
the long, hard moments of boredom, standing around, sitting around, waiting, which 
is a lot of what war is. It's ninety-nine percent monotony, and what the imagination 
does is to push that away and take what's left and reorder it into patterns that give 
meaning to it." (Naparsteck 1989; 1991 , 10) 
Story-truth gives meaning to fact, making it matter. And this is what makes 
O'Brien say in his short story "Good Form": "I want you to feel what I felt. I want 
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you to know why story-truth is truer sometimes than happening-truth." Story-truth is 
not just a story: it also has the ability to bear truth and that sometimes it can even be 
"truer" than happening-truth. As Derrida points out: "Literature serves as real 
testimony. Literature pretends, through an excess of fiction - others would say lie -
to pass itself off as a real and responsible testimony about a historical reality -
without, however, signing this testimony because it is literature and the narrator is 
not the author of an autobiography." (Derrida 2000, 71) The "-truth" is different in 
the two truths: the general reader would likely only concern himself with the 
happening-truth wondering if what he reads really has happened (actuality), but as 
we have discussed, to O'Brien story-truth can also be a testimony more real because 
it matters to him while the happening-truth cannot: "What stories can do, I guess, is 
make things present. I can look at things I never looked at. I can attach faces to grief 
and love and pity and God. I can be brave. I can make myself feel again." (from 
"Good Form") And the implication is that although the reader can never engage 
themselves in the happening-truth, he can still experience the "unexperienced" 
through this story-truth: "insofar as a reader can understand it, even if no such thing 
has ever 'really' happened to him, to the reader. We can speak, we can read this 
because this experience, in the singularity of its secret, as 'experience of the 
unexperienced,' beyond the distinction between the real and the phantasmatic, 
remains [ demeure] universal and exemplary." (Derrida 2000, 93; original emphasis 
and brackets) 
We should also come to realize that "non-literary testimony is no more a proof 
than is testimony in the form of a literary fiction." (Derrida 2000, 56) After all, who 
can really "swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth"? 
(Derrida 2000, 72). Thus literature is "the passionate place of literary writing, as the 
project to say everything" (72), and as Derrida reminds us what Celan observes: "No 
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one testifies for the witness" ( 61 ). Testimony is a personal and private thing. In a 
sense it is even secretive and has to remain so. I only "testify to what I do" (30; my 
emphasis): "What I testify to is, at that very instant, my secret; it remains reserved 
for me. I must be able to keep secret precisely what I testify to; it is the condition of 
the testimony in a strict sense, and this is why one will never be able to demonstrate, 
in the sense of a theoretical proof or a determinate judgment, that a perjury or lie has 
in fact taken place." (30) That O'Brien recounts the same incident in many- even 
contradictory - versions can also be justified because he is not restrained to speak the 
truth. It is only when someone declares to be speaking the truth that requires exact 
faithfulness every time the story is told and retold. Reproducibility and repeatability 
and sameness are out of the question. As Derrida says: "When I commit myself to 
speaking the truth, I commit myself to repeating the same thing, an instant later, two 
instants later, the next day, and for eternity, in a certain way." (2000, 33) 
Perhaps we the readers have so long presumed Truth as an intrinsic attribute of 
testimony and autobiography that we read O'Brien's war novels accordingly. Yet this 
is something O'Brien wants to challenge. "In essence a testimony is always 
autobiographical: it tells, in the first person, the sharable and unsharable secret of 
what happened to me, to me, to me alone, the absolute secret of what I was in a 
position to live, see, hear, touch, sense, and feel." (Derrida 2000, 43) Think of 
"O'Brien"-character, the "narrating ego" who refuses to talk about (i.e. , giving 
testimony to) what he has witnessed for the death of the young man along the railway. 
Nor can Yossarian speak of Snowden's "secret" because what has happened only 
happened "to me, to me, to me alone". 
Story-truth, perhaps, is not as disparate as happening-truth in the end. And the 
fact that some war novels look surreal may not be simply an aesthetic technique but 
instead conveys the personal experience of the facti city of war; there is not so much 
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"distinction between the fact of what 'actually' happened and the reality experienced 
by the individual" (Timmerman 2000, 101 ). After all, "reality" is what feels real to 
the individual; Curt Lemon is an example, even his own death by the sunlight is true: 
"in that instant, he must've thought it was the sunlight that was killing him. It was 
not the sunlight. It was a rigged 105 round. But if I could ever get the story right, 
how the sun seemed to gather around him and pick him up and lift him high into a 
tree, if I could somehow recreate the fatal whiteness of that light, the quick glare, the 
obvious cause and effect, then you would believe the last thing Curt Lemon believed, 
which for him must've been the final truth" (Things 79). O'Brien says that in a true 
war story: "Often the crazy stuff is true and the normal stuff isn't because the normal 
stuff is necessary to make you believe the truly incredible craziness." (70) There is 
no disparity between realism and surrealism fundamentally, we may say, because, 
O'Brien tells us in a 1982 interview: "In war, the rational faculty begins to 
diminish ... and what takes over is surrealism, the life of the imagination. The mind 
of the soldier becomes part of the experience [ ... ] War is a surreal experience"; and 
speaking of his most fantastical novel Going After Cacciato, he says: "Cacciato is 
the most realistic thing I've written. The life of the imagination is real." (interview 
by McCaffery 1982, qtd. in Timmerman 2000, 103; original emphasis) 
The "We" in war fiction 
Marcel Proust has said it clearly about his also commonly held autobiography In 
Search of Lost Time that his novel is not about him but rather the reader: "Every 
reader, as he reads, is actually the reader of himself. The writer 's work is only a kind 
of optical instrument he provides the reader so he can discern what he might never 
have seen in himself without this book. The reader's recognition in himself of what 
the book says is the proof of the book's truth." And Kundera says such lines are not 
restricted to Proustian novel but "they define the meaning of the very art of the 
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novel." (Kundera 2008, 95-96) We have spent some length in examrmng how 
O'Brien criticizes and tricks (-for their good, he says -) the spectator-readers. Yet 
the other side of the coin is that the authors and the readers are not necessarily 
irreconcilable antagonists. As Derrida notes in Demeure that a testimony presupposes 
a "we", a transition from the first person singular (''I") to first person plural ("we"); 
and the spectator-reader, originally an outsider, would automatically be expected to 
become an inclusive "we" (2000, 38) who is indispensable: "This 'we' without which 
there would be no testimony" (2000, 34 ). The "we" is essential because it is a 
prerequisite for the experience of the testimony to take place: "we will experience 
this, in the test of testimony, of the secret and of responsibility" (Derrida 2000, 35). 
Derrida says this presumes a "eo-responsibility" for linguistic, rhetorical or 
pragmatic competence (2000, 35-37), and "this indeterminate 'we' does not 
necessarily presuppose any agreement with what I am saying, any sympathy, any 
community, any consensus of any kind, except a minimal way of being, let us say, of 
an understanding with the other" (2000, 35) But I would suggest that our authors 
would argue otherwise. The "eo-responsibility" exceeds merely these practical 
competences. It must involve our competence for imagination and empathy. In 
sharing the secret (i.e. , in a sense a voyeuristic kind of consumption) the 
spectator-reader also shares responsibility. And this is the very common lack of the 
sense of one's responsibility which the authors in this thesis react against. 
I would argue that the authors, O'Brien in particular, are consciously presenting 
their testimonies (i.e., war stories) not as self-enclosed narratives but rather, as acts. 
As Derrida says: "The essence of testimony cannot necessarily be reduced to 
narration, that is, to descriptive, informative relations, to knowledge or to narrative; it 
is first a present act. When he testifies the martyr does not tell a story, he offers 
himself." (2000, 38) Even for "a false testimony", "a lie" or "a phantasmatic 
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hallucination" or "indeed a literary fiction pure and simple", "the event described, 
the event of reference, will have taken place" and "it exceeds the opposition between 
real and unreal, actual and virtual, factual and fictional." That "of which the narrative 
speaks have taken place even if they did not take place in what is commonly called 
reality." (2000, 91-92) Rather than "I saw X", the X is not as important as the fact 
that I am now telling you, testifying to my claim of "I saw X". O'Brien's 
metafictional The Things They Carried is a strong example not only about the 
problems of testimony, as many critics have argued, but the book is itself a process, 
an act of testimony. It is not about testimony. It is testimony. And testimony 
(especially one presented in the form of metafiction) is a best example of how we can 
engage the reader in the here-and-now. As Berger says: ''The act of writing is 
nothing except the act of approaching the experience written about; just as, hopefully, 
the act of reading the written text is a comparable act of approach." (from Berger, 
The Sense of Sight 1985, 14; qtd. in Berger 2001, 228) In Chapter 3 we will talk 
about a related issue to testimony: the problem of witnessing. 
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The Triumph of Death 
Pieter Bruegel the Elder, c. 1562 
Oil on panel 
117 x 162 cm, 46 x 63.8 in 
Museo del Prado, Madrid 
(What more can one do? ' 
Goy a 
The Disasters ofWar, 1812-15 
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Chapter3 
The War Photographer as the exemplary Spectator in disguise: 
False "Witness" of the Photographic Eye 
"To write a poem after Auschwitz is barbaric" 
- Theodor W. Adorno, 1949 
"Who was it who said that words had been exhausted by wars?" Markovic asked. 
"And a lie, besides. Whoever said that had never been in a war." 
-The Painter of Battles, page 144 
"Write the things which you have seen, 
and the things which are, and 
the things which will take place after this." 
Background: Phantasmagoria of War after Vietnam 
- The Revelation I : 19 
"When September 11 happened, my best friend was visiting. He called me from 
another room and said, "Hey, come out here and see the TV." He is a Vietnam 
veteran also. Afterwards, when it was all over and the towers had fallen, we both 
said, "God, that felt like Nam." The imagery, the horror, the surprise, the frustration, 
looking for an enemy-it all felt like Vietnam again to me, only now the whole 
country was there watching it and feeling it and actually going through it." 
(Karp 2002 interview with Tim O'Brien) 
Chapters 1 and 2 have already examined two major groups of impotent 
spectators: our soldiers-characters (Starkey, Yossarian, Berlin, etc.), the civilian 
readers and theatre spectators. In Chapter 3 we will look at a third, special type of 
Spectatorship which is uncommon in criticism of war fiction, that is, the 
spectatorship of the War Photographer; as Sontag notes: "War and photography now 
seem inseparable" (1977, 167). A War Photographer is a special type of Spectator 
because, as Sontag points out: "Only war photography combines voyeurism with 
danger." (1977, 39) The War Photographer is a Spectator-flaneur, "an armed version 
of the solitary walker reconnoitering, stalking, cruising the urban inferno, the 
voyeuristic stroller who discovers the city as a landscape of voluptuous extremes" 
who is privileged for " [g]azing on other people's reality with curiosity, with 
detachment, with professionalism" (1977, 55). He is at once both and neither 
participant and non-participant because his position is a self-resigned Spectatorship: 
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He subsides behind the camera and takes his non-intervention as his professionalism, 
yet paradoxically he forgets that his very presence in the scene is participatory 
enough. 
It is thus interesting to look at The Painter of Battles which is a novel about the 
life and experience of a Spanish war photographer who so feels the limits of war 
photography that he chooses to become "the painter of battles". That this novel is 
about a Spanish war photographer has brought us back to the notion of spectatorship 
of war, because the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) was indeed "the first to be 
witnessed ('covered') in the modem sense: by a corps of professional photographers 
at the lines of military engagement and in the towns under bombardment, whose 
work was immediately seen in newspapers and magazines in Spain and abroad." 
(Sontag 2004, 18) 
The Painter of Battles (Spanish title: El pintor de batallas), first published in 
2006, is written by the bestselling Spanish author Arturo Perez-Reverte (1951 - ) 
who is famous for his detective and adventure novels. 24 Like Heller and O'Brien, 
Perez-Reverte also had first-hand experience in war: he was originally a journalist 
for twenty one years ( 1973 - 1994 ), nine of which as a war correspondent. He started 
writing fiction from 1986 and was elected to the Spanish Royal Academy in 2002. 
The novel is also interesting because the character war photographers are not entirely 
fictional. I would suggest that the models for the fashioning of the character war 
photographers - Faulques and Olvido - in the novel may have been inspired by the 
flesh-and-blood photographers Henri Cartier-Bresson and Diane Arbus respectively 
and this adds to the credibility of the insights offered by the novel. 25 
The novel begins with our protagonist Andres F aulques in his fifties who ten 
years ago quit his thirty-year career as world-renowned war photographer and now 
lives a solitary, detached life inside a watchtower on the top of a cliff at Cala del 
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Arniez. For 7 months he has been working inside the watchtower on a grand 
360-degree circular mural of a "timeless battle landscape" (25m in circumference 
and 3m in height) on which he intends to paint "the battle of all battles." (13) Then 
one day, a stranger Ivo Markovic comes to hunt for Faulques announcing his revenge 
assassination. The novel thus evolves from our expectation of the fatal killing and the 
revelation of a series of secrets (What happened to Ivo Markovic ten years ago that 
he has spent all these years to hunt down Faulques? What happened, ten years ago 
too, to Faulques 's lover, Olvido? Why did she die? Why did Faulques quit his career 
and choose to reside in this quiet little town?) to at last Faulques's realization of what 
Olvido and Markovic have really meant to him. 
Markovic bears the task of challenging Faulques's deeply-held conception of 
what war photography truly is in the novel. It is interesting to note that at times says 
things which Olvido has said to Faulques before (99, 117, 140) and this uncanny 
sense of deja vu not only surprises Faulques but also implies a subtle linkage 
between Olvido and Markovic: both of them symbolize the Wisdom figures- Olvido 
as the beautiful, deified Goddess of Wisdom (Diana) and Markovic as the 
experienced avenger victim. The assassin, Ivo Markovic, is a former Croatian soldier 
whose life is forever ruined because of the prize-winning picture Faulques took of 
him ten years ago. Markovic calls it "[a] photo that destroyed my life" (203)- which 
made him the icon of the lost Croatian party thanks to Faulques - and exactly 
because of the "fame" that he gains Markovic has at the same time been made a 
target for both enemies and his own outraged people that leads to subsequent 
tragedies: Markovic is tortured and put into a prison camp for three years, and after 
the war he learns that his family - wife and his 5-year-old son - have been bullied to 
death because of the loss of the war. Markovic has finally hunted down Faulques to 
avenge himself on everything Faulques and his picture has done to him. But 
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Markovic does not want only to kill him, as he says: "I can't just kill you. I need for 
us to talk first; I need to know you better, to be sure that you realize certain things. I 
want you to learn and understand. After that, I'll be able to kill you." (35) 
The novel is thus a book-length eloquent conversation between the cold and 
intelligent Faulques and Markovic who - "often lightly touched the truth without 
penetrating the heart of it" (150) - serves like the elicitor in the novel to force 
Faulques to reflect upon himself and his long gone past. They talk about the nature of 
war and mankind, the line that blurs action and inaction, and if the dictum of the 
non-intervening, unempathetic camera can really excuse Faulques's responsibility 
from the atrocities in war, Markovic 's tragedies included. As Son tag says the 
professional photographers use this dictum: "a disavowal of empathy, a disdain for 
message-mongering, a claim to be invisible - these are endorsed by most 
professional photographers" (1977, 77). Is it really as Sontag says that "[j]ust as the 
camera is a sublimation of the gun, to photograph someone is a sublimated murder -
a soft murder, appropriate to a sad, frightened time" ( 1977, 15)? The novel is thus set 
in the immediate present of the remaining days of Faulques dotted with Markovic 's 
almost daily visits and conversations, penetrated by the scattered memories of the 
past through Faulques's reminiscences of his lover Olvido Ferrara- a former fashion 
model - who had followed him to different wars and at last died from stepping on a 
mine along the ditch on the Borovo Naselje road during one trip, in fact three days 
after Faulques had taken the picture of Markovic on the same road. The novel ends 
with the revelation of the secret of Olvido's death and Faulques's suicide, drowning 
himself in the sea. 
The Problem of Witnessing 
'One of evil's principal modes of being is 
looking beyond (with indifference) that which is before the eyes." 
John Berger, "Hiroshima" (1981) 
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What does it mean to be a "privileged witness of history, danger and adventure" 
(146)? Faulques thinks Ivo Markovic's photo, which is called "The Face of Defeat", 
"truly was a unique photo" because it is "[ c ]old, objective. Perfect." (28) It is 
"perfect" because it is "cold" and "objective". Faulques has long believed that his 
position as the "objective, ideal witness" (130) is his professionalism, even long after 
he has quit it. And it is this impersonal objectiveness for which the professional jury 
awarded him the prestigious Europa Focus for the picture and called it "the symbol 
of all soldiers of all war." (23) This "professionalism" of "objectivity" - which 
disguises indifference- infuriates Markovic: "And that was why they gave you the 
prize for my photograph? Because I didn't affect you either?" (52). Faulques denies 
that he is not completely without emotions; rather, it is a deliberate choice of self 
"resignation," an active act of resigning himself from what he sees and records (54). 
He says: "A painting like the one he was working on could not be painted with 
emotion, but neither could it be done by ignoring your feelings. First you had to have 
them, and then know you had rid yourself of them. Or been liberated from them." 
( 150) As Timmerman notes it is a "challenge to the writer of the true war story 
[which] arises precisely out of that effort toward authenticity. Every event is recalled 
by the intellect and as the emotions experienced during the event; writing involves, 
as Hemingway understood, the head and the heart." (Timmerman 2000, 113) It 
reminds us ofT. S. Eliot's idea of impersonality and that the poet is a catalyst, but 
Faulques is not exactly a poet as such, for at the end of the novel he realizes, 
surprised, that what his mural conveys is neither a purged emotion as he has claimed 
nor sympathy, but Evil itself. 
When Faulques invites Carmen Elsken, the tour guide whose voice passes the 
watchtower every day, to come to see the mural, Elsken can sense it right away. 
"There's something about you I don't like," she says: "There's something evil here." 
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(235) Only at this epiphanic moment can Faulques understand his own attitude in 
doing the mural: "Evil, Carmen Elsken had said with extraordinary lucidity, or 
intuition. That was the precise word, and now it was slithering through every twist 
and turn of Faulques's memory as he picked up his brushes and started working on 
that area of the mural, glimpsing out of the corner of his eye the Evil incarnate in the 
gaze of the soldiers, in that of the child sitting on the ground beside his mother." (23 8) 
The fact that F aulques paints the atrocious images on the mural does not suggest a 
sense of disapproval and sympathy on the part of Faulques; on the contrary, it 
suggests Evil and Faulques's inexplicable conspiracy in what goes on in the painting: 
"the role we all play in this painting" (243). He is part of the Evil. The false sense of 
compassion Faulques feels for his painting is, as Ivo Markovic says, "the same 
compassion that the researcher feels as he observes the battle in the infection of a 
wound through his microscope." Markovic concludes about Faulqes: "You look and 
you take note. [ .. ] That would make you worse than I am" (135). And Faulques 
seems to mistake his "resignation" (seemingly an active choice) for what it truly is: 
the word "hardening" which he denies but slips his tongue when he says how his 
journey through the hell of war has changed him: "At first it was an amusing 
adventure. The pain came later. In bursts. And finally, the impotence. I suppose that 
nothing hurts any longer." (54) Impotence is in any rate not resignation. As Son tag 
says: "A photograph is not just the result of an encounter between an event and a 
photographer; picture-taking is an event in itself, and one with ever more peremptory 
rights - to interfere with, to invade, or to ignore whatever is going on." ( 1977, 11) He 
fails to realize that his is indeed "professionalized looking and cruelty" that masks 
both his "impotence and aggression." ( 1977, 13) 
At the end of the novel Faulques and Markovic have come to understand that 
objective witness is impossible. First, the act of witnessing is never objective for the 
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very act of framing, of making a point of view, is already a selection, a statement of 
judgement: "to frame is to select and exclude. Save some things and eliminate 
others ... Not everyone can do that: set himself up as a judge of all that's happening 
around him." (151) An arrogant comment once made by Faulques can illustrate this 
point: "My camera didn't photograph that, [ ... ] so it doesn't exist." (191) Second, a 
witness is never totally objective, detached, because the act of observation itself is 
already participation which creates consequences, as F aulques remembers, like the 
basic element of quantum mechanics which states that "man created reality by 
observing it. Before that observation, what truly existed was all possible situations. 
Only through observation did nature become concrete, take a stance." That makes 
man "both things at once: victim as well as guilty party" (120). Third, the "seeing 
through camera" is not seeing at all. Although people may think, as Faulques has 
initially thought when he began his career as a photographer, that "photography 
allows us to see in fractions of a second things normal people don't see no matter 
how hard they look," (58) Faulques has soon realized that "no one could capture all 
that on film in 1/125th of a second," (40) not "with one miserable photo" (81)- note 
the pun: it is miserable because one miserable (i.e., too pathetically little) photo is 
unable to capture the whole of misery simply by one photo about the miserable. 
Reality is beyond the scope of human observation: "no photograph in the world, not 
even the image and sound that the television cameras were recording, could reflect or 
interpret that reality." (212) The seeing through photography is thus bound to fail 
even if you spend a whole lifetime doing it because actually you look without 
genuine seeing. You regard, never voir. 26 As Faulques realizes in the end: "you 
could look again and again, focus, clic, clic, clic, darkroom, print, International Press 
Photo, Europa Focus, and still fail throughout a lifetime" ( 40). 
This looking without seeing is best recounted from the perspective of the 
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photographed subject, Ivo Markovic, who accuses the indifferent and voyeuristic 
nature of Faulques 's so-called "observation": "You were focusing on me, or framing, 
or whatever you say, taking the photograph. Yes. Your camera clicked and you kept 
right on going, without a wave or a hello. Nothing. I think you'd already stopped 
thinking about me; you didn't even see me once you'd lowered your camera. [ ... ] 
That's funny, isn't it? You took a photograph of a soldier you crossed paths with for a 
couple of second. A soldier you knew nothing about, not even his name. And that 
photograph travelled around the world. Then you forgot that anonymous soldier and 
took other photos. Of other people whose names you also didn't know, I imagine. 
Maybe you made them famous the way you did me. It's a strange profession, yours." 
(32-33) Faulques is like Dante the character in Canto XXXII the frozen Lake of 
Cocytus who is arrogant about his sacred job to record their pain and stories, and 
prides himself for making them famous: "Living I am/ do thou sing praises/ For that; 
if thou seek fame, I'll give thee it,/ Writing thy name with other notable cases" 
(1.91-93). The soul asks Dante simply to back off: "All I demand is just the opposite;/ 
Be off, and pester me no more." (1.94-95) "Away, publish what thou wilt!" (1.112) He 
is not interested in becoming just another "notable case" for the annoying pain image 
collector to "publish". 
Faulques is of course aware of the "predatory character" (13) of his career as a 
war photographer. Olvido has also mocked his profession as "your merciless hunting 
trips" (168) and his photographs: "your beautiful and hygienic wars" (117), implying 
the sense of unreality - as if they are wars sanitized - and the uninvolvement behind 
the camera, immune. His witness is disinterested as well as uninterested- he is bored 
by certain scenarios of war such as the bullying of the mentally retarded young man 
which Faulques dismisses: "I don't think I'm interested in that episode. [ ... ] It's too 
predictable, and not very original." (133) - and he has committed the fault of 
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homogenizing war, and worse, of forgetting and obscuring the uniqueness of the 
story behind each photo of each single soldier and civilian victim. He forgets the 
difference between "every" and "each". His looking is thus affectless and even 
irresponsible: "The painter had seen many faces in his life, most of them through the 
viewfinder of a camera. Some he remembered and others he had forgotten: a fleeting 
look, a click of the shutter, a negative on the contact sheet [ ... ] Most of the people 
who appeared in those photos evaporated among a multitude of indistinguishable 
features and a succession of scenes impossible to identify without a major effort of 
memory: Cyprus, Vietnam, Lebanon, Cambodia, Eritrea, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Angola, Mozambique, Iraq, the Balkans ... solitary hunts, trips with no beginning and 
no end, devastated landscapes of a vast geography of disaster, wars that blended into 
other wars, people who blended into other people, dead that blended into other dead. 
[ ... ] Countless negatives amongst which he remembered one in every hundred, in 
every five hundred, in every thousand." (19) 
The worst of all is, witnessing always entails a false illusion that seeing is 
abstracting oneself from what is going on and making oneself into a spectator and 
what is happening before oneself a spectacle. The line which differentiates a 
"witness" and a "spectator" is vague. This is why even by the word "observation" -
especially "observation" in Faulques's sense - is not any better than the 
"observation" by the museum-goers, as Faulques and Markovic note: "all those battle 
scenes hanging in museums, with people looking at them as if the paintings had 
nothing to do with them." (59) These people are, in Sontag's words, "a spectator 
twice over, spectator of events already shaped, first by the participants and second by 
the image maker." (Sontag 1977, 169) A war photograph - as well as a war 
painting - often gives "mixed signals" which perhaps helps explain the ambivalent 
feelings we have when looking at images of a "sobering subject"; as Sontag points 
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out: "The photograph gives mixed signals. Stop it, it urges. But it also exclaims, 
What a spectacle!" (Sontag 2004, 68) Commenting on Eddie Adam's famous 1968 
photo of a Vietcong suspect being shot dead in the head in a street in Saigon, Susan 
Sontag observes the fact that even if one looks long enough, and even if many people 
look at it together, does not guarantee true understanding. And people forget that fact 
and the "indecency" such ''co-spectatorship" embeds. She notes: "one can gaze at 
these faces for a long time and not come to the end of the mystery, and the indecency, 
of such co-spectatorship." (2004, 53-54) 
Also, when one has been a passive spectator long enough, one would make the 
line which demarcates passivity and impassivity blur. Sontag observes that the 
prevalence of photographs of atrocities today makes it so "anyone can comfortably 
choose the parcel of horror he wishes to be moved by," and as if"[n]ow our official 
sympathy towards all kinds of victims frees us from responsibility. Or remorse." 
(1977, 11) The decline from seeing to looking is even made worse when people do 
not even bother to look; as Olvido comments: "People walk past [the war veterans] 
and don't realize a thing. Maybe that's because no one really looks any more." (127; 
original emphasis) When Sontag asks "Does shock have term limits?" she already 
knows the answer too well: "Shock can become familiar. Shock can wear off. Even if 
it doesn't, one can not look. People have means to defend themselves against what is 
upsetting." (2004, 73; original emphasis) We discussed in Cacciato the 
having-seen-it-before-really-seeing-it (because we see rmages, representations 
before- or even never- the real thing). In Painter there is a different seeing: when 
people forget - or it is a self-inflicted amnesia - that they have seen it before. 
Carmen Elsken cannot help exclaiming comments like "impressive" and 
"extraordinary" when she sees the mural, and Faulques comments later about her 
reaction as if she is a stranger to the scenes: "This was how people who hadn't been 
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there [the real war] were going to see it. Or more precisely, he rectified, looking at 
the half-painted cement and glass towers- those who thought, mistakenly, that they 
hadn't." (234) Faulques is saying that people in the past may- though this is also 
unjustified - still be able to say they have not been to the scene of war, but people of 
today's "living-room war" era can never again be exempt from the war scene because 
war is not fought in battlefields now but in civilian homes, and we can get access to 
the war scene by simply turning on the television however "faraway" we may be. 
Think about September 11, this is what Faulques suggests, and this is also why 
Faulques says to Carmen Elsken that in fact civilian lives are no stranger than a 
soldier 's. It is the civilians who deceive themselves that they are different from 
soldiers by denying the connectedness of their lives and the fact that today civilians 
and soldiers both live in the world as a global war zone. To conclude with Sontag's 
observation: "The feeling of being exempt from calamity stimulates interest in 
looking at painful pictures, and looking at them suggests and strengthens the feeling 
that one is exempt." ( 1977, 168) F aulques does not approve such a 
pseudo-phenomelogical pretension of not seeing in an attempt to forget about and 
eventually erase the reality of war. Therefore when Carmen Elsken says, referring to 
an atrocious image on the mural (rape, murder, evil): "I never saw this," Faulques 
reminds her: "The fact that you haven't seen it doesn't mean it isn't there." (234) As 
Sontag notes: "No one after a certain age has the right to this kind of innocence, of 
superficiality, to this degree of ignorance, or amnesia." (2004, 1 02) 
Impotence in the disguise of a Non-intervening Witness 
" An invented horror can be quite overwhelming. [ ... ] But there is shame as well as 
shock in looking at the close-up of a real horror. Perhaps the only people with the 
right to look at images of suffering of this extreme order are those who could do 
something to alleviate it [ ... ] or those who could learn from it. The rest of us are 
voyeurs, whether or not we mean to be. In each instance, the gruesome invites us to be 
either spectators or cowards, unable to look." 
- Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, 2004, 37-38 
The question here lies in who has really "the right to look at images of suffering 
114 
of this extreme order". In previous chapters we have already discussed Impotence in 
various forms of spectatorship (mainly demarcated into soldier-characters in war and 
the civilian reader at home). In The Painter of Battles the issue of Impotence is quite 
different because it involves a "spectatorship" which is privileged, celebrated, and 
preferred: It has long been held that non-intervention is the very nature of 
photography, and that the non-intervention (or impotence, we may say) which the 
Photographer (with capital 'P', the objective and objectified artist) advocates thus 
naturally does not seem to embed with any discussion of irresponsibility or guilt. 
Faulques declares: "I'm not sure about the word responsible. I always tried to be the 
man who was looking. A third, objective man." (119) The Photographer feels he has 
the right to subside to his role as the Spectator, and then differentiates his "looking" 
from the general Spectator, to become what Sontag calls the "ideal observer", one 
who practices a kind of "seeing with the detachment of a researcher." ( 1977, 122) 
Not a voyeur-spectator but a privileged, higher class of spectatorship (a 
"researcher"!), the photographer claims, and he emphasizes that he resigns, he 
chooses (an active choice) to be the observer, which is, he tries to argue, 
fundamentally different from a passive voyeur-spectator. 
The photographer is "thought to be an acute but non-interfering observer - a 
scribe, not a poet" (Sontag 1977, 88) because, it is argued, "[p ]hotographing is 
essentially an act of non-intervention" ( 1977, 11) even when it is an extreme case of 
"the choice between a photograph and a life". Recording is always of top priority: 
"The person who intervenes cannot record; the person who is recording cannot 
intervene." (1977, 12) Faulques the photographer has further reinforced his dictum of 
non-intervention by his belief in the "cosmic laws" (Painter 113) of "chance" and the 
Butterfly Effect, which is the "scientific formula" which states that "if a butterfly 
flutters its wings in Brazil, or somewhere, a hurricane will be unleashed on the other 
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side of the world" ( 46).27 Faulques thinks it is the Butterfly Effect which determines 
things, not him (and thus he is innocent). He says to Markovic regarding the bullying 
of a retarded boy: "the influence of the camera is minimal [ ... ] If those boys hadn't 
been there, if you hadn't been there, it would have been someone else. . . What kills 
them is geometry" (249). But Faulques has ignored the other side of the Butterfly 
Effect argument. If there is "a hidden network that trapped the world and its events, 
where nothing that happened was innocent or without consequences" (43), Markovic 
reminds Faulques: "Nothing is innocent, then, senor Faulques. And no one." (188) 
The Butterfly Effect theory will not excuse Faulques; as Markovic sneers: "Be 
careful. Your camera was a passive accomplice many times ... or active. Don't forget 
your damned butterfly. Don't forget why I'm here." (134) And when Markovic retells 
how - because of his famous picture - his wife is raped, breasts cut off and throat slit, 
and his son killed, he again condemns ironically: "They raped her, one after the other, 
as many times as they wished. Since the boy, all of five years old, cried and fought to 
defend his mother, they ran him through with a bayonet at the door. Just the way you 
pin butterflies, imagine, the butterflies of the effect you told me about." (51) "The 
Butterfly Effect, you said. What an irony. Such a delicate word." ( 49) 28 
The problem of responsibility, of whether war and the atrocities of war are 
caused by chance, by bureaucracy and governments and conflicts between nations, or 
by some fatalism, is evident in the war novels we have examined in this thesis. But 
the difference is that in Joseph Helier's works the responsibility lies more on the 
manmade mistakes by both the bureaucracy (e.g., the catch, the government, the 
army officials) and individuals (Yossarian and every single soldier involved). 
Likewise in Tim O'Brien's the responsibility lies on the government who wage a 
"wrong war" and every individual's impotence for actions; even in Cacciato the 
discussion of how "[t]he way events led to events, and the way they got out of human 
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control" (235) is more of an ironic accusation (i.e., this is Berlin's excuse to shun off 
his responsibility) than as an assertion. But here in the more recent war novel The 
Painter of Battles, we see the argument has become even more complicated that 
human life is (paradoxically) determined by chance and the "scientific formula" -
the Butterfly Effect - that today our human and individual responsibility to war and 
atrocities can be explained away by science at first glance. But we will see how 
Faulques's belief in that does not excuse him or any ofus?9 
Even though Faulques proclaims his innocence by saying he never pays people 
to kill in front of his camera, he is undeniably guilty of the death of the Druse who 
was shot in the head and after which the Somali executioner says to Faulques: Maik 
mee un photo. Even at another time when Faulques was on his knee trying to stop an 
African man from being killed (24 7), he knows too well that his very presence is 
"accomplice" enough, that he is the "agent", the "cause" ( 119), as noted by the 
mocking comment made by Markovic: "At any rate, you kept working, You took the 
second photo after the man was dead at your feet. . . Had it occurred to you in the 
interim that maybe they killed him because you were there? That they did it so you 
would photograph it? [ ... ] Do you think that kneeling down for ten seconds redeems 
you?" (247-248). Faulques has ignored the fact that there is no total, absolute 
"non-intervention"; as Sontag reminds us: "Even if incompatible with intervention in 
a physical sense, using a camera is still a form of participation. Although the camera 
is an observation station, the act of photographing is more than passive observing. 
Like sexual voyeurism, it is a way of at least tacitly, often explicitly, encouraging 
whatever is going on to keep on happening." (Sontag 1977, 12) I think the reason 
why back to the three years he has spent with Olvido, his lover, in wars Faulques had 
always felt that she has already outdone him and Olvido would leave him soon is 
because Olvido has apprehended the true nature of war photography: the 
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responsibilities, the very intervening nature of the so-called "non-intervention", the 
fact that such "intervening" is cruel, aggressive and violent. "To photograph people 
is to violate them," as Sontag points out, "The modem camera is trying to be a ray 
gun." (1977, 14) The camera is not simply there. It shoots (14). 
Olvido is the Lady of Wisdom in the novel exactly because she has -before she 
turns to be the photographer - already experienced what it is to be exposed under the 
camera. Faulques is different. He only has the perspective behind the camera 
intellectualizing what he sees. It is only when he feels what it feels to be seen that he 
can realize the immediate horror first-hand. Faulques has mistaken his own "seeing" 
(intellectual observation, he says) - along with the conventional, deep-rooted 
metaphor of "seeing equates understanding" (as in "I see." "I don't see it.") 30 -
with genuine understanding. Faulques's own collection of photographs which he 
names "The Eyes of War" shows again his mistaking his eyes for representational 
authority to the extent that his human eyes have become "the eyes of war" itself, and 
suggesting- though may be unconsciously- that what he (or the personified war) 
sees can provide understanding and serve as the access to war (eyes are 
metaphorically "windows"). Once Faulques visits to take pictures of a Bosnian Serb 
sniper in a building while he is shooting through his powerful telescopic lens on the 
terrace. Faulques at frrst is uninterested in who was in the viewfinder just now shot 
by the sniper, but when the sniper asked if Faulques two days before had driven by 
the Masarikov bridge, he realizes in shock that the sniper had had him in sight for 15 
seconds. Only when the predator becomes prey can he realize it does matter who the 
person is in the viewfinder. 
It has taken Faulques all these years- 30 years as a war photographer and then 
some more years for contemplation- for him to acknowledge at last: ''No photograph 
is inert, or passive" and that is why, Faulques admits, "Olvido photographed only 
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places and objects, never persons; [because] she had been the subject of cameras for 
too long not to know the dangers. The responsibilities." (24 7) It also explains why 
Faulques feels that the expression of a man about to die in his mural is problematic. 
On the mural there is a scene where a soldier "medieval in appearance but carrying 
modem weapons" is aiming his gun at a man, and "something in the victim's 
expression was not entirely convincing" to Faulques. "He was going to be killed an 
instant later, and Faulques knew it. The man who would shoot him knew it too. The 
problem lay in the emotions of the man who was going to be killed." Then Faulques 
at last realizes the problem. The face should not be "contorted with fear" because 
he was not turned towards the executioner but towards the viewer, or the painter, or 
anyone witnessing the scene. And that was why it didn't look right, Faulques realized. 
It wasn't terror that should be reflected on the face of that man who was about to die. 
He wasn't looking at his executioner but at the viewer, at the camera become the 
brushes and eye of the painter, the imaginary eye that was preparing so brazenly to 
witness his death; the condemned man's expression shouldn't reflect fear, but 
indignation. Indignant surprise was the exact nuance. Of course. The man was in 
pyjamas, he had just been pulled out of his house, hair mussed, not really awake, before 
the passive, cowardly, rejoicing, or complicitous eyes of his neighbours[ ... ] (128-129) 
Like the example of Markovic telling us what he sees when he is being seen by 
Faulques's camera, this example here is also interesting because it shows how so 
often we forget about the possibility of a "return gaze" and thus falsely think that the 
others are "someone to be seen, not someone (like us) who also sees." (Sontag 2004, 
65) Berger also reminds us that looking at a painting is actually "about the 
experience of being looked at by [the subjects in the painting]" (Berger 2001, 57). 
The subjects are not just the subjects but "He, She, They as I observed them" (Berger 
2001, 57; original emphasis). 
This new insight of the strong interdependence between the person who sees 
and the seen subject reminds Faulques of the actual scene of the Comiche in Beirut 
with that exact expression when Faulques, only 25, photographed him. The man had 
the very same expression which turned from fear to surprise and irritation when he 
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saw the camera photographing him. It was an "irate expression of invaded privacy," 
one which "registered the injustice of being photographed as he was about to die, and 
looking the way he did." (129) Faulques then repaints the expression on the mural: 
"Now the expression of the man who was going to die was right: astonishment, 
indignation. What the hell are you looking at, observing, photographing, painting?" 
(132; my emphasis). I have argued that the suffering condemned souls in Dante's 
Hell have grown more and more irritated by not only Dante the character's presence 
in there but his very act of looking, observing, and recording about them. Their 
reaction becomes less shame and self pity but more as the same irritation and 
indignation at their "invaded privacy" and the "injustice" of being looked at and 
written about when they are suffering, and "looking the way [they] did". Towards the 
end of Inferno Dante and his voyeuristic, sadistic, almost nasty journalist-like 
observation is rebuked by both Virgil and the observed subjects. What the hell are 
you looking at? 31 
The kind of observation initially advocated in the novel is one of the intellectual 
in the form of consolation. Faulques has been heavily influenced by the preaching 
from his science scholar friend who tells him: "The more we observe, the less 
meaning it all has and the more forsaken we feel. [ ... ] But look. If there's no 
consolation as a result of observation, we can find it in the act of observation itself. 
I'm talking about the analytical, scientific, even aesthetic act of that observation. [ ... ] 
it's like a mathematical procedure: it has such certainty, clarity, and inevitably that it 
offers intellectual relief to those who know how to utilize it. I wouldn't say it's 
analgesic. And so we turn to back to a somewhat battered but still useful Aristotle: 
understanding, including the effort to understand, is our salvation. Or at least it 
consoles us, because it converts absurd horror into serene laws." (108) This speech 
seems enlightening wisdom at first glance, and thereafter Faulques has been 
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converted to adopt this "unemotional tool for contemplating life" which is "cold" but, 
he thinks, "possibly effective" (30). He has believed that his camera instead of 
"catching normal people doing abnormal things" or "abnormal people doing normal 
things", really captures "normal people doing normal things." (145) But Faulques 
fails to realize that the "certainty", "clarity", and "intellectual relief' such 
consolation could offer - through "convert[ing] absurd horror into serene laws" and 
normalizing the most absurd things - is not unlike a self hypnotizing and hardening 
in the name of science. This consolation is only a way to make manageable and 
normal things over which one cannot hold sway, as demonstrated by Faulques's 
attitude to photography: "Nothing to do with aesthetics, nor with the ethics other 
photographers used - or said they used - to filter their objectives and their work. For 
him, everything had been reduced to moving about the collateral damage. His 
photographs were like chess: where others saw struggle, pain, beauty or harmony, 
Faulques saw only coalescing enigmas." (29) 
We may say that the moment at which Faulques has come to full realization of 
the limits of the photographic eye and the horror of intellectualizing horror is when 
he even tries to dehumanize, to mechanize the instant of Olvido's death through his 
camera, "to make things seem normal": "He had looked at Olvido, dead, through the 
viewfinder, first blurred and then clearer as he turned the focus ring from infinity to 
1.6 metres. The image in the viewfinder appeared in colour, but the thing Faulques 
remembered above all others, the one that time and memory preserved" is the grey 
colours developed in the dark room through slow materialization (273). As if only by 
rendering Olvido's death through a lens- i.e., through mechanization into an image 
in the form of a hypperreality - can Faulques manage to look at her death. His 
(perhaps unconscious) choice of looking at Olvido 's death that way also indicates his 
inability to register her death. He tries to register her death through an image instead 
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of the real corpse lying there in front of him, which is the best illustration of "our era 
[which] prefers the image over the object, the copy over the original, the 
representation over the reality, appearance over being." (170) But such intellectual-
highly intelligent and yet mechanical - aspect of observation reminds us again of 
Sontag's "researcher" analogy of the photographer which is one that disgusts 
Markovic, as noted earlier. It is the false sense of compassion Faulques feels for 
observation which indeed "the same compassion that the researcher feels as he 
observes the battle in the infection of a wound through his microscope." ( 13 5) That 
"compassion" is not felt because of care but of curiosity, of the satisfaction from the 
intellect. It is a shocking realization to Faulques that he may feel for Olvido 's death-
the fatal wound - through his camera in the same way that a researcher feels for "the 
inflection of a wound through his microscope". He realizes the very nature of his 
being a "scientific observer" is indeed being a "spectator", and it is interesting to 
note that they are by nature inseparable because the word "spectator" was really used 
as "a scientific observer" in some rare contexts ( OED). 
The flash of the camera is deflected to one of the very darkness of human 
understanding. This idea is symbolized by the transformation of the image of the 
watchtower by the sea which traditionally symbolizes the guidance of light in the 
dark (the Light: wisdom, liberating) into the very opposite: one which "resembled the 
guard tower searchlight in a concentration camp." (136) I think Faulques is the 
victim of experience and he seems to have forgotten the intuition and empathetic 
emotions he once had when he was young and new to war photography before he 
was preached to by his scholar friend. "Don't start off on Aristotle, for Christ's sake," 
the young Faulques said, "I'm talking about real life and real death. The smell of a 
corpse beneath the rubble, the smell of death slipping like fog along the bank of a 
river." ( 1 08) We have long equated Innocence with Ignorance these days and have 
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highly valued Wisdom and Experience, but we have forgotten the importance of 
Innocence, human intuition and our initial - thus true-hearted - response to things. 
Consolation and contemplation is always second degree because it is also 
intellectualization, a translation of our perception into the manageable, 
understandable, and reasonable, an act of putting into brackets the issue in order to 
scrutinize it as in a 3rd person (Is it not true that many of us think we are the 3rd 
person regarding war?). Think of the inhumanly uncanniness we feel when we see 
how Markovic tries to recount his tragic stories in the 3 rd person and even calls 
himself "he", "the man who suffered". But we have forgotten that we are always in 
the issue as first person singular and plural, as the true matter of things is always 
simple. Faulques realizes what Markovic has wanted him to: "Whoever had called it 
Horror, with a capital H - too much literature on the subject - was merely 
intellectualizing the simplicity of the obvious." (236). 
This is why Faulques paints his mural following the precedents of the Spanish 
masters, most notably Goya and his The Disasters of War (181 0-1820). Visions of 
war can be as long as human history but it seems that only relatively recently have 
we recognized the inappropriateness of the spectator to these war visions. A century 
prior to our authors in this thesis, Goya is one of the first to realize and point out the 
presence of such a voyeuristic spectatorship of war. As Sontag says, Goya "seems a 
turning point in the history of moral feelings and of sorrow - as deep, as original, as 
demanding. With Goya, a new standard of responsiveness to suffering enters art" and 
it becomes "new subjects for fellow-feeling" (2004, 40). Like our authors, Goya 
refutes and assaults the "spectators" of his paintings: "The ghoulish cruelties in The 
Disasters of War are meant to awaken, shock, wound the viewer. [ ... ] The account of 
war's cruelties is fashioned as an assault on the sensibility of the viewer." (2004, 40). 
Faulques has spent years realizing this point with his mural, and we, luckily, the 
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length of a book.32 
The Spectator-tourist of War Tourism and the Modern Landscape of war 
'What makes our landscape of 1939 inconceivable to us and puts it once and for all 
beyond our grasp is precisely the fact that we were not conscious of it as a landscape. 
In the world in which we lived, Plato was as close to us as Heidegger, the Chinese as 
close as the French- and in reality one was as far away as the other." 
-Merleau-Ponty "The War Has Taken Place" ( 1945) 
"Evil as Landscape." 
"What the hell." 
- The Painter of Battles 
In The Painter of Battles another central message is that our civilization is now 
the "ruins of modem spectacle" (Baudrillard; see below) and that the landscape is 
Evil, "Evil as Landscape." It is this new idea of the landscape which is directly 
linked to our understanding of war and its destructiveness. In my Introduction I 
discussed how our failure is our very lack of the consciousness of war, and now we 
see a further dimension: "we were not conscious of [the war] as a landscape" and 
so we cleanse it of any historicity and particularity. This is especially the case when 
war is seen as spectacle deprived of any physical, historical connections to the local 
specificities and this makes all the battles look the same. Like to Faulques the war 
zones he has visited and remembered all blend into one whole, undistinguishable 
from one another: "Most of the people who appeared in those photos evaporated 
among a multitude of indistinguishable features and a succession of scenes 
impossible to identify without a major effort of memory: Cyprus, Vietnam, Lebanon, 
Cambodia, Eritrea, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Iraq, the 
Balkans ... solitary hunts, trips with no beginning and no end, devastated landscapes 
of a vast geography of disaster, wars that blended into other wars, people who 
blended into other people, dead that blended into other dead." (19) This is in 
particular a modem-day spectator's perception of landscape because Faulques is 
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aware that he as well as all the others are living with transitoriness, in an "insecure 
terrain'' nowadays: "Now's it's different, everything is fast. Highways, trains ... 
even television shows us different scenes every few seconds." (62) Our modem war 
has revolutionized our understanding of landscape by its "involvement of civilians", 
"development of aerial bombing and long-range missiles", development of the 
media, and ever since WWII "the idea of war on an international, inter-continental 
scale became something of a totally different nature from anything mankind had 
ever previously experienced." (Jones 1968, 3) 
The power of modem warfare is hellish and unimaginable, as Olvido says 
when she comments that modem warfare is capable of making "[t]he ten years of 
Troy [be] reduced to thirty seconds of pyrotechnics and ballistics" (66). Faulques is 
"stunned by the transformation war had imposed on the urban landscape, by its 
functionalist logic, by the problems of locating and concealing, of firing range, of 
dead angles." (66-67) Modem warfare has made him "come truly to comprehend 
the concepts of fortification, of the wall, the glacis, the ancient city and its relation, 
or opposition, to modem urbanism" and "to note to what point man's technical 
advances had made the cityscape mutable, modifying it, shrinking it, constructing 
and destroying it according to the circumstances of the moment" ( 67) because now, 
"to kill, you pointed a finger: a bridge framed in the monitor of a smart bomb" (67). 
War makes us have the impression that modem civilization now exists in ruins 
because while civilization is fragile and destructible in 30 seconds (think of the 
Bomb), only "[ r ]uins were indestructible" ( 140) and it is a "geological amorality" 
(173). This shows "the ruins of the modem spectacle" (Baudrillard, qtd. in Plant 
1992, 155). Baudrillard "characterizes postmodemity as the attempt 'to reach a 
point where one can live with what is left. It is more a survival among the ruins than 
anything else."' (Plant 1992, 155) Our modem-day "survival among the ruins" is 
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not unlike the "America is Wasteland model" (see Olderman 1976), the idea that 
our civilization has become a "wasteland" which is a common literary scene in 
American literature after the 1960s (a metaphor since T. S. Eliot) to replace the "lost 
Eden" model. 
The very reason why Faulques began a career as a war photographer was 
because as a boy he spent a lot of time looking at a print of an old painting, The 
Triumph of Death by Brueghel the Elder, and he decided to go on a trip and see it, 
and see the landscape in the background. He decided "the best way to travel to a 
painting of war was to spend a long time in a war." ( 61) Then after having spent 
thirty years on the landscape depicted by Brueghel, Faulques gave up his camera and 
went back to his brushes and began to paint an allegorical mural that would depict 
his own landscape of The Triumph of Death from his first-hand experience and 
memory. And to Faulques, Brueghel 's The Triumph of Death is about the Final 
Judgement with "all those skeletons like armies, and the fires in the distance" ( 61 ). 
Indeed we fail to realize that the spectacle has become a claustrophobic 
situation itself. This is why John Berger thinks Brueghel 's Triumph of Death and 
Hieronymus Bosch's Millennium Triptych are two paintings with the mysteries of 
"strange prophecies": the former is "already a terrible prophecy of the Nazi 
extermination camps" and the latter whose right -hand panel depicts Hell "has 
become a strange prophecy of the mental climate imposed on the world at the end of 
our century by globalization and the new economic order." (Berger 2001 , 209) Both 
horrible scenes resemble, Berger says, "a typical CNN news bulletin", "or any mass 
media news commentary" because "[t]here is a comparable incoherence, a 
comparable wilderness of separate excitements, a similar frenzy." (Berger 2001 , 21 0) 
We need to refuse such "spectacle" and denounce it: "The act of resistance means not 
only refusing to accept the absurdity of the world-picture offered us, but denouncing 
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it. And when hell is denounced from within, it ceases to be hell." (Berger 2001, 
214-215) It is because landscape is a state of mind: Nam or Paris, War or Peace. 33 
We tend to ignore the fact that we are now living in the claustrophobia of the 
Apocalypse Now, as Berger says: "The culture in which we live is perhaps the most 
claustrophobic that has ever existed; in the culture of globalisation, as in Bosch's hell, 
there is no glimpse of an elsewhere or an otherwise. The given is a prison." (Berger 
2001, 214) Similar to O'Brien's accusation at the civilian reader, in Painter we also 
see how the spectacle of our so-called civilization is indeed a fa<;ade which prevents 
our realization that the Apocalypse is now and that War is everywhere. Markovic is 
puzzled by such spectator civilians: "After I left that prison camp, I was taken to a 
hospital in Zagreb, and the first thing I did when I got out was go and sit in a cafe in 
Jelacic Square. To watch people, hear their words. And I couldn't believe what I 
heard: the conversations, the preoccupations, the priorities ... Listening to them, I 
wondered. Don't they realise? What does a dented car matter, a run in your stocking, 
the payment on the TV? Do you know what I mean?" (144-145). These 
spectator-civilians are so blinded to their very living inside a spectacle that Markovic 
thinks they are indeed living in two different planets: "I see them all around me. 
Where do they come form? I ask myself. Am I an extraterrestrial? Can it be that 
they're not aware that theirs is not a normal state?" (145). As Sontag points out: 
"Central to modern expectations, and modern ethical feeling, is the conviction that 
war is an aberration, an unattainable one. This, of course, is not the way war has been 
regarded throughout history. War has been the norm and peace the exception." 
(Sontag 2004, 66) How, then, can the war veterans communicate with "people [who] 
would pay a fortune to have dinner overlooking a panorama like [a war scene]" 
(Painter 184), the museum-goers who flock the exhibitions of war paintings and 
photographs - "It seems exploitative to look at harrowing photographs of other 
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people's pain in an art gallery," as Sontag notes (2004, 1 07) - all of who do not even 
realize their own state of being? 
Referring to a collection of paintings about "the sixth of August 1945", Berger 
says: "after repeatedly looking at them, what began as an impression became a 
certainty. These were images of hell" and that he "was not using the word [i.e., Hell] 
as hyperbole." (Berger 1993, 288) In our "society of spectacle" we even have a "War 
is Tourism in Hell" model which is a composite of the other two common models of 
representation of war in war fiction: the "War is Hell" and "War is Journey" models. 
These two models are evident in all the novels we have discussed in this thesis. 
The "War is Journey (tourism)" model is adopted in Catch-22 in the form of the 
flying missions and the AWOL trips to Rome (and Helier has admitted in a 1962 
interview that his novel is inspired by Celine's Journey to the End of Night, see "An 
Impolite Interview with Joseph Helier"); in We Bombed there is the soldiers' 
excitement at flying missions to foreign touristic places; in Cacciato there is an 
imaginary 8,600 miles to Paris led by the "touring soldiers"; and in The Things They 
Carried the young soldiers treat the war as "a nature hike". These works all begin 
with the "war is tourism" model and end in the other model of "war is hell", as we 
see how the exotic, touristic cities are in the end turned into surreally, hellish, 
collapsed civilizations, the urban Inferno. Think about the Eternal City chapter in 
Catch-22 where Rome becomes a hellish scene (instead of God's "Eternal City" -
paradise - it is a man-made hell), the decadent Parisian street corner in Cacciato, and 
Faulques 's apocalyptic vision of his mural. It is held that the reasons for the 
prevalence of these two models in much war fiction is obvious: first, War resembles 
Hell because it is unimaginably evil and devastating to both human bodies and 
civilization; second, War does resemble a "journey" in both the physical and 
psychological sense. War involves physical movement, geographical displacement as 
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well as psychological learning from going to new places, seeing new things and 
meeting new people. It is particularly the case with the advance of transportation that 
soldiers do travel around to fight their wars. However, I would like to make a 
distinction between such "journeys" and the "war is tourism'' model. Indeed it is 
argued that such a "War is a journey" model is nothing new in the history of 
literature, as Homer's Odyssey already is an example (see Leland 1981 ). 
But I think "journey" is in fact a more neutral word than "tourism" which marks 
the distinctive feature of modem war fiction. "Tourism" entails the mentality and 
attitude of the voyeuristic, unsoldierly soldiers who treat war not as a national heroic 
mission but rather as excursions to the exotic (and spectacular) others (places and 
the localities become entertainment and wonder). In fact the idea of "tourism" of war 
can parody and best suit the fun-making, unserious, exalting nature of modem war 
where soldiers become spectators and war spectacle. 34 In a hotel in Cavtat 
overlooking the cities burning in flame with flashes and explosions in the distance, 
Faulques and Olvido could not help it but "sat there, the two of them, quiet, 
mesmerised by the spectacle." ( 184) This is a good example of the image of the 
tourists through the hell of war who consume the war scenes as "spectacles", 
themselves sitting comfortably and safely in a hotel room. Both the photographer 
Diane Arbus and Susan Sontag have already commented on our becoming tourists to 
the realities of atrocities in the 60s; Sontag directly called war photography "war 
tourism" in her 2003 book (2004, 1 00). That there are many Dantesque readings of 
war fiction shows how Dante 's Inferno is a handy metaphor because it can 
encompass the "War is Hell" and "War is Tourism" models to make a third, i.e., the 
"War is Tourism in Hell" model. The Painter of Battles is one of the best novels for 
such Dantesque reading for it is explicitly worded in the novel that the relationship 
between Olvido and Faulques is the same as Dante and Virgil. 35 In The Painter of 
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Battles, Olvido is the modem Dante who wants Faulques to be her "silent Virgil": "I 
want to go with you. I need a silent Virgil and you are good at that" ( 168); he is 
"[t]he hand that leads [her] across landscapes" (81). Indeed I feel that Dante and 
Olvido would make a good comparison because Dante, I think, is in many ways like 
a nasty photojoumalist in Hell, which Olvido resists becoming. Olvido has this 
strong desire to see war firsthand because she thinks that she, who used to be a 
beautiful fashion model from a wealthy family, has long "lived in a fictitious world 
since she was a girl" only knowing war from TV like all spectator civilians do. Now 
she wants "to see the world in its true dimensions, without the varnish of false 
normality." (169) She thus needs Faulques to be her "passport" back to reality 
because Olvido knows that war is not another reality but is reality, and civilian life is 
not: "The camera, [ ... ] you yourself, Faulques, are my passport to what's real: there 
where things can't be embellished by stupidity, rhetoric or money. I want to shred my 
former naivete. My badly battered and overvalued innocence." ( 169) 
Unlike Faulques and many other war photographers claiming good intentions, 
Olvido is truly aware of her prestigious status as a "tourist of disaster" (81 ), "an elite 
tourist" ( 1 71) performing what Son tag would mock as the "touristic, 
world-anthologizing tasks of photography" (Sontag 1977, 11 0); to Son tag, "having a 
camera has transformed one person into something active, a voyeur: only [ s ]he has 
mastered the situation." (1977, 10) That "world-anthologizing tasks of photography" 
began with the photography of the "ethnographic Other", the "colonized" where the 
"colonial fantasy mirrors itself - the image embodies the observer's imaginary 
conceptions rather than any external conditions." (Edwards 2006, 25) Olvido resists 
acclaiming herself as the professional photographer for she sees that she is 
performing a form of cheating and that her very presence in war reminds her of the 
unfair, indeed cheating nature of her position as the tourist-voyeur in disguise of the 
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Photographer: "I don't want to cheat. I do that often enough with a camera around 
my neck and a civilized passport and return ticket in my pocket." (84) This is part of 
the reason why Faulques has chosen the brush instead of his camera: a patronizing 
tool can never be true witness to the pain of others while it always treats them as the 
Others. 
Faulques 's mural is important because it does not only show a battlescape of 
hellish war but also it is a Revelation. What F aulques has learned during "a lifetime 
of photographing cruelty and wickedness" ( 49) is the innately cruel nature of 
mankind, that men are "bloodthirsty animals. Our ingenuity in creating horror has no 
limits" (49), that "[m]an tortures and kills because it's his thing. He likes it", and that 
"[ o ]bjective, elemental cruelty isn't cruelty. To be truly cruel, there must be 
conscious calculation. Intelligence." (95) Think of the systematic holocaust which 
exactly demonstrated our human "intelligence" and milestone of "modernity", as 
Chris Rodriques (2005) observes: "What about the Nazi Holocaust in the 1940s? Was 
that modernity in its application of managerial Taylorism and assembly-line Fordism 
to the extermination of millions? Isn't the A-bomb quintessential modernity?". 
Concluding his ironic note, Rodrigues reminds us: "The rationalism of modernity 
disguises its alternative irrationalism." (Rodrigues 2005, 27) Faulques paints his 
landscape not about Evil but as it: "Evil as landscape." (236) Markovic 
asks Fauqlues: "Why paint something that someone did better before you?". The 
answer is simple, as Faulques says, because "[ e ]ach person has to paint his own thing. 
What he saw. What he sees." (197) This echoes the job given unto us by the 
Revelation (1 :19): "Write the things which you have seen, and the things which are, 
and the things which will take place after this." Faulques has thus painted a 
landscape about the ancient burning cities and our modem Troys and modem Babel. 
In that sense Faulques's painting qualifies what Olvido says of a good painting: 
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"Every good painting has always aspired to be a landscape of another landscape not 
yet painted," especially one which shows "allegories of certainties that become a 
certainty only after a lot of time has gone by." (163) 
Faulques 's "timeless battle landscape" is one of "an immense and disquieting 
landscape, no title, no specific time" where in the background there stands an ancient 
walled city (like Troy) which is burning in the distance, and next to it two modem 
cement and glass towers ("nearly Brueghelian tower of Babel still asleep and 
tranquil" which is also an allusion to the twin towers of Sept-11 ), ignorant of what is 
going to happen to them like their adjacent ancient city. The crack of the mural 
naturally develops into "the form of an irresolute lightning flash between the two 
cities" ( 112) and the "wooden horses were lurking and aeroplanes flying very low 
towards the twin towers of all the sleeping Troys" (112). The volcano is erupting in 
the distance, we see "hanged men swinging like clusters of fruit from the trees", a 
dog sniffing human remains, ships sailing away on the grey horizon, fleeting soldiers, 
women and children fleeing for life to the lower edge of the painting where they 
meet the "futuristic metallic reflections of soldiers" who cast them indifferent gaze, 
soldiers who "look like killing machines", symbolizing the eternal and inhuman 
nature of evil and cruelty mankind is capable of. There are also a child sitting on the 
ground beside his mother, a violated woman with a shaved head who "seems almost 
inhuman", the medieval horsemen awaiting the moment to ride into combat, the men 
in anachronistic garments and weapons from thirty centuries ago slashing at each 
other in the foreground. Each of the images is a story in the way Faulques has seen 
and remembered it. The anachronism of putting both ancient, medieval images and 
modem ones together makes Markovic wonder at Faulques: "So ancient wars also 
form part of your memories? Troy and places like that?" (27). And Faulques replies: 
"That's what it's about. Places like that are always the same place." (28) The 
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battlefield on earth, the violence and cruelty inflicted upon humanity is the same 
throughout history, which is why Faulques and Olvido say every modem, civilised 
city is a modem Troy, and there is "[a] predictable Troy beneath every photograph 
and every Venice" (116); And the towers of the "sleeping Troy" are "the towers of 
Manhattan, Hong Kong, London, or Madrid; any city of the many that lived trusting 
in the power of their arrogant colossi: a forest of modem, intelligently engineered 
buildings inhabited by people convinced of their youth, beauty and immortality" 
(139). The tower symbolizes human arrogance and their nature of the overreacher, 
like Babel, which Olvido parodies with a bitter allusion to the Twin Towers of WTC: 
"That was why the history of Humankind was so well supplied with towers built to 
be evacuated in four or five hours but able to withstand the fury of a fire for only 
two" (139). Because what they show to Faulques is only "devastated landscapes of a 
vast geography of disaster" which levels down everything, each real war story is 
rendered as a pathetic example: "[c]ountless negatives amongst which he 
remembered one in every hundred, in every five hundred, in every thousand." (19) It 
is the way war memorials are composed too: they "homogenize the imagination 
about the war dead. Complex, personal events are visualized as uniform for public 
consumption" and "the tens of thousands or millions who served in any war are 
cemented into one face. [ ... ] In the war memorials, they are all one. . . [and] make no 
distinction" (Perlmutter 1999, 186) The "memory" such memorials preserves is, 
Debord would say, "an impersonal memory, the memory of the administration of 
society" (7 6) instead of personal significance. Thousands of millions of corpses in 
war zones were "one more corpse, one more image" to F aulques, but through the 
book-length contemplation of Faulques he comes to realize the uniqueness of each 
photograph he has taken. The picture of Ivo Markovic for one, which is of a man he 
does not remember and whose name he even does not know, who has come to kill 
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him; the picture of the death of Olvido, for another, has haunted him for ten years, 
and he knows that photograph of Olvdio is different, "she wasn't just one more", not 
"one amongst so many." (45) Likewise, what every writer of war fiction strives to do 
is to refuse being just "one amongst so many". Yossarian, Paul Berlin, Curt Lemon, 
Norman Bowker, Olvido, Morkovic, every one of them, even the poor damn baby 
water buffalo, is unique and irreducible to just one more example. They are not an 
instance. They linger in our memory en instance. The power of representation of war 
lies in its ability to make eternal the evil that has happened and is still happening or 
even that is about to happen. And the spectator is forced to face the true horror of 
evil - the eternalness of evil - and to realize the implied accusation at the spectator 
who is eternally immobilized from intervening; as Sontag comments about the 
pictures of the Cambodian women and men and children who are photographed: 
"[They are] forever looking at death, forever about to be murdered, forever wronged. 
And the viewer is in the same position as the lackey behind the camera; the 
experience is sickening." (Sontag 2004, 55) The chief task of representation of war, I 
would argue, is exactly to provoke such "sickening" experience of the reader who 
has long been the "lackey" because they never experience anything and because they 
"witness" the forever instant of the pain and death of others. The suffering are 
forever en instance, Derrida would say, because (1) always, repeat ably, "the singular 
instant becomes an ideal instant" (think of Pater's idea of the "ideal instant", too) and 
(2) because the man is forever "on the verge" of dying, "imminent" to his death. 
Derrida says: "testimony is thus always a matter of instant and instance or exemplary 
'instance"' (Derrida 2000, 42-43). 
How can the reader not react? How can they do so when in fact even the cold 3rd 
person dehumanized narrating voice in Catch-22, for example, cannot remain 
detached regarding the pain of others? Perhaps the most moving part in the novel in 
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the scene is of a nice warm day with people having fun at the beach when all of a 
sudden Kid Sampson is sliced into half by Me Watt's plane, his entrails are swept by 
the wave in the sea and everyone is screaming and running to get out of the water, 
which is a scene where "on the beach, all hell broke loose" (388). Paradoxically, it is 
a scene that "[ e ]ven people who were not there remembered vividly exactly what 
happened next." (388) Note also the description of the crowd of spectators as struck 
and "rooted in awe" and could not help but watching, "gravely crane their heads 
upward and watched the guilty, banking, forlorn airplane with Me Watt circle and 
circle slowly and climb" (389). It shows the human instinct that the more horrible a 
scene the more tempting it is. In the hilarious scene that follows the narrating voice 
tells us that Yossarian is the first among the spectators to react to the spectacle: 
But Yossarian understood suddenly why Me Watt wouldn't jump, and went running 
uncontrollably down the whole length of the squadron after Me Watt's plane, waving his 
arms and shouting up at him imploringly to come down, McWatt, come down; but no 
one seemed to hear, certainly not Me Watt, and a great, choking moan tore from 
Yossarian's throat as Me Watt turned again, dipped his wings once in salute, decided oh, 
well, what the hell, and flew into a mountain. (390) 
This is the only bit in the novel where we see a slip of emotions leaking out from the 
third person narrator. His narrative is deliberately fused with Yossarian through 
taking away the inverted commas (e.g., Me Watt, come down). The outburst of "oh, 
well, what the hell" must have surprised the reader - as it clearly is said by the 
narrator before he, as if realizing his own revelation of subjective emotions, slaps 
back to his normal aloofness remarking about the increased number of missions: 
''Colonel Cathcart was so upset by the deaths of Kid Sampson and Me Watt that he 
raised the missions to sixty-five." (390) Even the narrative itself cannot be muted 
regarding the pain of its characters near the end. 
We have spent at length in this thesis discussing our spectatorship and 
impotence regarding the pain of others in war; it is time we drew to a close by 
examining what possibilities for transcendence of our spectatorship are offered by 
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the authors. In Chapter 2 we looked at Paul Berlin as a possible psychogeographical 
jlaneur. Now we will look at the other two possibilities. 
The Anti-Spectator Female: From Impotence to Male Impotence 
"It wasn't a war story. It was a love story. It was a ghost story." 
- The Things They Carried 
It does seem that every war story has a sub-story - a love story - interwoven 
with it. All of the novels examined in this thesis are no exceptions: Nately's whore 
and Yossarian (Catch-22), Starkey and Ruth (We Bombed), Paul Berlin and Sarkin 
Aung Wan (Cacciato), Lieutenant Cross and Martha, Norman Bowker and Sally, 
Mark Fossie and Mary Anne, little Timmy and Linda (Things), and Faulques and 
Olvido (Painter). Love suggests the original state of innocence and a transcendence 
of identity beyond war, as Kinney speaks of Cacciato: ''This nostalgic innocence is 
exactly the idea Paul Berlin seeks to establish through Sarkin Aung Wan. By falling 
in love, Paul Berlin [ ... ] seeks to declare his separation from the war. He is no longer 
an alien presence, a soldier, an embodiment of a national and imperial identity, but a 
lover, a man, an individual." (Kinney 1995, 648) In Catch-22 the whole novel begins 
with the very line "It was love at first sight." (7) The Things They Carried also 
begins and ends with love: the first chapter is about the lovesick Lieutenant Cross's 
letter received from Martha, the second chapter is entitled "Love", and all the way to 
the last chapter with the 9-year-old Timmy's dead little girlfriend Linda. "Tim 
O'Brien" even says that he becomes a writer in order to save her: "And as a writer 
now, I want to save Linda's life. Not her body- her life." (229) It is also the same 
reason for Faulques to become a painter of battles for Olvido. Faulques "had at the 
age of twenty thrown himself into war, observant, lucid, with the caution of one 
exploring a woman's body for the first time. And until Olvido Ferrara walked into 
and out of his life, he had believed he would survive both war and women." (Painter 
14) But I would suggest that the presence of Love in these novels is only there to 
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reveal the very impotence of our male protagonists as the impotent spectators. And 
their impotence is also a male impotence. This is not unlike what Olderman (1976) 
tells us about the "wastelanders" who are "characterized by enervating and neurotic 
pettiness, physical and spiritual sterility and debilitation, an inability to love, 
yearning and fear-ridden desires. They are sexually inadequate, divided by guilts, 
alienated, aimless, bored, and rootless" (Olderman 1976, 11 ). A key 
twentieth-century figure of such impotent man is, of course, Mr. Prufrock. In new 
light this Mr. Prufrock becomes the symbol to link together all our male protagonists. 
Love, as we have observed, is a sub-text throughout our texts, but perhaps to put 
it more accurately it is the impossibility, inability of love. The concept of "male 
impotence" in the novels refers first of all to the male protagonists' inability to 
pursue love and a happy future with the women due to various forms of inertia, 
impotence resulted from constraints of the present situation or even their being stuck 
in the past to their fundamental lack of action, their personalities. But "male 
impotence" when read more explicitly in sexual terms also refers to a translation of 
the male protagonists' psychological impotence to the physical, finally expressed 
through their inability to make love. See how F aulques, Berlin, Starkey or even 
Yossarian the seemingly most sexually active are indeed sexually impotent. 36 
But the key point is not about sex: it implies the mystic, tantalizing, subversive 
female power over the male protagonists. The empowered females - Olvido, Sarkin 
Aung Wan, and Mary Anne - do not only serve as counter-examples against the 
general candy females ridiculed in the novels (who embody the worst spectators of 
war for their ignorance and oversentimentality); their real target of contrast is our 
male protagonists, the impotent soldier spectators. In Tim O'Brien's novels there is 
always a sense of belittlement of the female because they are excluded from the male 
world of war. They are "sisters who never write back", "uninvolved" (Things 14, 19), 
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who do not know a thing about war - like Martha and the old lady who pities the 
baby water buffalo - and who "belonged to another world" ( 14 ), the World back 
home. At first glance these seem to demonstrate the superiority of men by belittling 
women rendering them ignorant and weak. 
But O'Brien overthrows such mentality by giving us counter-examples who are 
weak female figures transfigured into those even stronger, more capable than the 
impotent male figures in the novels. Mary Anne Bell is such a revolutionized 
embodiment symbol of the New Woman against the traditional unknowing 
girlfriends critiqued in most novels: "those girls back home, how clean and innocent 
they all are, how they'll never understand any of this, not in a billion years. Try to 
tell them about it, they' 11 just stare at you with those big round candy eyes. They 
won't understand zip." (Things 105) Mary Anne is an exception because she 
experienced it, she is no spectator of war: "There it is, you got to taste it, and that's 
the thing with Mary Anne. She was there. She was up to her eyeballs in it. After the 
war, man, I promise, you won't find nobody like her." (Things 105; original emphasis) 
Mary Anne, who, at once in the war, smuggled into Vietnam from the U.S. back 
home, demonstrates the very adaptability and power which the male soldiers lack. 
When the male soldiers loathe the women back home for their innocence (and thus 
ignorance) and exclusion from the war, self-pitying - which in fact is self-boasting 
for the significance and contribution of the men at war - Mary Anne shakes her head 
and tells her lover soldier Mark Fossie: "You're in a place where you don't belong." 
(103; my emphasis) It is men who do not belong to Vietnam, even to war. They are 
displaced and even castrated the way Mary Anne makes her necklace out of cut-off 
tongues. She has outgrown the girl the male soldiers fancy her to be - the 
"Sweetheart of the Song Tra Bong" - and become a predatory alliance with Vietnam. 
Mary Anne says: "Sometimes I want to eat this place. Vietnam. I want to swallow the 
138 
whole country - the dirt, the death - I just want to eat it and have it inside me" ( 103) 
and "it's like I'm full of electricity and I'm glowing in the dark." (1 04) Later she 
quits her lover and the squad of men who she has also outgrown. Likewise, Sarkin 
Aung Wan in Cacciato is another such female figure who shows the power of action 
as a strong contrast to the impotent men. It is Sarkin Aung Wan who keeps 
encouraging Paul Berlin the willy-nilly guy along the road to have a beautiful dream 
of happy future at Paris and, above all, to realize it, and at her last attempt to make 
him react, she demands a "positive commitment" and action: "Spec Four Paul Berlin, 
I urge you to act." (300) But without success, she, like Mary Anne, also desserts the 
impotent man to pursue her own future. In Painter, Olvido once says to Faulques: 
"You men are all amazingly stupid" (166). She is in many ways comparable to Mary 
Anne who also no longer wants to just be a spectator of war and she wants to see it 
and in the end she demonstrates her perceptive insight of what war really is that the 
male protagonists fail. As Olvido says about the wars: "Soon I won't need you, 
Faulques, but I will always be grateful for your wars. They free my eyes from that 
past. They give me perfect licence to go wherever I want: action, adrenaline, 
ephemeral art. They liberate me from responsibilities and make me an elite tourist. I 
can look, finally. With my eyes." (Painter 171; original emphasis) 
All the male protagonists in the end realize they have become only a spectator 
of their women. As Olvido says to Faulques: "Whether I'm catching the war or if it 
was already in me and you have merely been the inciting agent, or witness." (208) 
Faulques also admits bitterly: "A man [ ... ] believes he is a woman's lover, when in 
truth he is only her witness." (224) A man is not the active participant of a woman's 
life, always only a witness, that is, he always remains as the impotent spectator of a 
woman. But more to all these, Olvido represents Faulques's darkest secret. 
O'Brien loves to call his war novels "love stories", but his are different from the 
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usual romances. There is a pathetic nature to his "love stories" not only because they 
are often about the impossibility of love conspired by male impotence, but also 
because such male impotence exactly reveals the darker, pathetic side of the men in 
pursuit of love. "You usually think a love story is about kisses and roses," Tim 
O'Brien says, "but sometimes people do bad things for love. My guy goes to war for 
love, he spies for love, he guards his secret for love, all these are bad things he's 
doing. We all do bad things for love. Every single one of us, things we won't tell and 
secrets we'll guard. That's how I'd tag it, as a love story." (Edelman 1994 interview) 
F aulques in Painter, likewise, is one such person who also guards a secret which has 
haunted him for ten years: the death of Olvido along the ditch on the Borovo Naselje 
road. Faulques is only able to come to terms with her death and reveal to Markovic, 
the readers, and to himself, too, this secret upon his death: that it was him who let 
Olvido die stepping on the mine. He confesses: "I saw the mine. [ ... ] Or to be more 
precise, I divined it. [ ... ] I hesitated for three seconds. That was all. Three. She was 
leaving, do you understand? She was already leaving me. Suddenly I wanted to know 
how far ... I don't know. How she was leaving didn't depend on me. Maybe geometry 
had something to say on that subject." (274) So he watched, he kept quiet, he 
hesitated, and he did not intervene to save Olvido and what is worse, he found 
himself "fascinated." (275) This shows again that the key issue is not what one does 
but what not. And Faulques shows us the extreme form of male impotence, that he 
was fearful of her leaving him, "but he was even more fearful that Olvido would 
survive that last war." (224) And so he preferred her dead. 
The Ultimate Anti-Spectator: Jesus Christ 
"God is a concept/ by which we measure/ our pain" 
- John Lennon, "God" (1970) 
( qtd. in Bennett & Royle 2004, 161) 
That spectatorship is Evil is the central lesson in the novel for F aulques as well 
140 
as the readers to learn. The neighbours in Painter who did not help Markovic's 
Serbian wife are culpable, as Markovic adopts that ironically "objective" 3rd person 
recounting his tragedy: "although the woman was screaming all night, not a single 
neighbor turned on a light or came outside to see what was happening." (51) But 
Markovic who despises the impotent, timid herd of neighbors is no better himself. 
The young, handsome Bosnian kid comrade of his who sacrificed himself to be 
brought away by the Serbian guard in exchange for little gifts and medicine for his 
sick men in the camp prison is scorned by the comrades, as Markovic reveals, 
"ashamed": "When some nights the guard took him away with him [ ... ] that boy 
always came back with something. A little chocolate, a tin of condensed milk, 
tobacco ... he gave it all to us. Sometimes he brought medicine for those who were 
sick... even so, we scorned him. How about that? We did, however take everything 
he brought us. Greedily, I assure you. Yes. Down to the last cigarette." (126) What's 
worse, one night several of Markovic 's companions sodomised the kid: "If you let 
the Serbian do it, they said, then let us. They had stuffed a rag in his mouth so he 
wouldn't yell. We did nothing to defend him." (127) And the boy hanged himself the 
next day. Or another example, in outskirts of Vinkovci where Markovic sees women 
raped and "men taken to the trucks" and still insists: "I don't know what they did 
with them. It didn't matter to me, I didn't care." (133) Of course he knew what would 
have become of the men taken to the trucks, but all these examples show clearly the 
contrary of the Christian "Love Thy Neighbor" commandment- which is the second 
greatest commandment in the Law to "Love Thy God" - and how such cruelty is not 
ad hoc examples. We regard the pain of others because they will always remain as 
the others, not neighbors, and we do not love them. The crimes Markovic recounts 
do not surprise Faulques either, as Faulques says: "It's here, under our skin [ ... ] In 
our genes. Only the artificial rules, culture, the varnish of successive civilizations 
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keep man within bounds. Social conventions, laws. Fear of punishment. [ . . . ] God? 
Don't be a bore. [ ... ] Look at them. So civilized within their parameters, as long as it 
doesn't cost them too much effort. Asking for things with a 'please'; some still do. 
Put them in a locked room, take away their basic necessities, and you'll see them 
destroy each other." ( 1 01) Not that man is corrupted from innocence, but that man is 
born evil. Evil is his normal state. 
O'Brien has implied a sense of the world not only as a spectacle but also a 
Grand Spectator who is everywhere. In his highly autobiographical story "On the 
Rainy River" the "0 'Brien" character, fidgeting whether or not to go to war, says: 
"All those eyes on me - the town, the whole universe - and I couldn't risk the 
embarrassment. It was as if these were an audience to my life, that swirl of faces 
along the river, and in my head I could hear people screaming at me. Traitor! They 
yelled. Turncoat! Pussy! I felt myself blush." (Things 54) God, or the gods, are, in a 
sense, divine Spectators too, and "O'Brien" character is rueful toward such watching, 
"witness", from above: "a witness, like God, or like the gods, who look on in 
absolute silence as we live our lives, as we make our choices or fail to make them. '' 
(54) Similarly, in Catch-22 we see the criticism of God as unloving and 
"incompetent" (i.e., impotent): "What a colossal, immortal blunderer! When you 
consider the opportunity and power He had to really do a job, and then look at the 
stupid, ugly little mess He made of it instead, His sheer incompetence is almost 
staggering." (Catch-22, 206-207) 
If we mankind are all spectators to the pain of others, and even if God also 
becomes the Eye of the Universe, a Grand Spectator, there is still hope to transcend 
our spectatorship of war and of our regarding the pain of others. The only one left 
who is not a Spectator is: Jesus Christ. Because his Passion differentiates him from 
the rest of the spectators regarding the pain of others because Passion "implies 
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liability, that is, imputability, culpability, responsibility, a certain Schuldigsein, an 
originary debt of being-before-the-law"; it also "implies an engagement that is 
assumed in pain and suffering" (Derrida 2000, 27). Christ's Passion, his willingness 
to go through suffering and death, then, makes him not a passive, impotent, unfeeling, 
spectator regarding the pain of others but an active, compassionate doer experiencing 
it firsthand. We may say the fact that Jesus Christ has been incarnated into our 
suffering instead of being a divine spectator above, merely regarding, is indeed a 
most significant thesis which founded Christianity. 37 Indeed the relationship between 
images of suffering in war and the Suffering in a Christian sense is not uncommon; 
as Sontag points out that the spectacular nature of suffering is what we have 
inherited from our Christian tradition: "Photographer-witnesses may think it more 
correct morally to make the spectacular not spectacular. But the spectacular is very 
much part of the religious narratives by which suffering, throughout most of Western 
history, has been understood. To feel the pulse of Christian iconography in certain 
wartime or disaster-time photographs is not a sentimental projection." (Sontag 2004, 
71) Images of suffering may be spectacular, but I would add that it is also the 
anti-spectatorship of regarding the pain of others which lies at the heart of 
Christianity. 
I would also argue that this is a hidden theme in the novels that the protagonists 
can possibly transcend their spectatorship of war and distinguish themselves from the 
rest of the impotent spectators regarding the pain of others by becoming Christ 
figures. In effect all the protagonists do bear a Christ-like mentality in the end of the 
story (whether they succeed or not). By transforming their eros (erotic love) to agape 
(love for all humanity) they may also overcome their male impotence by extending 
their love to actively encompass the whole humanity. In fact Susan Sontag also 
witnesses a sensibility of the need to violate one's own innocence in the 1960s by the 
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middle-class who the authors might represent, as she notes, referring to the 
photographer Diane Arbus's determination to go into atrocities: "it is the sensibility 
of someone educated and middle-class who came of age between 1945 and 1955 - a 
sensibility that was to flourish precisely in the 1960s." (1977, 43) Such a sensibility 
may have paved the way to many writers' sense of the need to violate the general 
public's innocence, too, and engage them into war. 
In a sense the strong feeling of violating one's Innocence and wanting to 
penetrate in the pains of others is Messianic, as it resembles Christ's Incarnation (to 
violate his own prestige and innocence as the divine Spectator up there) to go unto 
this world of evil and suffering. It surpasses self love (selfishness) to eros (romantic 
and sexual love for another human being) and at last to agape (i.e., God's pure love, 
the greatest love of all, devoid of selfishness and eroticism, showing an equalitarian 
Passion for everybody, all humanity). Even though Yossarian is often held as an 
atheist by many critics, Helier did not agree (1962 interview). Yossarian's first 
epiphany- Snowden's death- has taught him that man is only substance and thus, he 
tells himself he would not die so unnecessarily. In a sense that establishes Yossarian's 
selfishness and ever since then he has tried to escape his flying missions believing 
that everyone is trying to kill him. Yossarian is changed from the sexually impulsive, 
selfish man who used to place his own self on top of the others (to the extreme that 
he does not care how his act of trying to free himself from war would have harmed 
the others, such as putting laundry soap into sweet potatoes) to a selfless man. He 
overcomes his selfish and sexual love to become a man with at least some dignities 
and sensitivities to the question about the suffering of the others, no longer 
eccentrically him alone. This Assyrian - who is "intrinsically an outsider" (Helier 
1962 interview; original emphasis) and this makes him similar to our "spectator" -
does at last involve himself into the pain of the others. Recalling when he breaks the 
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news of Nately's death in a mission to "Nately's whore" and she out of rage tries to 
stab him to death, Yossarian shouts, bewildered with "exasperated confusion" ( 452): 
"What do you want from me?" "I didn't kill him." (452) Nately's death was then to 
Yossarian "some heinous crime he had never committed" (451) and it "had not been 
his fault" (451). When "Nately's whore" jumped onto Yossarian and lay beneath him 
kicking and swearing and fighting him, Yossarian was "stirred by thoughts of sex that 
made him ashamed." (453) But such eros is later fundamentally transformed to pure 
love, desexualized: Yossarian wants to help Nately's whore's kid sister not because 
he wants to sleep with her but because he really cares about her as a human being, 
and he is truly angered and bewildered when he knows Aarfy has killed the maid: 
"you can't take the life of another human being and get away with it, even if she is 
just a poor servant girl. Don't you see? Can't you understand?" ( 480). In the Eternal 
City chapter near the end of the novel, we see an almost Christ-like Yossarian. 
Yossarian who penetrates the Rome streets - "Eternal City" - thinks he can 
empathize with what Christ himself must have felt. Yossarian's initial "Jehovah 
complex" (22) is ridiculed when the novel begins: by "link[ing] himself with a series 
of heroic figures from history and myth" (Bayley 1987, 16), Yossarian indeed only 
shows his pride as mankind thinking he is "a bona fide supraman", the Nietzschean 
"supraman", not what Clevinger mishears as "superman". At this stage Yossarian is 
still wrong-headed, failing to see that both mentalities are indeed wrong because 
while "Supraman" entails his fascist/ Nazist mentality (racism is ridiculed in the 
novel) the seemingly better "Superman" only reveals the American Superman (the 
messiah-of-the-world mentality). But in the Eternal City chapter the "Jehovah 
complex" is brought up again but in a more serious light. Yossarian shows his 
sympathy in his response to the apocalyptic sights he sees- violence, human greed, 
misery, injustice - and he ends up exclaiming: "What a lousy earth!" (472) He 
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realizes at last that these similar crimes are actually happening everywhere and it 
gives him a sick, uncanny feeling of deja vu, which is a sudden realization that he is 
trapped in "a ward full of nuts" and "a prison of thieves" with every sin repeating in 
every corner of the world: "The night was filled with horrors, and he thought he 
knew how Christ must have felt as he walked through the world, like a psychiatrist 
through a ward full of nuts, like a victim through a prison of thieves. What a 
welcome sight a leper must have been!" (475) The importance here is how he 
stresses that Christ - and he himself - hates this evil sight not because this is a 
claustrophobic evil world but because it is a world of impotent, non-intervening 
spectators regarding the pain of others: "At the next corner a man was beating a 
small boy brutally in the midst of an immobile crowd of adult spectators who made 
no effort to intervene. Yossarian recoiled with sickening recognition. He was certain 
he had witnessed that same horrible scene sometime before. Deja vu? The sinister 
coincidence shook him and filled him with doubt and dread. It was the same scene he 
had witnessed a block before, although everything in it seemed quite different. What 
in the world was happening? Would a squat woman step out and ask the man to 
please stop? Would he raise his hand to strike her and would she retreat? Nobody 
moved." (Cacth-22, 475) What sickens and shocks him - "What in the world was 
happening?" - is not really the evil deeds but our very impotent spectatorship of 
them. Yossarian's realization of the spectacle of the pain of others does not, however, 
successfully spare him from being another Spectator whom he himself despises 
because he, too, fails to translate his indignation into action. Having witnessed the 
evil scenes, he still fails to initiate to help: "Yossarian knew he could help the 
troubled old woman if she would only cry out [ ... ] But the old woman passed by 
without even seeing him, mumbling in terrible, tragic vexation [ ... ] Yossarian tore 
his eyes from her and hurried away in shame because he had done nothing to assist 
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her. He darted furtive, guilty glances back as he fled in defeat" ( 4 77). "Guilty" and 
"shame" are the key words here. Although Yossarian fails to truly become a 
Christ-like figure who finishes his mission, and he shows a compassion which is only 
almost the Passion, the realization of his own responsibility in the spectacle of the 
pain of the others is still important. Like he comes to understand why Nately's whore 
has to kill him for Nately s death and he should be held responsible for all the deaths. 
His "Why me?" mentality is finally transformed to the Christ-like "Why not me?" 
mentality who is willing to bear responsibility of the whole humanity onto himself: 
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Nately's whore was on his mind, as were Kraft and Orr and Nately and Dunbar, and 
Kid Sampson and Me Watt, and all the poor and stupid and diseased people he had seen 
in Italy, Egypt and North Africa and knew about in other areas of the world, and 
Snowden and Nately's whore's kid sister were on his conscience, too. Yossarian 
thought he knew why Nately's whore held him responsible for Nately's death and 
wanted to kill him. Why the hell shouldn't she? It was a man's world, and she and 
everyone younger had every right to blame him and everyone older for every unnatural 
tragedy that befell them; just as she, even in her grief, was to blame for every 
man-made misery that landed on her kid sister and on all other children behind her. 
Someone had to do something sometime. Every victim was a culprit, every culprit a 
victim, and somebody had to stand up sometime to try to break the lousy chain of 
inherited habit that was imperiling them all. ( 464-465) 
Someone had to do something sometime. Perhaps for a long time we the readers are 
like Yossarian too and think that it is ridiculous of Nately's whore to want to kill 
Yossarian for Nately's death. But then we, too, experience the "message" of the 
novel that nobody is innocent, that inaction is also culpability. All of a sudden, 
Yossarian's Jehovah complex is not something to make fun of: it is we who lack it 
who should feel ashamed. Although more as an excuse than a true conviction, in 
Cacciato Berlin still shows a similar Messianic mentality (as opposed to our 
Spectator mentality) near the end of the novel when he says: "Peace of mind is not 
simply a matter of pursuing one's own pleasure; rather, it is inextricably linked to the 
attitudes of other human beings, to what they want, to what they expect." ( Cacciato 
303) Even Painter seems to suggest a faint connection of Faulques and Markovic to 
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Christ figures by having Markovic's left side wounded by a 12.7 bullet and Faulques 
suffering from a continuous pain at his side. And Faulques in particular demonstrates 
his Messianic testimony by his self-chosen death. Initially Faulques insists that "that 
mural surrounding him with its shadows and its ghosts was a scientific exposition of 
what he had observed, not remorse or expiation" (160); but in the end, whether or not 
he does feel a tinge of "remorse or expiation" at last, the fact is F aulques lets 
Markovic kill him (we may say Christ in a sense also knows he is going to be killed 
in advance but he lets it happen to complete his mission of testimony), and when 
Markovic does not kill him, Faulques commits suicide: both behaviours show his 
strong desire for death. Commenting on the photographer Diane Arbus 's suicide in 
1971, Susan Sontag says: "the fact of her suicide seems to guarantee that her work is 
sincere, not voyeuristic, that it is compassionate, not cold." (1977, 39) Likewise, 
Faulques, who has been the cold, detached, unemotional - almost stoic - war 
photographer and then the "painter of battles", has at last chosen to leave behind his 
photographs and painting to join the dead, to go on a true journey to Hell (He put one 
coin in his mouth under the tongue for Charon) and to experience what he cannot 
while alive. It may be like what Markovic says: "Maybe surviving when others can't 
implies a certain class of depravity." (54) Through his death Faulques may be able to 
rid himself of depravity (he joins the dead) and at last proves himself not 
compassionless, as Derrida notes, it is "[t]he compassion for suffering humanity, thus 
for a passion of death" (Derrida 2000, 69). It seems like commonsense that the 
witness must always be a survivor, but Derrida calls this into question: "Allow me to 
call to mind an essential kind of generality: is the witness not always a survivor? This 
belongs to the structure of testimony. One testifies only when one has lived longer 
than what has come to pass." (45) But the paradox is, Derrida reminds us, "No one 
testifies for the [true] witness" (Celan, qtd. Derrida 2000, 61). The "witness" who is a 
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survivor is always only "the third party" (45). It is why in the end we may say a true 
testimony has to be Christ-like because only the "Christian-Roman meaning" of 
"passion" can achieve this as it "always implies martyrdom, that is - as its name 
indicates -testimony. A passion always testifies." (27) 
A true witness has to suffer, even writers, as Tim O'Brien thinks that "a writer 
does have to suffer. As we all do." (Bourne 1991 interview) and Faulques thinks that 
Goya is one of the greatest war painters exactly because he suffered: "He saw it [war] 
and he suffered. [ ... ] His are the best engravings that have ever been made. No one 
saw war as he did, nor came as close to the darkness of the human condition ... " 
(Painter 197). Goya "saw it and he suffered": this makes him a true witness and his 
paintings true testimonies because he is not a Spectator. Likewise, Christ is the 
Ultimate Anti-Spectator because he bears the very opposite attributes of the 
modem-day spectators: He has Passion (as opposed to our indifference); He goes 
through Suffering and Death (as opposed to our disengagement); He follows two of 
the most important commandments: "Love Thy Neighbour as Thyself' and "Do not 




Open Your Eyes 
''All belongs to everyone. Nothing to anyone. All is no-one. 
0 human gaze, rediscover power!" 
-Le Clezio, War 
This is time to recapitulate what we have gone through in this thesis. I have 
discussed a different form of war experience today in what Debord calls "the Society 
of the Spectacle" which marks our human condition of "regarding the pain of others": 
war is rendered as spectacle and we spectators, and this spectator ship (and 
consumption) of war - instead of engagement and commitment - marks our very 
impotence physically, politically, emotionally, even intellectually. As Sontag points 
out: "Our failure is one of imagination, of empathy: we have failed to hold this 
reality in mind." Our failure is also one of our accustomed spectatorship which has 
reduced our imagination and empathy in the first place. The authors Joseph Helier, 
Tim O'Brien and Arturo Perez-Reverte thus all strive to challenge our unquestioned 
spectatorship of war and to re-engage the wrongly privileged spectator-readers into 
the immediacy of war again. 
I have subsumed the Spectators 1n three maJor groups: (1) the 
Spectator-characters in the novels (such as Yossarian and Paul Berlin); (2) the 
civilian spectators such as the readers in O' Brien's works; the spectator-audience in 
Hell er 's play who represent the general public characteristic of their consumption of 
war: consumerist, voyeuristic, sadistic, passive, impassive, uninvolved, uncommitted, 
non-intervening, non-participatory and second-hand; (3) a special type of Spectator 
in the disguise of the War Photographer (The Painter of Battles) who has mistaken 
his spectatorship of war for his professionalism, and spectatorship for "witness". The 
novels rebuke the spectators, making them realize that spectatorship is itself 
impotence which is also a form of accomplice. A wrong-seer is no better than a 
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wrong-doer as we have discussed that regarding the pain of others is a form of 
violence in itself. The key theme evident in all the novels is that what is accusable is 
not so much as what one does than what not. We have also discussed the fact that not 
only does our experience is limited to seeing, our way of seeing has also become 
vacuous, devoid of both intelligence, understanding and sensitive feelings. This is 
from seeing to looking and at last from looking to, as Berger dismisses, "looking 
beyond", from regarding the pain of others to regardless of it. 
In terms of literary representations to deal with the issue of spectatorship of war, 
both Joseph Hell er and Tim O'Brien begin their writing of the wars with a relatively 
more traditional, self-enclosed model of fiction (Catch-22 and Cacciato) plus 
innovative writing techniques (Helier's use of absurd humor and O'Brien's use of 
fantasy) as well as a varying degree of the age-long "War is Hell" model. Feeling the 
growing sense of impotence across the national psyche, both authors have turned to 
address the disapproving issue of the passivity and impassivity of the 
spectator-readers and to spell out the accusation and criticism of them with the more 
metafictional fiction (We Bombed and The Things); and I argue that their works are 
meta-theatrical and meta-fictional in order to be meta-readerly. Yet both authors do 
not think that it is a failure of language or literary form which makes them not work. 
Think about the discussion of Starkey playing tragedies in We Bombed, or O'Brien's 
hope for his works as "a reminder that war is hell for a particular reason", or 
Faulques says that it is not that the capacity of language to encompass war in our age 
has failed (which is a commonly held argument today)- "Maybe war exhausts stupid 
words, but not the rest. The ones you and I know" ( 144) - but that it is our modem 
day lack of experience and the corrosion of our capacity to feel and understand and 
empathize today that fails. Prior to Auschwitz, Henry James already said in 1915: 
"The war [WWI] has used up words; they have weakened, they have deteriorated" 
151 
(qtd. in Sontag 2004, 22). The authors have strived to prove it wrong through their 
novels and to point out that the very problem lies with the spectator-readers, not 
language, not the forms or models. 
"Picasso never saw a war in his life." 
- The Painter of Battles 
Pablo Picasso, Guernica, 193 7 (26 x 11 1/2 feet) 
The air attacks in Spain 1936 were "used as a weapon of war for the first time in 
Europe" (Sontag 2004, 28) and Pablo Picasso wants this painting to express his 
horror "at the military caste which has plunged Spain into a sea of suffering and 
death" ( qtd. in Perlmutter 1999, 206) on 26 April 193 7 where the Basque town of 
Guemica with a population of 10,000 experienced enormous destruction by flying 
German bombers, and it became "the first town ever bombed in order to intimidate a 
civilian population" prior to the even more devastating, the Bomb, in Hiroshima 
almost a decade later (Berger 1980, 166). Ever since the completed mural was 
exhibited for the Paris World Fair it has become a world-wide icon as an anti-war 
image, "the most famous painting of the twentieth century", and "thought of as a 
continuous protest against the brutality of fascism in particular and modem war in 
general" (Berger 1980, 165). But what is the significance to all of this? 
In previous chapter to draw to a close of our discussion of spectatorship of 
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atrocities we have talked about the subversive female anti-spectators (such as Olvido 
and Mary Anne) and Jesus Christ the ultimate anti-spectator. But what about us? Can 
we ever be able to get rid of our "regarding the pain of others"? The fact that Picasso 
indeed did not see the war himself - he read about it from only newspapers and 
images and subsequent written accounts of it - links him to the majority of us 
modem-day civilians; but his ability to react and to produce Guernica nonetheless 
has made him a possible counter-Spectator, too, because he shows that he possesses 
what the rest of the spectators lack and what Sontag urges us to replenish today: 
empathy and imagination. It is one best example of how an imagined reaction and 
expression of war - even by someone who knows about war only secondhand - can 
also affect so much both politically and aesthetically. It moves us again. The fact that 
we are protected from the physicality and facts of war does not mean that we can 
never have access to the allegorical, spiritual dimension of it which affects emotively, 
as Picasso himself has called his painting an "allegory" (Berger 1980, 167). Picasso 
who "never saw a war in his life" can be a best exemplar of what a spectator-reader 
can still achieve positively. Every spectator-reader can envision his own Guernica, 
just as Faulques says everyone has to paint his own landscape of the Triumph of 
Death. When our eyes have become "regardless" (vacuous), we can resort to our 
"mind's eye" (i.e, memory and imagination) for empathy. As Berger says "Guernica 
is a painting about how Picasso imagines suffering" (1980, 168; original emphasis) 
and "in Guernica he is painting his own suffering as he daily hears the news from his 
own country." (169; my emphasis) It is still both necessary and possible to imagine 
the pain of others. It also stresses again O'Brien's conviction that story-truth is truer 
sometimes than happening-truth, and Derrida's idea that literary fiction is itself also a 
valid testimony. Literature is the possibility for imagination to work. Kundera says: 
"It was not the knowledge of historical events that I lacked. I needed some other kind 
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of knowledge, the kind that, as Flaubert would have said, goes into 'the soul' of a 
historical situation, that grasps its human content. Perhaps a novel, a great novel, 
could have made me understand how the Czechs of that time had experienced their 
decision. Well, such a novel has not been written. There are cases where nothing can 
make up for the absence of a great novel." (2008, 157) The novels we have examined 
belong to this great novel category to fill up the missing part of our modem-day 
consciousness of regarding the pain of others. This is especially important because 
today too often we have mistaken quantity for quality, without realizing that in fact 
the mass media hypnotizes us "with the huge flow of images to create an impressive 
feeling that saturation equals depth and thoroughness," and that the "pretense that we 
are better informed than ever in history about wars in distant lands is the big lie of 
the television age" (Perlmutter 1999, 192). People - especially those who claim that 
they have good critical thinking - would say we are clever enough to think about the 
war images. Although the media "may not tell us what to thin/C', we should not forget 
that they are "very effective in telling us what to think about." (Perlmutter 1999, 
191) 
The novel is then a last resort to guard our quality of understanding as well as 
re-insert the issues wrongly censored away from the public agenda by "communal 
ignorance" or deliberate amnesia. (Unlike a photograph) the novel can oblige the 
reader to look and it "can unfold, go further, and further still." (Sontag 2004, 11 0) 
And narratives "can make us understand" and make sense of things (Sontag 2004; 
see also Culler 2000). 
After all, war is never about war because it is itself a "metaphor", or in 
Faulques 's words, war is "the best expression of how things are" (186), "war as the 
sublimation of chaos" (186), war is "life carried to dramatic extremes". Like Sontag 
has moved from discussing the "regarding" of our everyday life in On Photography 
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(1977) to her 2003 book which deals with the most extreme form of ''regarding the 
pain of others", which is war. Tim O'Brien says his books are not "Vietnam books" 
because Vietnam to him is more a "metaphor", a "convenient metaphor", an 
"essential metaphor", a "life-given metaphor" (Boume 1991 interview) which is a 
beginning place to go to somewhere else. He says: "The Things They Carried, that 
takes place 25 years after the War, if it was just a Vietnam book you'd have to take 
out half of it. It's like calling Toni Morrison a black writer or Conrad an ocean writer 
or Shakespeare a royalty writer. Your subject matter is given to you. I don't write 
about bombs and bullets, I write about the human heart." (Edelman 1994 interview) 
He wants to "use Vietnam, as a way to get at the human heart and the pressure 
exerted on it" (Boume 1991 interview). War is a context more than subject matter: 
"I'm not interested in writing traditional guts and gore war stories. But I am 
interested in stories in which the context is the war-that's for sure. So on one level, 
yeah, every book I've written has the shadow of Vietnam on it, sometimes directly 
and sometimes obliquely. But it's always there, especially in July, July. I think the 
stories are meant to be about the human heart under pressure. Vietnam is a way of 
applying that pressure." (Karp interview) O'Brien wants to "use the framework of 
war" to create the "situation" which has "an instant sort of pressure": "If two guys 
are sitting in the middle of a war, talking about their girlfriends, that's not the same 
as two guys sitting in a cafeteria at a college talking about theirs. There's a sense of 
the unexpected or the unanticipated happening at any second, a sense of one's own 
imminent death being just beyond the next word that's uttered." Such a unique 
"situation" a framework of "war" can offer is, "an added resonance and an added 
existential tension" (Bourne 1991 interview). 
Let us recall Son tag's comment that those who have the right to watch the pain 
of others are only "those who could do something to alleviate it [ ... ] or those who 
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could learn from it". Berger holds a similar view: "Any pain witnessed, shared or 
suffered remained of course pain, but could be partly transcended by being felt as a 
spur towards making greater efforts for a future where that pain would not exist." 
(Berger 2001 , 177) My thesis will not make a difference in the common 
spectatorship of war today, but at least I hope it has made a contribution (however 
small it might be) to make us more aware of our very watching, and as Le Clezio in 
his 1970 novel War urges us: "0 human gaze, rediscover power!" 
END OF THESIS 
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Endnotes 
1 A possible problem of speaking of "mentality" is our tendency of quantification; as 
Caroline Brothers notes: "historians of mentalites have at times been criticised for an 
overwhelming inclination 'to measure attitudes by counting'"; "Quantification tends to 
presuppose a correlation between the number of images published (in this case) and their 
influence on the viewing public" (Brothers 1997, 29). In my thesis I am aware that I have 
also a similar tendency to talk about the presence of the "spectacle mentality" by indicating 
how the many authors and critics have all shown it in works of fiction and criticisms. But I 
wish at least the fact that I am pointing out the less obvious discussions of the spectacle 
found in war novels, interviews, and essays would make my thesis more "objective". 
Endnotes to Introduction 
2 
"pageantry" 1651; "show" meaning "appearance put on with intention to deceive" 1526, 
meaning "display, spectacle" 1561, "showy" from 1712, "show" meaning "entertainment 
program on radio or TV" 1932, "for show" ("for appearance's sake") from 1700, "Show 
Business" from 1850, the expression "the show must go on" 1941 (The Online Etymology 
Dictionary). We will discuss "the show must go on" for Heller's 1967 play We Bombed in 
New Haven in Chapter 1. The spectacle meaning "showy parade" is first attested in 1805. I 
am not sure if there was anything to do with the military as there were the American War of 
Independence (1775-1783) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815), for example. In Catch-22 
the pointless showy parades of the soldiers making war only a ridiculous spectacle is 
comically ridiculed by Heller. 
3 PIE: Proto-Indo-European language 
4 For a useful collection of essays about "reading images" across disciplines (such as 
psychoanalysis and feminism) see Julia Thomas (ed.) Reading Images (U.K.: Palgrave [2000] 
2001). 
5 War (v.) meaning "to make war on" c. 1154, war time 1387, warfare 1456, war crime 1906. 
World War "first attested as a speculation, probably a translation of Ger. Weltkrieg. Applied 
to the first one soon after it began in 1914. World War I coined 1939, replacing Great War as 
the most common name for it; First World War first attested 194 7. World War ll so-called 
since 1939; Second World War is from 1942." (The Online Etymology Dictionary) 
It is suggested that the Latin word "bellum" referring to war is because war was once fought 
as a beautiful and carefully planned spectacle (with the soldiers and weapons and epic 
combat etc.) Some say it is mere coincidence, though. Nevertheless in Catch-22 Yossarian 
does show a similar (bellum-tumed-bellus) sublime/ spectacle mentality when he sees for the 
first time how the management of war can be awesome: "[Y ossarian] woke up blinking with 
a slight pain in his head and opened his eyes upon a world boiling in chaos in which 
everything was in proper order. He gasped in utter amazement at the fantastic sight of the 
twelve flights of planes organized calmly into exact formation. The scene was too 
unexpected to be true. There were no planes spurting ahead with wounded, none legging 
behind with damage. No distress flares smoked in the sky. No ship was missing but his own. 
For an instant he was paralyzed with a sensation of madness." (166) 
6 Sublime ( c.1586) derives from Middle French sublime from Latin sublimis (The Online 
Etymology Dictionary). 
7 Berger, John. "Hiroshima" (1981) The Sense of Sight. 1993 . Vintage. pp 286- 295. Original 
emphasis. Berger was given by an editor a book called Unforgettable Fire, which is a 
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collection of paintings by the Japanese witnesses about the day of the Bomb in Hiroshima. 
But Berger was uninterested and left it on his table unopened for three months. He says: "It 
lay on my desk unopened. Occasionally its title and cover picture caught my eye, but I did 
not respond. I didn't consider the book urgent, for I believed that I already knew about what 
I would find within it." He regretted his initial non-response to the urgency of the book later 
and writes about the general attitude of indifference of the public then through the "process 
of suppression and elimination" because we are falsely contented that "the facts are there in 
the textbooks" and this results in an abstraction of our understanding of what "evil" is: "In 
public thinking nowadays, the concept of evil has been reduced to a little adjective to support 
an opinion or hypothesis (abortions, terrorism, ayatollahs)". 
8 See Peter Alien's 3/3/2008 news article '9/11 attacks made up,' says French best actress 
Oscar-winner at Mail Online. 
9 
c. 1340, from Old French, regarder "take notice of'; Regardless "indifferent" is from 1591 
(The Online Etymology Dictionary). Regard also embeds the meaning of opinion (fr. le 
regard des autres, "other people's opinion"), attitude (fr. le regard amuse, "amused eye"; des 
regards indiscrets, "prying eyes"), surveillance (fr. au regard de la loi, "in the eyes of the 
law"). And as French indicates, such seeing ("regard") is something we can "put on and off' 
(fr. "porter"), as in porter son regard sur qch (to look at something), porter un regard 
nouveau sur qch (to take a fresh look at something). It lacks the sense of examination and 
attentiveness the other French word of seeing voir connotes. Voir is not only "regarder avec 
attention". It is also: fr. voir pourquoi (to find out), voir a (to see to), voir clair dans qch (to 
have a clear understanding of something), and one of the meanings of voir can be "witness" 
( etre temoin) and "to have some experience" and ''think" (rejlecher) etc. Voir also implies 
involvement as in avoir a voir avec (to have something to do with) (WordReference 
Dictionary). 
10 
"In the preface to the second edition (1843) of The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach 
observes about "our era" that it 'prefers the image to the thing, the copy to the original, the 
representation to the reality, appearance to being"' (qtd. in Sontag 1977, 153) This argument 
is not unlike what Baudrillard says about hyperreality one century later, but Baudrill~rd 
stresses further our inability to distinguish the image from the real. 
11 
"For the first time in modem history," says Robert Elegant, an Asian correspondent, in 
1981, "the outcome of a war was determined not on the battlefield but on the printed page 
and, above all, on the television screen." ( qtd. in Brothers 1997, 205) The awareness of the 
significant role played by the media is then "taken note of' by government leaders 
worldwide who are awaken to also the need for "managing the media" in subsequent wars, 
such as Britain's Falkland Islands campaign in 1982 was dubiously said of as "the worst 
reported war since the Crimea" ( qtd. in Brothers 1997, 206). 
Endnotes to Chapter 1 
12 Helier had his enlisted training in the US Air Force from 1942 to 1944; service from 1944 
to 1945 as a Lieutenant Bombardier stationed in Corsica. He completed 60 combat missions 
bombing targets in France and Italy, autobiographically like Yossarian the protagonist in the 
novel which is set as the Italian campaign of the final year of the war (see Bayley 1987 for 
autobiographical details ofHeller). 
13 In Helier's Catch-22 we see how war is represented as sublime spectacle almost without 
second thought. The idea that war is nothing more than spectacle (not even necessarily 
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sublime) is ridiculed and made fun of throughout the novel with the sense of bathos (fr. chute 
du sublime au ridicule) meaning the fall from sublime to ridiculous. For example, what the 
officers are concerned about is all the absurd parades, how they and the war will look in the 
Saturday Evening Post, General Peckem's order that dense bombs make beautiful aerial 
photographs and that (making a fa~ade of a good show for the public to see) is the point of 
the missions: "We don 't care about the roadblock,' Colonel Kom informed him. 'Colonel 
Cathcart wants to come out of this mission with a good clear aerial photograph he won 't be 
ashamed to send through channels.' " (3 76) '"Go on out there and bomb-- for me, for your 
country, for God, and for that great American, General P. P. Peckem. And let's see you put all 
those bombs on a dime! "' (378) Not only is the war represented like a spectacle to the reader, 
it is how people who manage the war feel and want to present it so, like Milo the 
benefit-maker from the war refers the whole war as "the whole theatre of operations". The 
officers are those who never go to real combats but simply give orders behind the frontline, 
bossing the soldiers to real dangerous places by pointing their finger at the maps, and what is 
ironic is that this spectacle mentality is what gives the generals pleasure because they can 
subside to the position of the spectator and see the war as spectacle happening far away, like 
Lieutenant Scheisskopf "had poor eyesight and chronic sinus trouble, which made war 
especially exciting for him, since he was in no danger of going overseas." (79); or Colonel 
Cargill who is "aghast" at Wintergreen's suggestion of going into combat says: "Of course, I 
wouldn 't actually mind going into combat, but my best abilities are mainly administrative 
ones." (139; original emphasis) This is a ridicule made on the bureaucratic spectator. 
When Yossarian goes AWOL, takes a nap and wakes up to see a scene "too unexpected 
to be true", with twelve flights of planes passing across the sky above his head, the exact 
perfect symmetry he observes from the planes, the human organization of warfare which is 
to Yossarian a moment "paralyzing" him "with a sensation of madness" . We can call such an 
experience Kantian mathematical sublime: "[Yossarian] woke up blinking with a slight pain 
in his head and opened his eyes upon a world boiling in chaos in which everything was in 
proper order. He gasped in utter amazement at the fantastic sight of the twelve flights of 
planes organized calmly into exact formation. The scene was too unexpected to be true. 
There were no planes spurting ahead with wounded, none legging behind with damage. No 
distress flares smoked in the sky. No ship was missing but his own. For an instant he was 
paralyzed with a sensation of madness." ( 166) Yossarian experiences the destructi.ve, 
overwhelming power of war like Kantian dynamic sublime when the spectator is perceiving 
what may threaten to destroy him. This is when Milo attacks his own squadron having made 
a deal with the enemy, and the narrator describes that as "monstrous", "bug-eyed", 
"blinding", "eerie", the "most apocalyptic sight" of all and those who see it are the "unruly, 
bewildered mass" (296). The scene is too unimaginable to take in; everybody was shocked 
and Colonel Cathcart, instead of fleeing for life, could not react for a while but "stared up the 
sky in stark astonishment and horror" . Colonel Cathcart is struck by his disbelief that he is 
being attacked by his own army and the horror of the attack, yes, but one interesting thing to 
note is that he is not so much as struck by only "horror'' as by the accompanying 
"astonishment' that he cannot help but remain on spot to look at the scene, as Yossarian talks 
of this hilarious scene (because of its ridiculousness): "This time Milo had gone too far. 
Bombing his own men and planes was more than even the most phlegmatic observer could 
stomach, and it looked like the end for him." (297; my emphasis) A scene which is "more 
than even the most phlegmatic observer could stomach" is, again, the sublime spectacle. 
End notes to Chapter 2 
14 For an analysis of this "historical amnesia" in O'Brien 's In the Lake of the Woods, see 
Melley 2003. Melley speaks of a "postmodem amnesia" in relation to our sense of history 
and subjectivity: "If amnesia has registered anxiety about the stability of the liberal self, it 
has also become a metaphor for historiographical dilemmas - for the sense that it is no 
longer possible to ground historical narratives securely and that the failure to do so has led to 
159 
dangerous forms of collective forgetting." ( 1 07) 
15 Talking of his novel In the Lake of the Woods about the notorious 1968 My Lai massacre, 
O'Brien remarks: "They'd [the participants in the massacre] wish this book weren't 
published, wish the whole thing would go away, be forgotten. And it practically has. This is 
all basically a footnote to the Vietnam War now. The 25th anniversary recently passed 
without any mention in the press. If there was any, I sure didn't see it. I think the American 
public views it as an aberration, you know, brutality's just a part of war and atrocities are 
going to happen. Unfortunately, that doesn'tjustify it." (Edelman 1994 interview) 
16 Milan Kundera sees such "power of the pointless" in Flaubert and he says: "The everyday. 
It is not merely ennui, pointlessness, repetition, triviality; it is beauty as well; for instance, 
the magical charm of atmosphere, a thing everyone has felt in his own life [ ... ] these trivial 
circumstances stamp some personal event with an inimitable singularity that dates it and 
makes it unforgettable. [ ... ] In the theatre a great action could only be born of some other 
great action. The novel alone could reveal the immense, mysterious power of the pointless." 
(Kundera 2008, 20-21) Likewise, O'Brien has made a point with the "power of the 
pointless". 
17 See Carpenter (2003 ). Among the various arguments, Carpenter draws us to the proximity 
between the Vietnam War and Postmodernism which we may overlook: "First of all, the 
Vietnam War was an important cause of the political tumult of the 1960s in America and 
Europe that, instead of the hoped-for political and social revolution, helped give rise to that 
polysemic, protean cultural phenomenon now known as postmodemism. This might be 
obvious, but in the theoretical labyrinths of postmodernism it is easy to forget that its origins 
are ultimately grounded in historical events. Indeed, the principal theoreticians of the 
postmodem - Lyotard, Foucault, Jameson, Deleuze, Baudrillard, and others - either 
participated in or were strongly affected by the turmoil of the 1960s, and their early 
expressions of postmodern theory appear in the shadow of the Vietnam War." (31) Fredric 
Jameson names the Vietnam War in Postmodernism, "the first terrible postmodernist war", 
and Carpenter also sees the experience of the war "helped create and define what Lyotard 
labeled 'the postmodern condition"' (qtd. in Carpenter 2003, 35). 
18 Such a model is "a tradition extending from Stephen Crane through Ernest Hemingway 
and John Dos Passos to Norman Mailer and James Jones. For these, the essence of the 
human experience of war is always everywhere the same, generally entailing a profound 
progression from innocence to experience involving some combination of fear, courage, 
brotherhood, sacrifice, and, at its most existential, an ultimate realization that one is a 
meaningless pawn in the larger (though equally meaningless) game of history. Vietnam was 
different only in terms of locale, participants, and technology." (Carpenter 2003, 31) 
19 See Calloway's 1995 essay which is held as the frrst to discuss The Things They Carried 
as metafiction. 
20 This self-consciousness and reflexivity of the fictionality of novel is termed "surfiction" 
by Raymond Federman, "fabulation" by Robert Scholes, and "meta-fiction" by others 
(Bradbury 1992, 203). 
21 In Boume's 1991 interview, Tim O'Brien says of the same issue of public "knee-jerk 
reaction" as well as "ignorance" again: "The people who vote and participate in civic events, 
who build playgrounds and prop up our libraries and then turn around and send us to wars, 
oftentimes out of utter and absolute ignorance. And I'm bitter about it. I'm bitter about 
people who say with a knee-jerk reaction, "let's go kill Satan." [ ... ] They didn't know Bao 
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Dai from the man in the moon. They didn't know the first thing about SEATO. They didn't 
know the first thing about French colonialism, about basic history. One of the questions I 
was asked at the Kiwanis club yesterday after I finished my little talk was, "How many 
Chinese did I fight?" Chinese! This person knew nothing about the history of Vietnam and 
China and their antagonism. [ ... ] And the ignorance in these little towns is overwhelming. 
There's a laziness and a complacency, a kind of Puritan sense of pious rectitude, that you can 
tell really pisses me off. [ ... ] There are some people out there who do read their newspapers 
carefully. But in my experience, by and large that is not the case, and I'd like to nail the 
bastards." See also Weber's 1998 interview where O'Brien addresses the issue as well. The 
consistent and persistent critique of those who "didn't know the frrst thing about it" ts 
evident throughout the years in his books and interviews. 
22 See Sontag's discussion of war photographs as "substitutes" for war in On Photography. 
23 See Calloway ( 1995). 
Endnotes to Chapter 3 
24 The publisher of Tim O'Brien's 1994 Vietnam novel In the Lakes of the Wood packages 
this book of mixed genres of detective, love, and mystery novel under the category of 
"literary thriller", which seems to be a new trend of war novel of the 1990s and 2000s. The 
Painter of Battles, for example, is written more in the form of a thriller. 
25 In fact there are many other occasions where Faulques and Olvido in the novel are closely 
linked to two real-life photographers. I would suggest that the models for the fashioning of 
Faulques and Olvido may have been inspired by the flesh-and-blood photographers 
Cartier-Bresson and Diane Arbus respectively. 
Faulques & Henri Cartier-Bresson: 
Faulques is like the intellectual embodiment of the photographer Cartier-Bresson for they 
share some essential attitudes to photography. For example, when asked if he thinks 
"someone can think and photograph at the same time," (Painter 245) Faulques admits he can, 
but the key is to think carefully beforehand if the shot is worthwhile. Once decided, just 
press: "War [ ... ] can be photographed well only when, as you raise the camera, what you see 
doesn't affect you. The rest you have to leave for later." (Painter 52) It is in alliance to 
Cartier-Bresson's idea that "thinking should be done beforehand and afterwards [ ... ] never 
while actually taking a photograph." (Sontag 1977, 116) Cartier-Bresson also believes that to 
take photographs is "to find the structure of the world", to disclose that "in all this chaos, 
there is order." (1977, 100) Similarly, Faulques in the novel has believed that war, too, has a 
structure amid that "gigantic cosmic paradox" (13), and this idea runs through the whole 
novel: "There is a hidden order in disorder. [ ... ] An order that includes disorder." (Painter 
96) 
0/vido & Diane Arbus: 
Faulques once describes Olvido as "Diana with a photographer's quiver and a pair of 
cameras." (Painter 72) At first glance the "Diana" he refers to is the goddess of Wisdom and 
he wants to highlight the idolized, "exceptional beauty" (Painter 72) and wittiness of Olvido. 
But perhaps it would be interesting to misread a little this "Diana" with the name of the 
photographer "Diane Arbus" who, like Olvido herself, also looks at the world with a 
"Dantesque vision" and wittily ironic attitude: "Her [ Arbus 's] Dantesque vision of the city 
(and the suburbs) has no reserves of irony" (1977, 45) Olvido in the novel is initially a 
fashion model from a rich Italian family which has been running important galleries in 
Florence and Rome for three generations. Because she has long "lived in a fictitious world 
since she was a girl" she now wants "to see the world in its true dimensions, without the 
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varnish of false normality," (Painter 169) She "had no idea of what war was" and "she had 
only seen images on television", then she "decided to move to the other side of the camera" 
(Painter 72). Likewise, Diane Arbus, a former fashion photographer, is also born in a 
well-to-do Jewish family and she also feels that she was too well-protected in an illusionary 
world who at last turned her career from the fashion world to freak shows and human 
atrocities. Diane Arbus writes: "One of the things I felt I suffered from as a kid [ ... ] was that 
I never felt adversity. I was confined in a sense of unreality. [ ... ] And the sense of being 
immune was, ludicrous as it seems, a painful one." The camera thus became her "way of 
procuring experience, and thereby acquiring a sense of reality" through "if not material 
adversity, at least psychological adversity- the shock of immersion in experiences that cannot 
be beautified, the encounter with what is taboo, perverse, evil." Arbus does demonstrates a 
strong desire to "violate her own innocence, to undermine her sense of being privileged, to 
vent her frustration at being safe" (1977, 43) Like Olvido who is fed up with being a fashion 
model, Arbus also feels the sickness of the industry of fashion photography ("a fashion 
photographer - a fabricator of the cosmetic lie" ( 1977, 44) ): "It was her way of saying fuck 
Vogue, fuck fashion, fuck what's pretty." (1977, 44) Feeling the need to violate her own 
innocence (her "former naivete"), Olvido says Faulques and the camera are her "passport" to 
reality: "They give me perfect licence to go wherever I want: action, adrenaline, ephemeral 
art. They liberate me from responsibilities and make me an elite tourist." (Painter 171) This 
also echoes Diane Arbus 's idea that her camera is a licence: "Photography was a license to 
go wherever I wanted and to do what I wanted to do." (qtd. in Sontag 1977, 41) Susan 
Sontag goes on to say: "The camera is a kind of passport that annihilates moral boundaries 
and social inhibitions, freeing the photographer from any responsibility toward the people 
photographed." (1977, 41) And like Olvido's idea of the "elite tourist'', Diane Arbus also 
shares the idea that "[t]he photographer is supertourist" (1977, 42). During their life as a 
photographer of atrocities, both Olvido and Diane Arbus realize the cruelty of photographing 
people and thus they are more interested in the found objects (in practice of Surrealism). 
Olvido says war "is filled with found objects, her trouves. It puts surrealism in its place." 
(Painter 176) Arbus also "chose subjects that she could believe were found, just lying about, 
without any values attached to them. They are necessarily ahistorical subjects, private rather 
than public pathology, secret lives rather than open ones." (1977, 42) 
26 French: "voir" and "regarder" may be compared as "see" and "look" in English where the 
latter action of seeing is less attentive. Thus, the title of Sontag's famous 2003 book 
Regarding the Pain of Others may suggest one more level of meaning about "regard" - ( 1) 
about the pain of others, (2) looking at the pain of others, and now, (3) the "looking" at the 
pain of others is an inattentive, uninvolved kind of looking. People just want to have a look 
and turn their gaze, and then forget. They look without much attempt to understand. 
27 Key figures shaping this theory see Jacques Hadamard ( 1890), Pierre Duhem ( 1906), Ray 
Brad bury ( 1952), especially Edward Lorenz ( 1963), Phi lip Merilees ( 1972): Does the flap of 
a butterfly s wings in Brazil set off a tornado in Texas? 
28 The symbol of "butterflies" is common in war fiction. There is a butterfly in The Things 
They Carried which flutters around the dead boy's face with the star-shaped wound at the 
eye, symbolizing the incarnation of O'Brien's soul and imagination because the next chapter 
right after is the imagined story of this dead young man's life. The butterfly takes the 
hilarious form of the "fly" that annoys the boy about to be beheaded in Cacciato whose 
detailed description signals the importance of that passage. Here in The Painter of Battles the 
author has pushed the delicate symbol of butterflies into the more scientific, 20th century 
"Butterfly Effect". Now, these "butterflies fluttering through all wars and all peaces" (116) 
are the network of circumstances, coincidences, and determinations which determine the fate 
of everyone, everything. Note also the sense of bathos as the works of war fiction proceed 
where the sublime aspect (symbolized by the fragile butterfly) is transformed into the 
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spectacle aspect (ridiculed by the hilarious fly). 
29 Kundera refers what is called the "Butterfly Effect" (somehow a depersonalized and 
scientific view of the interconnectedness of actions) to "the Tragic Chain" in his essay: "An 
action, however innocent it may be, does not die off in solitude. It provokes, as effect, 
another action, and sets in motion a whole chain of events. Where does a person's 
responsibility end for an act that stretches off endlessly into some incalculable, monstrous 
transformation?" (Kundera 2008, 113) In Catch-22 Yossarian realizes what Kundera's has 
called the ''tragic chain" of actions: "Someone had to do something sometime. Every victim 
was a culprit, every culprit a victim, and somebody had to stand up sometime to try to break 
the lousy chain of inherited habit that was imperiling them all." (464-465; my emphasis) 
30 See, for example, Lakoff & Johnson. 2003. Metaphors We Live By. U.S.A.: The 
University of Chicago, pp 104-105 
31 Indeed it makes perfect comparison of Faulques and Olvido the war photographers to 
Virgil and Dante the Hell visitors which would enrich our understanding of the nature of 
regarding the pain of others. Dante actually resembles more and more like a nasty war 
journalist roaming from circle to circle looking for scoops of atrocity from the suffering 
souls. And the whole journey through hell is not unlike a modern voyeuristic tourism, and 
Dante is actually doing exactly what Sontag rebukes in Regarding the Pain of Others about 
the act of comparing one hell with another and see which is worse, as he says, for example, 
that what he sees is bowge 10 was "nothing, nothing whatever/To that ghast sight in the ninth 
bowge revealed" and, yet again in Canto XXIX he exclaims: "No sadder sight was seen." (I. 
3 8) We have also briefly discussed how Dante grows more and more voyeuristic and sadistic 
when he proceeds from circle to circle in Hell, and his initial sympathy as shown in Canto 
XXIX when he sees the Falsifiers "lie stricken with hideous disease" may still (weakly) be 
sympathy: "My eyes were grown so maudlin with the plight/ Of all these people racked with 
wounds and woe,/ They longed to linger weeping at the sight;/ But Virgil said: "How now! 
Why dost thou grow/ Rooted to gaze? Why is thy vision drowned/ Among these smitten 
shades?" (Canto XXIX, I. 1-6) Dante's "rooted gaze" will take him from a possibly 
sympathetic visitor of Hell to a voyeuristic, sadistic consumer of Hell who enjoys more t,han 
sympathizes with the pain of others and this "rooted gaze" at last becomes a "maudlin" gaze 
in Canto XXX, 1. 148 that even the sense of the word already tells us the exaggerated and 
insincere nature of his gaze. 
Towards the end of Book I in fact we see an increasing concern with the gaze and more 
and more suffering souls point out explicitly the annoying nature of Dante's gaze, as in 
Canto XXXII the frozen Lake of Cocytus, a soul who had lost both ears was infuriated and 
"cried out": "Why doest thou stare at us so hard?" (1. 34) and another soul sneered at Dante: 
"who art thou, to go/ Through Antenora, kicking people's faces?/ Thou might'st be living, 
'twas so shred a blow." (1.88-90) and Dante goes on to show off his status as the arrogant 
Living Poet who is doing such a sacred job to record their pain and stories and who can 
make them famous: "Living I am/ do thou sing praises/ For that; if thou seek fame, I' 11 give 
thee it,/ Writing thy name with other notable cases" (1.91-93), the soul asked Dante simply to 
back off: "All I demand is just the opposite;/ Be off, and pester me no more." (1.94-95) He is 
simply not interested in being just another one among so many "other notable cases". Having 
failed, Dante then plays the role of the shameless journalist for he then grasped the scruff 
behind the soul's head and demanded imperiously: "Thou'lt either tell thy name, or have thy 
hair/ Stripped from thy scalp/ shred by shred." (1.98-99) The soul still resists to tell his story 
to this unsympathetic recorder and shouted: "Away, publish what thou wilt!" (1.112) In Canto 
XXXill, Circle IX, Dante the Poet demonstrates again like a nasty, relentless journalist who 
this time, instead of threat and violence employed in previous Canto, tempts and cheats Fra 
Alberigo to tell his story in the name of his profession (as a Poet, not unlike a 
journalist-writer): "TelJ me thy name: that is my price/ For help; and if I do not set thee fee,/ 
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May I be sent to the bottom of the ice." (Canto :xxxm, I. 115-117) Of course he does not 
help Fra Alberigo anything and being ungrateful, Dante says what Fra Alberigo has told him 
are "pure deceits" and thus useless for his writing (1. 282). 
This is a true nature about war photography which Olvido has learned that she chooses 
not to photograph people which is the exact act of regarding and recording the pain of others, 
a "touristic, world-anthologizing tasks of photography" (Sontag 1977, 11 0), or in Inferno as 
Virgil rebukes Dante's "gaze" at the suffering souls in Hell a task of cataloguin~': "Dost 
think that thou art bound/ To catalogue them all?" (Canto XXIX I. 7-8) This is a lesson 
Faulques has to learn later through his conversations with Ivo Markovic. The transformation 
power of hell of war has made Faulques a "predatory" photographer the way Dante gets 
obsessed with the suffering souls as potential stories for record. 
32 The provocation of representation of horror and pain in Goya: 
John Berger says "that paintings from the Palaeolithic period until our century have in 
common" is that "[ e ]very painted image announces: I have seen this, or, when the making of 
the image was incorporated into a tribal ritual: We have seen this. The this refers to the sight 
represented. Non-figurative art is no exception." (Berger 2001, 14) But the texts we examine 
in this thesis are more concerned not with the idea that I have seen this but to the reader: You 
are seeing this. Berger goes on to say: "The image pinched. In it there is a compassion that 
refutes indifference and is irreconcilable with any easy hope." (Berger 2001, 178) This is the 
key message in The Painter of Battles and Faulques's realization about his mural: He is not 
painting what he has seen but that the mural is an accusation to Fauqlues, Yes, you have seen 
this. It has a "return gaze" (see Berger's 2001 discussion). Painting his grand mural which 
aspires to describe the war of all wars, Faulques has drawn extensively from the "twenty-six 
centuries of the iconography of war" (8) from museums and galleries around the world, and 
Goya is one of the painters who Faulques has returned to his own Spanish tradition, to one of 
the most significant artists in Spanish painting history: Goya and his early nineteenth-century 
sequence of 83 etchings named The Disasters of War (made between 1810- 1820, published 
35 years after his death in 1863) about the atrocities of Napoleon invasion of Spain in 1808. 
Goya is unique because his art, Sontag says, "seems a turning point in the history of moral 
feelings and of sorrow- as deep, as original, as demanding. With Goya, a new standard of 
responsiveness to suffering enters art" and are "new subjects for fellow-feeling" (2004, 40). 
Goya's expressive phrases in script below each of the images are also comment on a 
"provocation" by the author. Sontag describes: "While the image, like every image, is an 
invitation to look, the caption, more often than not, insists on the difficulty of doing just that. 
A voice, presumably the artist's, badgers the viewer: can you bear to look at this? One 
caption declares: One can't look (No se puede mirar). Another says: This is bad (Esto es 
malo). Another retorts: This is worse (Esto es peor). Another shouts: This is the worst! (Esto 
es lo pear!). Another declaims: Barbarians! (Bcirbaros!). What madness! (Que locura!), cries 
another. And another: This is too much! (Fuerte cosa es!). And another: why? (Por que?)" 
(2004, 40). Olvido, contemplating on Gherardo Stamina's Thebaid, says it is a painting 
where ''you begin by being entertained, but little by little your smile freezes." (162) It aspires 
to achieve the same effect of what Joseph Helier wants to do in Catch-22 when the story 
turns from dark humour to the very dark, when the reader turns from being amused to 
ashamed. 
What Fauqlues has learned from Goya is Goya's power of the synthesis: "That the 
atrocities perpetrated by the French soldiers in Spain didn't happen as pictured - say, that the 
victim didn't look just so, that it didn't happen next to a tree - hardly disqualifies The 
Disasters of War. Goya's images are a synthesis. They claim: things like this happened." 
They "evoke" (Sontag 2004, 42). It reminds us again of the same conviction of O'Brien in 
the power of "story-truth" that it can be truer sometimes than "happening-truth", that it is 
necessary to "make up a few things" to get at a truth you will never get if told otherwise. 
33 Markovic says Faulques's 360 degree mural, and the whole watchtower, is in fact "like a 
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trap." (252) Not only are they entrapping like one of claustrophobia, they are also uncanny 
and ghostly as Faulques has painted onto the mural evil scenes and the victims which he has 
witnessed: "the images painted on the wall seemed to encircle him like ghosts" ( 159). 
Faulques has drawn Olvido into the mural too: ''Now Olvido was on the dark shore where 
shadows spoke with the barking of dogs and the howling of wolves." (161) "And also Olvido 
F errara, in all the corners and in all the lines of the vast landscape" (207). This entrapment 
shows that Faulques, even years after his immersion in wars, is still there. He never leaves 
that landscape, for landscape is a state of mind. Tim O'Brien equates the horror of war with 
headache and says: "You don't have to be in Nam to be in Nam" (Bruce 1998 
interview/article). Nam is a state of mind, a headache you can never get away from because 
it is inside your head, as he has said earlier in a 1995 interview: "All writers revisit terrain. 
Faulkner did it with the South. It's an emotional and geographical terrain that's given to us by 
life. Vietnam is there the way childhood is for me." ( qtd. in Karp's interview) In Cacciato, 
O'Brien has expressed this idea into Paul Berlin who also declares: "Paris is not a place. It is 
a state of mind." We have already discussed in Chapter 2 that Paris is not simply referring to 
a physical place, nor is it simply a symbol of civilization and peace. To Paul Berlin and many 
of the American soldiers in Vietnam, Paris also embeds the past glory - Paris of 1945 - and 
their innocence of waging a right war. Critic Timmerman puts the argument further to 
suggest that while Paris is the Utopia for Cacciato, its laden meaning for Paul Berlin may be 
the United States: "[Paul Berlin's] primary reality is elsewhere, in what the infantrymen in 
Vietnam called 'the World.' The World is a state of mind - an absence of fear and conflict, an 
idealized place that really exists nowhere. For Cacciato the imaginary utopia is Paris; for the 
average infantryman like Paul Berlin, it is simply the United States." (Timmerman 2000, 1 02) 
The journey to the West (Paris) is also, Bates notes: "the archetypal home of every American, 
the 'Far West"' (Bates 1987, 276). Paul Berlin's capacity to be at different places (the 
Observation Tower and the exotic cities out there) at the same time is also a matter of state of 
mind and it involves only "a movement of consciousness in and out." (86) This is in the 
same way that peace is also a state of mind; as Paul Berlin observes in an ordinary day of a 
Paris street scene: "People chatting while infants slept in carriages, students reading under 
trees, the order of things. Simple courtesies. 'Merci,' people said. '11 n 'y a pas de quoi,' was 
the answer, and he learned these things. He looked for meanings. Peace was shy. That was 
one lesson: Peace never bragged. If you didn't look for it, it wasn't there." (Cacciato 273) 
34 The "War is game" model is already evident in war fiction on the First World War. See 
Wussow's The Nightmare of History (1998). He discusses how Virginia Woolf "frequently 
compares the activities of war [WWI] to child's play" (109) and how "the irony of dimension, 
the comparison of world war to an 'idiotic game,' distinguishes her comments on war. War is 
a game both ludicrous and horrifying." (110) Elaine Scarry is another critic who has also 
commented on the "obscenity of war equals game" equation. 
35 Some critics have applied a Dantesque reading of Catch-22 and Going After Cacciato 
(See Doskow 1967; Lelan 1981), but The Painter of Battles is perhaps the best novel for 
such reading because it is explicitly worded in the novel that Olvido calls Faulques her 
"silent Virgil". 
36 Male Impotence in terms of sexual impotence: Faulques and Paul Berlin, for example, are 
handsome and attractive to females, but still, Paul Berlin can only "almost made love" to 
Sarking Aung Wan because he thinks she is too innocent and beautiful to violate, in the same 
way that Faulques who thinks that he himself does not deserve Olvido, that making love with 
Olvido is "as beautiful as a dream." (115) The ending of the novel again brings up this issue 
when we see Faulques unable to make love with Carmen Elsken when she comes to the 
watchtower to see the mural, and he, like the sexually disabled Mr. Prufrock, thinks there 
would be time and chance if only he wanted to, denying to acknowledge his very impotence: 
"And Faulques knew that if he took one step towards her, lifted his hand and slipped those 
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straps from her tanned shoulders, the dress would fall to her feet with nothing to stop it, and 
the external light would gild her naked body. He felt a slight shiver. Fleeting. There is a time 
for everything, he told himself. And this wasn't. It couldn't be. He looked away, towards the 
floor, and lifted his shoulders slightly. Really, he thought with amazement, it wasn 't hard at 
all to leave things as they were. Not now. So he walked past the woman" (237). 
Even the sexually active Yossarian in Catch-22 who almost has sexual relationship or 
fantasies with every woman present in the novel is the same, as his "fish dream" as well as 
the Chaplain who says to Yossarian reveal: "Hasn't it ever occurred to you that in your 
promiscuous pursuit of women you are merely trying to assuage your subconscious tears of 
sexual impotence?" (343) There are two forms of male impotence: as a man -()f course- and 
also as a father. Starkey in We Bombed thus undergoes a strong double sense of male 
impotence for frrst, his failure as a lover of Ruth, as a man, and also his failure to fulfill the 
role of a father which even makes him despised in the end by his own actor-son. The sense 
of male impotence is manifest by a sense of the "absent father" in Tim O'Brien 's stories 
(Timmerman 2000). Paul Berlin frequently escapes back to his warm memory about his 
camping with his father in Winconsin or their last night along the Des Moines River for 
consolation and a feeling of certainty and security, secretly showing his wish to become the 
innocent young boy protected by his father. This is why, as many critics have pointed out, 
Tim O'Brien has a major theme of "cowardice" in almost all his war novels discussing the 
importance of the affinity and solidarity among the male community - comradeship, 
brotherhood, manhood. But I would argue that O'Brien treats the topic not so much as to 
affirm male strength and masculinity than, on the contrary, to expose the very sense of male 
impotence. 
37 See Derrida (2000) where he discusses the relationship between Christ's Passion and 
testimony. 
38 Both Yossarian and Doe Daneeka best exemplifies the "Why me?" mentality. Doe 
Daneeka - a doctor who should embody love and fraternity and selflessness - is concerned 
with only his own problems and he shuns off the pain of the others: "Oh, I' m not 
complaining. I know there's a war on. I know a lot of people are going to have to suffer for 
us to win it. But why must I be one of them? [ ... ] I don 't want to make sacrifices. I wan.t to 
make dough." (36) When Wintergreen talks about the issue of cowardice: "But suppose 
everybody on our side felt that way", Yossarian gives the famous quote demonstrating the 
"Why me?" mentality: "Then I'd certainly be a damned fool to feel any other way." (119) 
Indeed everyone in the modern day is doing the same thinking that if he can remain a 
spectator and pretend that war is there not here it will not exist: "outside the hospital there 
was still nothing funny going on. The only thing going on was a war, and no one seemed to 
notice but Yossarian and Dunbar. And when Yossarian tried to remind people, they drew 
away from him and thought he was crazy." ( 18) 
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